Network-centric peace: an application of network theory to violent conflicts. by Kramer, Reik
	   1	  
	  
	  
The	   London	   School	   of	   Economics	   and	   Political	  
Science	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Network-­‐centric	   Peace:	   An	   Application	   of	   Network	  
Theory	  to	  Violent	  Conflicts.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Reik	  Christian	  Kramer	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	   thesis	   submitted	   to	   the	   Department	   of	  International	   Relations	   of	   the	   London	   School	   of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science	   for	   the	  degree	  of	  Doctor	  of	  Philosophy,	  London,	  October	  2014.	  	   	  
	   2	  
Declaration	  
	  
	  I	   certify	   that	   the	   thesis	   I	   have	   presented	   for	   examination	   for	   the	   MPhil/PhD	  degree	  of	  the	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science	  is	  solely	  my	  own	  work	  other	  than	  where	  I	  have	  clearly	  indicated	  that	  it	   is	  the	  work	  of	  others	  (in	  which	   case	   the	   extent	   of	   any	   work	   carried	   out	   jointly	   by	   me	   and	   any	   other	  person	  is	  clearly	  identified	  in	  it).	  	   The	  copyright	  of	  this	  thesis	  rests	  with	  the	  author.	  Quotation	  from	  it	  is	  permitted,	  provided	  that	  full	  acknowledgement	  is	  made.	  This	  thesis	  may	  not	  be	  reproduced	  without	  my	  prior	  written	  consent.	  
	  I	  warrant	  that	  this	  authorisation	  does	  not,	   to	  the	  best	  of	  my	  belief,	   infringe	  the	  rights	  of	  any	  third	  party.	  
	   I	  declare	  that	  my	  thesis	  consists	  of	  83,395	  words.	  	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	   3	  
 
Acknowledgments  
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to Dr. Sue Onslow, who provided unwavering support and 
advice in the researching and writing of this piece. Her kindness, curiosity and 
incredible work ethic is humbling, and serve as the ideal I strive to reach. It is the 
quality and rigour of her academic work that encouraged me to pursue this degree, 
and her generosity that made it possible. Thank you.  
 
 
Professor Christopher Coker supervised me with extraordinary attention and patience 
and I greatly value his trust, advice and support. It has been quite a journey from the 
first drafts of my research proposal to the final thesis, but is has been the scenic route. 
I hope you enjoyed it as much as I did and do.  
 
 
I would like to thank my parents who instilled in me a sense of marvel and curiosity, 
and were always there when that got me into trouble. You were, and are, a great 
source of inspiration, strength and love, and have nursed not just one but all of your 
three children through university and to a PhD.  
 
 
I also would like to thank my sisters who could not be more different from me, yet 
blood is thicker than water. I am proud of you.  
 
 
Thank you to Hilary Parker, Alison Carter, Martina Langer and Tiha Franulovic. It is 
you who keep the show on the road and have at some stage not just rescued me, but 
every single student passing through the department.  
 
 
My gratitude also goes out to family and friends, with too many to name. Especially 
though to Sonia and Alan, Joe and Mary, Ulla and Bill, Sabrina and Heddy, the Frey 
family, Edoardo, Matthieu, John, Andrew, Alex and Amy and last but not least Holle, 
Olli, Vivi, Lisa, Kai, Feliks and Andy.  
 
 
Finally, and most of all, to Joey. My wife, best friend, companion, confidante and 
fidus Achates. Zusammen.  
	   	  
	   4	  
Abstract	  
 
 
 
Social networks are complex adaptive systems made up of nodes - human beings - 
and the links between those nodes. The links in any given network provide 
individuals with goods and services necessary for survival, including the quest for 
meaning, narrative and identity. This thesis argues that social networks are not rapidly 
increasing in complexity (a common view) but that the process of making and 
breaking links, and the ability to observe and document such processes, has been 
accelerated and simplified by modern technology. It is this ability to observe the 
dynamics within networks, networks that are subject to constant and on-going change 
and evolution, which makes the study of networks useful. 
 
Most approaches to social network analysis focus on spoken and written 
communication along links between the nodes, but shared suffering or execution of 
violence, or the simple association with a narrative involving violence, is a powerful 
dynamic in networks. It is a dynamic which has thus far been largely overlooked, but 
one which has important implications for international relations. Violence creates a 
shared identity and provides guidance for the behaviour of individuals, but also 
destroys life.  
 
The thesis analyses the case studies of Lebanon and Afghanistan from these 
perspectives. Whilst most studies on the Lebanese Civil War argue that the outbreak 
of violent conflict was unavoidable due to domestic and regional antagonisms, these 
studies do not explain why and how the war ended in 1990 in circumstances where 
the same factors continued to exist yet suddenly with a relative absence of large-scale 
violence. In contrast, violence has plagued Afghanistan since the 1970s and shows no 
signs of abating. Violence here is not tied to a specific conflict but has become the 
defining form of communication between the various network actors.  
 
Network theory can be used to gain a deeper understanding of the causes of violent 
conflict as well as, importantly, the forces that maintain or limit violence. Once these 
forces are understood, they can be utilised in an effort to change the prevailing 
dynamics of violence within a network, and to initiate a more successful approach to 
peacebuilding efforts within violent conflicts.  	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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  
 
1.	  Introduction	  
 
What is most remarkable about the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005 is not what happened, but what did not 
happen. Hariri was one of the country’s most influential politicians and wealthiest 
individuals – he was a central figure in the political and economic landscape of the 
nation. It would not have been surprising if his execution, by a suicide bomber using 
1.8 tons of TNT which not only killed Hariri but also resulted in the deaths of a 
further 22 innocent bystanders, triggered an immediate and severe violent backlash.. 
The assassination could easily have triggered a chain of violent reactions, and 
Lebanon could have been plunged back into the all-out civil war that destroyed much 
of its urban centres between 1978 and 1990. The perpetrators have still not been 
identified - an incomplete and still on-going investigation into the incident is being 
run, not by Lebanese bodies but by a UN special tribunal, and the matter has still not 
been brought to a conclusion. Hariri was not only a very influential political leader, 
but had also made much of his financial wealth through what are alleged to have been 
corrupt and illegal property transactions related to Solidere, a private company tasked 
with rebuilding Beirut following the civil war. Hariri had emerged on the stage of 
Lebanese politics thanks to his personal friendship with, and financial support of, the 
Saudi royal family, especially the Saudi King Khaled. He is also credited with having 
played a major role in the development of the Taif Accord of 1989 that led to the 
1990 Taif agreement, commonly acknowledged as having ended the Lebanese Civil 
War.  
 
Despite all of this, instead of provoking further violence, the violent and ruthless 
assassination of Rafik Hariri acted as a unifying force of grief within Lebanon. Rather 
than deepening the divisions that existed between the different factions it served as a 
catalyst that united them in joining forces and ultimately led, as part of the ‘Cedar 
Revolution’, to the withdrawal of Syrian forces that had been based in the country 
since 1976 (Knudsen & Kerr, 2012).  
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This incident is not the only recent occasion in which Lebanon has demonstrated a 
remarkable resilience to economic, social, sectarian and political stresses. The brutal 
and on-going civil war that began in Syria in 2011 has all but destroyed Lebanon’s 
most important trading partner, and has led to a general weakening of the economy in 
the region (Carpenter, 2013). It also has, via the Shiite and Iranian supported 
Hezbollah, polarised the domestic political debate. With Hezbollah presenting a “state 
within the state” (Azani, 2009, p. 158) in the south of the country, and Iran having a 
strong cultural and educational influence in Lebanon (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008), the 
threat of the Lebanese government being pulled into the fighting of the Syrian Civil 
War is ever present. Add to this the influx of an estimated 1.1 million Syrian refugees 
(UNHCR, 2015) into a society of only 4.5 million Lebanese, which is having 
considerable impact on the social services, the education system and employment, and 
one might assume that Lebanon must be in a highly volatile and instable situation. 
After all, political and sectarian disagreements, economic and demographic shifts and 
the country’s geographic location (in a region where high levels of tension often turn 
into violent and protracted conflicts) are often put forward as primary explanations for 
the outbreak of Lebanon’s own civil war (Khalaf, 2002) (Traboulsi, 2007). In fact, the 
general absence of major violent conflict in Lebanon becomes even more perplexing 
when assessed in light of the country’s executive, legislative and judicative structures 
and institutions. Far from presenting a unified and strong government with reliable 
access to resources, a functioning bureaucracy and a solid monopoly of power, the 
social, economic, sectarian and political divisions and rifts are visible in all levels and 
functions of the state (Yacoubian, 2009) (Najem, 2012).  
 
Yet, with the horrors of the civil war lying a distant 25 years in the past, it certainly is 
no longer sheer exhaustion, nor memories of destruction and brutality, that prevent 
the outbreak of another war in the country. There is an absence of plausible 
explanation as to why Lebanon has remained largely at peace and has not descended 
into an all-out civil war, and the reasons beg for further study. This is especially so in 
light of the many situations around the world where violence on a large scale 
continues to dominate the discourse.  
 
In these areas it is not uncommon that cease-fires and peace agreements are at least 
initially unsuccessful, or we see negotiations subsisting over a long period of time 
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without result, including many attempts at ‘peace’ leading to renewed and even 
intensified hostilities (E. Newman & Richmond, 2006a). Even today’s most powerful 
nations and their military, political and diplomatic organisations are often unable to 
terminate violent conflicts. Led into concepts with neat names such as ‘state-building’ 
or ‘peace-building’, their efforts often appear to actually prolong or even reinforce 
grievances and hostilities. The combination of local and international factors in 
prolonging and amplifying a violent conflict is especially visible in Afghanistan, 
where despite considerable international resources and funds large scale violence 
continues to plague the country and its people (Cordesman, 2013).  
 
Assassinations, for example of Vice-President Haji Abdul Qadir in 2002 (Halliday, 
2002), or former President Burhanuddin Rabbani in 2011 (Nissenbaum, 2011) have 
been credited with triggering major armed offensives or military campaigns in the 
country (Thiessen, 2014). With the persistent and frequently erupting violence 
between a number of local, regional, national and international actors, Afghanistan 
appears to share little in common with Lebanon. Yet, a closer look reveals many 
similarities: they both lack a stable, potent and legitimate central government and 
political system; both possess uneven economic development with the population 
divided into a small group of ‘haves’ and a much larger majority of ‘have nots’; 
corruption and nepotism is rampant and organised crime, for example in smuggling, 
kidnapping and capital crimes, is rife. Just as the Levant is a politically unstable 
region, so is Central Asia.  
 
Despite its obvious poverty and underdevelopment in much of the country, 
Afghanistan has been central to policies of some of the world’s economically, 
politically and militarily most powerful countries. It has received billions of dollars in 
foreign aid – both through public and private organisations – and yet remains a hotbed 
and fertile ground for violence. Observers struggle to explain this continuation of 
violence that appears to have taken hold of Afghanistan, especially in its urban 
centres (Kilcullen, 2009), transport infrastructure (Misdag, 2006) and the border 
region to Pakistan (Shaikh, 2009). 
 
While Afghanistan has a 250 year-long history as a nation-state, those who fight on 
Afghan soil often claim allegiance to a large number of different actors – both foreign 
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and domestic. Throughout its history, and at present, much of the country is not ruled 
by a strong central government but rather through a complex and constantly changing 
network of regional, professional, ethnic, family and other groups. It it said that 
shared language and customs, patronage and land ownership relations and, in effect, 
local self-rule are the factors which have kept the country unified as a nation, but not 
as a state (Barfield, 2011).  
 
Similarly to Lebanon, Afghanistan is situated in a volatile and politically unstable 
region where historic and contemporary empires, ideologies and ideas struggle for 
influence and strategic control. Its strong affinity to stories of conquest and war, vast 
natural resources, trade routes of legal and illicit goods and strong sense of 
identification of its people to both nomadic and settled ethnicities, make the entire 
region prone to conflict (Kremmer, 2002). 
 
Whilst most foreign actors, for example NATO and India, or Russia and Iran, 
promote the notion of a strong and centralised Afghan state centred on Kabul, this 
view has largely failed to bear fruit. To the contrary: this strategy appears to alienate 
Afghans themselves and has worsened the situation (Barfield, 2011). This is 
especially so since the power structure of today’s Afghan state is associated with 
foreign interests and interference. Rather than being part of a narrative that Afghans 
can identify with, and feel they can benefit from, they are often at best ambivalent, 
especially in rural areas and areas distant from the capital. 
 
While Lebanon appears to defy the odds, portraying a remarkable resilience towards 
what could be seen as an irresistible descent into civil war once more, Afghanistan 
has, at least for the past half century, failed to end the endemic violence. What these 
two countries highlight is the weakness of many key concepts employed by 
contemporary international relations. Already ambiguous and disputed concepts such 
as ‘war’ and ‘peace’ demonstrate their limitations: is Lebanon at war or at peace? Is 
all of Afghanistan at war all of the time? Many observers would point to indications 
of both or, most likely, reject the polarity these concepts demand, and argue for a 
neither-nor, hybrid or why not an entirely different approach?  
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The neat concepts of ‘war’, ‘peace’ and ‘security’ begin to unravel when applied to 
individual human beings who are living in the regions being analysed. There is ample 
evidence that for many Afghans the choice between war and peace, between 
supporting the nascent central government or cooperating with local strongmen, or 
between benefitting from the production of opium or finding other forms of providing 
financial sustenance, is often fluid and dependant on the circumstances. During the 
day it makes sense to support the government with the armed forces that are allied to 
it, while at night circumstances might be such that one provides shelter to an 
insurgent. To classify these individuals as either supporters or opponents of the course 
favoured by the central government and its international allies is not only 
counterproductive but impossible (Kilcullen, 2009). 
 
Rather than pointing to hierarchical, absolute and state-centric dynamics, the pictures 
painted in Lebanon, Afghanistan and elsewhere present a complex and interdependent 
reality. We see structure and behaviour being adapted to the situation and the 
challenges faced, rather than adherence to predefined, insular, predictable and linear 
processes.  
 
 
2.	  Complexity	  and	  Complex	  Systems	  
 
There are no agreed definitions of ‘complexity’, or ‘complex systems’ (Bousquet, 
2012), but there is broad agreement that non-linear phenomena and an inability to 
observe proportionality between input and output, indicate complexity. Also linked 
are situations where small changes have major impact (Mitleton-Kelly, 2000), which 
in turn is linked to bifurcation, explained by Urry as follows: “systems reach points of 
bifurcation when their behaviour and future pathways become unpredictable and new 
higher order, more differentiated, structures may emerge” (Urry, 2003, p. 28). Life is 
thus “the balance between forces of order and forces of disorder, between fixed rigid 
structures and chaotic motion” (Bousquet, 2009, p. 177). Conversely, any system that 
is either too rigid or too disorderly will either adapt to a more sustainable state, or 
cease to exist. 
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Many of these observations were conceived in the natural sciences where they are 
now, following initial reluctance from the scientific community, accepted as 
fundamental components necessary to understand phenomena. They are slowly being 
incorporated into the social sciences, but there remains a culture of preferring a more 
‘Newtonian’ approach; one that relies on causality, aims to distil and to apply 
absolute laws and reject non-linearity (Byrne, 2001). 
 
In complex systems there is a multitude of simple processes running parallel and 
impacting each other; the complexity emerges as a result of this rather than due to the 
underlying processes themselves:  
“[W]henever you look at very complicated systems in physics or in biology, 
you generally find that the basic components and the basic laws are quite 
simple; the complexity arises because you have a great many of these simple 
components interacting simultaneously […] the complexity is actually in the 
organization - the myriad possible ways that the components of the system can 
interact” (Stephen Wolfram quoted in Waldrop, 1992, p. 86).  
Complex systems are adaptive; this means that they can alter their behaviour through 
positive feedback loops. In contrast to hierarchical and linear structures, where a 
change or alteration in process or behaviour has to travel from the top down, complex 
adaptive systems are able to incorporate challenges within, and become more efficient 
and resilient in the process.  
 
Rather than relying on a central body to control and moderate a system, and the 
processes that are taking place within it, it is the interaction, competition and 
cooperation between individual bodies that make up the system itself. Thus any 
coherent behaviour of the system is an expression of this rather than that of a 
controlling authority (Holland, 1992). In order to study these kinds of systems, this 
means that: 
“[W]hen dealing with complex systems in which neither structure nor agency 
take precedence, in which the different constitutive parts are tightly 
interconnected and where borders with the broader environment are porous 
and ill-defined, it is largely futile to seek either to outline linear causal chains 
or to assign any final causality to a given phenomenon. Rather, one should 
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strive to identify the points at which feedback loops both drive the emergence 
and maintain the coherence of such systems.” (Bousquet, 2012, p. 351) 
This implies that an analysis of international relations relying on absolute concepts is 
prone to the weaknesses of what Weber calls “ideal type”. Because of the myriad of 
different actions happening at the same time the ability of the observer is limited, as 
well as being subject to bias and accentuation (Shils & Finch, 2011). 
 
As stated, these patterns of complexity and complex adaptive systems were first 
discovered in the natural sciences. When observing weather patterns in order to 
deduce a more accurate forecasting, it turned out that the same data computed through 
the same logarithms would provide entirely different outcomes. The proverbial 
butterfly flapping its wings at the Amazon River and causing a thunderstorm in New 
York is in fact more feasible than it seems – despite vast amounts of data and 
calculating power, the weather cannot be predicted much more reliably today than 
before the invention of the computer. This highlights the difficulty of extracting 
causality chains, as well as the weakness of the reductionist approach that argues that 
a system is nothing but the aggregation of its constituent parts (Gleick, 1998).  
 
Initially the scientific community was hostile towards complexity and chaos theory 
and unwilling to embrace it as a valid discipline. However, today it is accepted not 
only as a phenomenon but as a fundamental component in the emergence and 
existence of life. From evolution theory, climate studies and quantum physics, to 
astronomy and biology, the view of the world as a network of networks, where 
linearity and causality are rare, if not non-existent, is widely accepted. Recently, the 
social sciences have also begun to apply complexity theory to the study of human 
affairs, and with the explosion of digital communication its effects can be observed as 
never before (Byrne, 2001) (Bolotin, Tur, & Yanovsky, 2013).  
 
 
3.	  Networks	  
 
Assuming that a complex adaptive system is a network – which Manuel Castells 
defines as “a set of interconnected nodes” (Castells, p. 19) - then a focus on emergent 
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properties1 will provide a much more useful concept in the analysis of phenomena. In 
other words it is the marriage of complexity – interactions that take place in non-
linear and parallel fashion – and networks that allows the concept of ‘complex-
adaptive networks’ to emerge. 
 
Complex-adaptive networks have specific properties and have shown themselves to 
be the basis of many natural (Winfree, 1980) (Nowak & May, 1992) and social 
phenomena (Milgram, 1967) (Kochen, 1989) (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In order to 
understand a system it is important to observe interactions within it, and the impact of 
those interactions, rather than to merely focus on individual actors and their capacity 
and potentials. Deleuze et al. call this “assemblage theory” - it focuses on the 
interaction between individual actors, and the effects these interactions have, rather 
than the actors themselves. Social networks, or “social assemblages” are objects in 
themselves: by causally affecting their component parts, i.e. the individual ‘nodes’, 
and providing boundaries and guidance for their actions, the connections or links 
between actors become their own entities (Deleuze, Guattari, & Massumi, 2011).  
 
Amartya Sen points out that all human beings possess multiple identities that emerge 
through different associations of the individual (Sen, 2006). Based on shared 
understandings, patterns of behaviour, ideas, motivations and forms of 
communication, every identity is a network in which individuals are linked to each 
other. The establishment and maintenance of connections to other nodes, or 
individuals, requires energy, and the more stress an individual is faced with the less 
he or she is able make such connections. For example, a violent conflict causes many 
links to disappear while at the same time strengthening those judged to be most 
important for survival (Berg Harpviken, 2009). The stress faced by the nodes of a 
network will impact their behaviour and, in turn, alter the network or networks they 
belong to. The less secure an individual feels the more he or she will seek to 
strengthen his or her association to certain networks. In turn, this will impact the 
behaviour and performance of the networks themselves. Thus, all phenomena have to 
be analysed both from the perspective of the individual and the relevant social 
networks (Bauman, 2007).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Properties	  of	  the	  whole	  that	  cannot	  be	  deduced	  from	  the	  constituent	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When applied to international relations, and more specifically a violent conflict 
between political bodies, the outcome is that one cannot simply analyse the conflict 
by comparing the military, economic, social or other resources of the belligerents. 
Instead, the conflict has to be approached through studying the interactions between 
the different individual nodes that make up the actors themselves (DeLanda, 2006). 
 
History provides ample ammunition to support this approach: from ancient times until 
today, many military campaigns have ended not because the initially most potent and 
powerful actor exerted his power and claimed victory. Rather, seemingly unrelated, 
random and often uncontrollable factors and events (such as the weather, terrain or 
epidemics) have made themselves known and had huge impact. Even more 
confusingly, events taking place far away from the battlefield, such as public opinion, 
social cohesion or natural disaster, have turned out to be far more decisive than 
military actions and resources. Thus it is not surprising that military planners and 
strategists were among the earliest to adopt the emergence of complexity and 
complex-adaptive networks from science and nature to human interactions.  
 
The concept of ‘Network-centric Warfare’ emerged following the end of the Cold 
War, but was driven more by the development of digital communication such as the 
internet, satellite technology and remote controlled weapons systems (Cebrowski & 
Garstka, 1998). Further developed as ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) it aims 
to place networks at the centre of future military engagements (Lonsdale, 2004). By 
focusing on technological developments, especially in Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT), and the changes in human behaviour caused by 
the emergence of these inventions, it argues that the world is undergoing radical 
changes. Today’s societies differ greatly to those of a mere generation or two ago, in 
which thanks to technology the centrality of the individual is now being replaced with 
the network (Castells, 2006). 
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3.1	  Programming	  networks	  
 
Because of the underlying nature of complexity it is futile to try and assess 
developments based on an analysis of the nodes that make up a network. Not only do 
individuals create and abandon links on a constant basis, with the result that the 
instant a map is created it may already be inaccurate and useless, but this method is 
also unable to reliably describe the nature of the connections. While most social 
network analysis relies on conscious and deliberate cooperation for the mutual benefit 
of those involved (see for example Kardushin, 2012), scrutinising the nature and 
quality of relations can only be done in a very limited manner. Early approaches to 
network theory highlight this (Milgram, 1967; Pool & Kochen, 1978; Verbrugge, 
1977) (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Not only is it difficult to qualitatively and 
quantitatively analyse the links in social networks, but also it is impossible to reliably 
predict which links will have the strongest impact on future developments. 
 
Because of the complexity of social networks, attempting to discover causality chains 
is futile; too many processes take place in a parallel fashion so this approach only 
works with hindsight to distil how a certain situation has emerged. Castells 
approaches the issue by promoting the role of what he calls ‘programmes’: since no 
power relation takes place in isolation, or in a vacuum, they depend on the existence 
of a form of communication shared by all actors involved:  
“[N]etworks do not have fixed boundaries; they are open-ended and multi-
edged, and their expansion or contraction depends on the compatibility or 
competition between the interests and values programmed into each network 
and the interests and values programmed into the networks they come into 
contact with in their expansionary movement. […] A network is defined by 
the program that assigns its goals and its role of performance.” (Castells, 2009, 
pp. 19-20) 
Therefore, a network’s programme has two purposes: firstly, it describes the 
network’s purpose and with this its boundaries. Secondly, it illustrates the form of 
communication that is used within it. Because this approach looks at the forces that 
keep a network together and unified, instead of focusing on the role of individual 
nodes, it is able to allow the observation of a network even if the components that 
make it up change and evolve. It also accounts for the non-permanent borders and 
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non-homogenous nature of networks: because programmes are not exclusive every 
individual can belong to different networks at the same time.  
 
Lebanon can be analysed using this approach: instead of relying on abstract and 
absolute limits, such as geographic borders, it allows individuals to identify with a 
programme. Rather than to try and define ‘Lebanese identity’, a Castellian 
programme of Lebanon would argue for the existence of a network defined by a 
shared purpose and form of communication. The shared purpose is to provide 
identity, safety and belonging, both in abstract emotional terms and for the 
satisfaction of concrete requirements for survival, for example food and shelter. By 
relying on a shared form of communication – language, music, art, symbols and 
rituals – it allows the exchange of ideas and provides the framework in which power 
relations can take place. Even someone living overseas and outside of the geographic 
entity will be able to belong to this network and identify with ‘Lebanon’.  
 
Every form of interaction depends on a form of language that all actors need to share. 
While spoken and written language may be the first to come to mind, it still requires 
some sort of earlier mutual agreement regarding grammar, lexis and syntax. Symbols, 
art and rituals, for example flags, paintings and ceremonies, equally serve to 
communicate between nodes. This is the avenue on which power relations take place. 
Because every action takes places in a network, and conversely no action happens in a 
vacuum, it is the programme of a network that determines the kind and form of 
interaction. Every observation and any kind of behaviour – both social and otherwise 
– will be interpreted under the lens of a network’s programme. A single spoken word, 
the waving of a coloured cloth, the drawing of a simple symbol or quick physical 
contact, will cause a reaction. Whether the action is seen as benevolent or aggressive, 
constructive or destructive, integrative or disintegrative depends on its interpretation 
through the programme in which it takes place. Each network has its own programme, 
and just as the shape and function of a network changes, so does the programme 
evolve and adapt.  
 
Much of Castells’ work focuses on the function and impact of the political discourse 
through media in technologically highly developed societies. For example, he 
highlights the role of key individuals or “gatekeepers” in media, politics or 
	   19	  
advertising within a particular network – those gatekeepers work as filters or 
moderators for the kind and range of processed information (Castells, 2001) (Castells, 
2009) (Castells, 2010b). Yet Castells’ contribution to the debate becomes much more 
valuable when the scope and application of his work is widened to embrace societies 
outside the technologically highly developed cluster. If societies are defined as 
complex adaptive networks the same dynamics apply to all. 
 
In Afghanistan, for example, a trader reaching small communities may provide word-
of-mouth information to the people of a remote village. In the absence of a formal 
position, and possibly even unintentionally – at times even involuntarily, this may 
render the trader not only the sole provide of information on events outside the small 
community, but also make him a gatekeeper and increase his ability to shape opinion. 
Equally obscure, yet potentially very powerful, could be the work of a young Al 
Qaida sympathizer living in the United Kingdom: thanks to his skills in programming 
websites he can, without any formal or physical connection to the rest of the network, 
function as a key node in the organisation. By helping to broadcast the programme on 
which Al Qaida is based, he can expand the organisation’s network.  
 
The mantra ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’ may, on first 
impression, sound cynical since it appears to offer justification for destructive and 
often murderous behaviour. Yet it also highlights the role of the convictions, 
motivations and ideologies of the individual. Someone growing up in a society marred 
by war, violence and instability will understandably feel much less reluctant to revert 
to use those tactics he or she observes in daily life. Based on extensive fieldwork 
David Kilcullen is able to point out the different motivations for people joining 
insurgencies; often the reason to pick up arms and join local battles and skirmishes is 
found within local dynamics rather than national or even international narratives 
{Kilcullen, 2009 #118}. When observing the impact of nuclear weapons on human 
affairs, the physicist Werner Heisenberg uses the findings of his research as a natural 
scientist to reach similar results: just like the uncertainty principle he discovered (also 
known as the ‘Indeterminacy Principle’), which describes the limitations of an 
observer in measuring certain conditions in quantum physics, Heisenberg warns of the 
impossibility of differentiating between objective and subjective observations of 
social phenomena (Coker, 2010). While Christopher Coker concedes the limitations 
	   20	  
of the applicability of physical laws to the social sciences, he is right to point out that 
with the expanding role of information, and information technology, in today’s world, 
the more useful an awareness of the limitations of observations of social phenomena 
becomes. Heisenberg would argue that the distinction between freedom fighter and 
terrorist would be irrelevant because the impossibility of providing a definite answer 
prevents it from being of use. Instead, he would point to the importance of observing 
the entirety of a system – a network – in order to try and extract regularities which can 
help to gain further insights into complex networks.  
 
The military strategist Carl von Clausewitz wrote his seminal book ‘On War’ much 
before the concepts of quantum physics, complex-adaptive systems and networks 
were introduced into the natural sciences. Perhaps the most prominent theorist on war, 
he argues that at the heart of the idea of war is not the military alone but a 
‘remarkable’ trinity:  
“As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a 
paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, 
which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and 
probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element 
of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason 
alone. The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second 
the commander and his army; the third the government.“ (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 
30) 
In this sense, Clausewitz was much ahead of his times; rather than to subject war to a 
linear and absolute paradigm for analysis, he highlights its complexity; firstly by 
showing that the concept of war is approached in a very different manner by each of 
the three entities he points out above, and secondly by later highlighting that the 
conduct of war and warfare is subject to incomplete information, action and reaction 
and uncertainty – in other words complexity.  
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4.	  Conflicts,	  power	  and	  complexity	  
 
To fight wars and make peace are some of the most powerful and prominent human 
activities. This is evidenced by the many books that chronicle the past against a 
framework involving the threat of battles, skirmishes, wars and peace agreements, but 
the two terms are common not only in the political and military realm but many 
others. History as a science is more often than not a narration of wars, violence and 
destruction, with both ‘war’ and ‘peace’ being words and concepts used daily. 
Confusingly however they are often used outside the historical or political realms. 
‘Peace’ is invoked by demonstrators demanding disarmament – yet aren’t they at 
peace right now? Even more prominently, ‘war’ is used to describe economic 
conflicts (‘price wars’), sporting events and heated conversations (‘war of words’), 
and both words often emerge in political speech to indicate, in an Orwellian fashion, 
the exact opposite. Politicians who call for a ‘war on drugs’ actually want to prevent 
the destructive power of illicit substances. A ‘war on terror’ is more of a populist 
rallying cry, rather than the signal to physically pick up weapons and fight (Lakoff, 
2004).  
 
Even those instances that serve as undisputed examples of the concepts of ‘war’ and 
‘peace’ also demonstrate the inability of establishing clear distinctions between them. 
The First World War certainly was a war, yet historians continue to debate on who or 
what caused it, and struggle to mark the specific incident from which onwards there 
was no longer ‘peace’ and, accordingly, when the war started. There were formal 
declarations of war, but hostilities between the antagonists started much earlier. Only 
with hindsight is it possible to try and identify the event in which a system suddenly 
collapsed, and with the benefit of access to archives and further information, is it 
possible to make an argument for when the perceived stability of peace was replaced 
with the apparent chaos of war (C. Clark, 2013). Interestingly enough, the discovery 
of quantum physics that heralded the end of the ‘clockwork universe’, coincided with 
the breakdown of the political order in the early 19th century. However, it was not 
until the emergence of chaos theory in the 1950s and 1960s that this was also applied 
to the macroscopic world (Kautz, 2001). Just as much as these discoveries in the 
natural sciences surpassed the Newtonian linear approach and allowed for a deeper 
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understanding of the dynamics that govern physics and biology, so can they also shed 
a light on human affairs (Byrne, 2001) (Shils & Finch, 2011).  
 
Say, for example, a Lebanese individual reaps financial benefit from a trade deal he 
has made with a French customer. He uses part of those benefits to purchase weapons 
from a foreign arms dealer, and he may aim to use those weapons only to protect 
himself and his family. Yet he also has a desire to protect his newfound wealth, and 
this will change the power relations between the different nodes of the networks he is 
linked to. Several observations can be made here: this transaction is taking place at a 
junction of a multitude of networks – the local neighbourhood in Lebanon, the 
commercial network to France, and the links to an arms dealer who himself is linked 
to other entities. The initially commercial transaction changes power relations, which 
then subsequently trigger changes to power relations in the other networks to which 
the Lebanese trader is linked; the complexity of the situation emerges. Furthermore, 
many other processes and interactions take place in a parallel and non-linear fashion - 
reverberations are difficult if not impossible to predict accurately.  
 
The initial transaction may trigger unintended consequences that ultimately become 
detrimental to the power capacity of the instigator. For example, a neighbour might 
observe the transaction and copy the method – the neighbour will do it at a decreased 
cost (because, for example, he does not have to spend time analysing the market to 
find a buyer for his product), he will pursue a positive feedback loop and produce an 
even more efficient structure. Naturally, he will also feel the desire to protect his own 
new wealth and, since he is aware of both the level of wealth and protection owned by 
his neighbour, may conclude he both requires, and has the potential to, purchase 
more, and more powerful weapons.  
 
The initial trader might now feel less secure, living next to an arsenal of weapons he 
cannot match, and a neighbour he may accuse of unfairly benefitting from his 
creativity and expenditure. His reaction, however, cannot be predicted: he could feel 
forced into making a further transaction in order to try and balance his neighbour’s 
power, which then may cause an arms race. Alternatively, the two could cooperate for 
mutual benefit. Since the possibilities are virtually inexhaustible, an event such as a 
	   23	  
banking or credit crisis, an epidemic or simply moving house, may have its own 
impact.  
 
So we see that power relations are subject to continuing and endless change, yet they 
do not take place in a vacuum, and are subject to interpretation and re-interpretation. 
Waging war, and subsequently making peace, are human behaviours and they emerge 
out of the complex network of human societies. At the heart of both concepts is how 
conflicts are being addressed and how power, and changes in power, are played out in 
networks. 
 
Manuel Castells’ work is based on the assumption that networks have to be 
understood not simply as passive structures but as themselves being actors as well. 
Instead of being rigid constructions that are useful only as an illustration of 
infrastructure, networks are, through interactions, the venue of power relations: 
“Power is the relational capacity that enables a social actor to influence 
asymmetrically the decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that favor the 
empowered actor’s will, interests, and values. Power is exercised by means of 
coercion (or the possibility of it) and/or by the construction of meaning on the 
basis of the discourses through which social actors guide their action. Power 
relationships are framed by domination, which is the power that is embedded 
in the institutions of society. The relational capacity of power is conditioned, 
but not determined, by the structural capacity of domination.” (Castells, 2009, 
p. 10) 
Conversely, power depends not only on the potential itself, but also on the ability to 
exert it – which is done through the links between the nodes of networks.  
 
What Castells highlights are the constant and permanent changing power relations 
that cause the network to change and adapt. Because power is based on relational 
capacity, in other words it is insufficient to say ‘this node (or human being) has 
power’, instead one must say ‘this node has power over these other nodes’, power is 
not always visible. One instance in which it becomes observable is in violent conduct, 
and likely the most powerful example of violent conduct is war. Despite the 
popularity of the term ‘war’, which is often invoked in abstract terms (for example in 
the ‘war on drugs’, or in reference to events in the distant past – the Peloponnesian 
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War is one instance), it is a concept that is very difficult to define. Equally so its 
antonym, peace, suffers from the same impediments.  
 
 
4.1	  War	  
 
Levy and Thompson define war as "sustained, coordinated violence between political 
organisations" (Levy & Thompson, 2011, p.5 (a similar definition can be found in 
Bull, 1977, p. 5) The key to this definition, and to understanding the dynamics of war, 
is the behaviour of the ‘organisation’ rather than the behaviour of the individual. 
Sustained violence by an individual is what his or her, society would consider a crime 
and be subject to a legal process. This indicates that the organisation, in other words 
the social network, is of great importance here. At the same time, Levy and 
Thompson continue to place an emphasis on the individual:  
"[…] Causes of sustained, coordinated violence between political 
organisations are not driven by a clear sense of political interest or the 
organisation, but instead of the personal or domestic political interests or 
perhaps by an insubordinate military leader, still qualify as wars." (Levy & 
Thompson, 2011, p. 10) 
This makes war a communal action: while individuals take part in the killing, and are 
being killed, it is the wider society that warrants, explains and narrates sustained 
violence – with or without a political interest.  
 
Coker approaches the topic by arguing for what purpose wars are fought, and presents 
three reasons: the instrumental, the existential and the metaphysical. In the context of 
international relations this is highly valuable since it presents a convincing 
categorization that can be applied to virtually all violent conflicts: either they are 
fought with the aim to obtain certain goods or control territory, are a reaction to an 
existential threat or attack, or finally are fought for the purpose of creating a sense of 
community or belonging (Coker, 2008).  
 
What these approaches to defining war share, however, is their failure to provide a 
clear denotation: for example, paid mercenaries may be involved in major armed 
conflict yet they lack a political motivation; groups of violent hooligans are organised 
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and often share political convictions and organised crime – for example drug cartels - 
can supplant state structures to the extent that not political but criminal interests 
dominate (Chouvy, 2015). 
 
 
4.2	  Peace	  
 
On the other side of the coin lies peace that, as a concept, is suffering from the same 
difficulty in definition. As Castells points out, power relations within society are 
constantly changing, meaning that conflicts emerge on a constant basis. Yet for 
Thomas Hobbes war is an exception:  
"[s]o the nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known 
disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. 
All other time is PEACE.” (Hobbes, 1960, p. 23) 
More contemporary commentators mirror the argument that peace should be the norm 
since without it, and the subjective feeling of security, no objective development or 
improvement of the individual and society is possible (Libschutz, 1995). Yet as 
Castells states, power relations trigger conflicts over domination, and since complex 
networks change and adapt disputes, antagonisms and conflicts are an inherent 
component of human affairs. In other words, daily life is subjected to a constant 
struggle over resources and the ability to dominate; domestic violence emerges out of 
disagreements in intimate relationships, children rebel against their parents and co-
workers challenge each other. These conflicts can harm and cause damage even if 
they do not contain physical violence, yet their presence does not shed light on 
whether or not ‘peace’ exists. 
 
Equally so, the ‘war on drugs’ indicates that there does not necessarily need be a 
component of sustained and coordinated violence in order to allow the use of the 
word ‘war’. Most of the societies in which the conflict is fought are largely at peace 
and mostly become victim only by chance rather than affiliation (Mallea, 2014). 
Conversely, there are many situations in which individuals are prosecuted because of 
their (at time perceived) association or affiliation to a group or identity, but even in 
this context the distinction between war and peace does not help to provide further 
insight into why and how. 
	   26	  
 
In regards to international relations peace appears to be elusive and hard to obtain: in 
fact most attempts at ‘peace-building’ are unsuccessful or even lead to a worsening of 
the situation (E. Newman & Richmond, 2006a, 2006b). Just as many violent conflicts 
often appear as miscalculations and unintended effects, so the concept of peace is 
fraught with ambiguities. In other words, if the triggers and causes of wars – however 
defined – are in most cases disputed, then peace is equally a detached and broad 
concept. The only way to provide clarity to both the concepts of war and peace, as 
well as to allow them to be used as notions in international relations, is to focus on the 
surrounding discourse. 
 
 
5.	  Discourse,	  language	  and	  communication	  
 
Let us return to the example of the Lebanese trader who feels threatened by his 
neighbour’s behaviour. He could react either with hostility, or seek to amicably deal 
with the challenge. Yet he has little control about what reaction his own actions may 
trigger. In other words he is unable to predict, let alone determine, the reaction his 
actions will cause. Conversely, he will feel emotions of security or insecurity, of 
ambivalence or hostility, inclinations to confront or willingness to accommodate, 
depending on the wider environment he finds himself in.  
 
According to George Lakoff this is further complicated by the fact that the vast 
majority of thinking is subconscious, and that every human being will interpret facts, 
figures and behaviour differently – yet not necessarily consistently. Lakoff focuses on 
language when he states: 
“Since language is used for communicating thought, our view of language 
must also reflect our new understanding of the nature of thought. Language is 
at once a surface phenomenon and a source of power. […] Since we all have 
similar bodies and brains and live in the same world, it will appear in many 
cases that language just fits reality directly. But when our understanding of 
reality differs, what language means has to differ as well, often radically.” 
(Lakoff, pp. 14-15) 
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The emphasis here should be placed on ‘communication’ rather than language. This is 
because commonly language is, at least initially, limited in its definition to spoken 
words. Its plural – languages – refers to different constructs of grammar and lexis 
used in different networks centred on nations, indicating that every network has 
specific approaches on how to relay information.  
 
Beyond spoken language every network has its own sounds, gestures, symbols and 
expressions that go far beyond just vocal sounds. Occasionally the same expression 
can have a completely different meaning in a different network (a nod in India is used 
to indicate non-acceptance, while in most other parts of the world it stands for 
agreement and acceptance), but even in the same network they can be oppugnant, 
depending on context (for example the word ‘black’ in the United States). Most 
likely, the most exceptional form of communication is violence: yet a punch thrown 
can stand for hostility as well as friendship and intimacy. The ability to communicate 
is necessary for power relations to take place, and a shared form of communication 
indicates the existence of a network – regardless of which form of expression it is 
based on. 
 
An even more extreme example of communication could be a fist-fight: on the street 
it would be judged inacceptable and trigger a legal and judicial action; in a boxing 
ring it would indicate a sporting event and command the attention of spectators, 
sponsors and judges. In other words, communication depends on the context in which 
it takes place, and this context is what Manuel Castells refers to as the ‘programme’ - 
the purpose and the behaviour of a network (Castells, 2009).  
 
Without a shared programme communication, i.e. the relay and exchange of 
information, is not possible, indicating that the network would cease to exist. 
Conversely, the programme sets the context in which communication takes place. In 
Afghanistan a NATO soldier may not be able to speak to a local, but gestures, 
behaviour, uniforms and signals will provide the basis for communication. NATO’s 
superior capacity to use violence does not, as its experience in Afghanistan since 2001 
shows, indicate superior power. Instead it presents an example of how violence in 
networks has to be understood as a component of the discourse and a form of 
communication in an environment in which human activities take place.  
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How the Lebanese trader will act and react will depend on the wider setting he is 
faced with. Subsequently, how his neighbour will react will also depend on a number 
of complex and interacting provisions that may be out of the control of both 
individuals. To consider the role violence plays in such circumstances and its ties to 
the programme of the network, requires further analysis of violence itself as a specific 
form of social interaction. 
 
 
6.	  Violence	  	  
 
Power relations in networks are played out through a large number of different forms 
of communication, including violence. Violence is both in terms of universality and 
simplicity enormously powerful. Violence causes pain, a sensation known to all 
human beings and triggers immediate reaction (Ginsberg, 2013). For Hannah Arendt 
violence is the key concept in human affairs since it has, and continues to, shape our 
existence throughout life (Arendt, 1969). Violence is never meaningless, but instead 
always requires and depends on the context (Arendt, 1970). Similarly, Anton Blok 
presents strong evidence regarding how violence is found in all societies, and the 
fundamental role it plays in shaping behaviour and narratives (Blok, 2001). 
 
In the first instance, violence is seen as deplorable, triggering pain and evasive 
behaviour. At the same time, though, human beings have always been and remain 
closely linked to it; in spite of its negative effects, violence is an important component 
in the construction of narratives and meaning. The shared experience of violence 
creates a very powerful sense of identity and belonging, regardless of whether one is 
the perpetrator, victim or are simply observing a violent act. This becomes especially 
apparent in the most extreme situations, most notably violent conflict and war. The 
extreme behaviours and scenarios both require and provide narratives and identities 
which are much stronger than those found in settings where violence is less intense or 
absent (Hedges, 2003) (Waltz, 1959). In regards to network theory, it can be argued 
that violence is an important component in creating and maintaining networks. 
Violence in this sense is integrative since it provides identity, belonging and 
association. Additionally, it necessarily creates a strong distinction between the ‘us’ 
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versus ‘the other’, and so provides for a clear understanding of who belongs to a 
network and who does not. 
 
While violence creates identities it also harms, kills and destroys. Just as spoken 
language can be positive and negative, so violence also has different functions 
depending on the context. The violence in a boxing match is integrative, while in a 
street fight it is disintegrative. In other words the same violence can have different 
effects in different scenarios. Gilligan argues that violence is often tragic since while 
perpetrators feel justification before or during their violent acts, they often feel 
remorse afterwards{Gilligan, 1996 #64}. Ginsberg argues that violence is the source 
of political power but risks becoming perpetual and increasingly destructive, 
inhibiting basic human interaction and behaviour and ultimately risking an end of all 
human societies {Ginsberg, 2013 #125}.  
 
The danger of violence dominating the discourse in a network is three-fold: first of all 
it tends to escalate and destroys the ability of nodes to compromise, ultimately 
tending to culminate in the demise of the node with the inferior in power. Secondly, 
violence becomes perpetual. Its close relation to honour leads to a reinforcement of 
group identity that prevents reconciliation and instead favours confrontation, as 
Sharif’s studies on youth groups have shown {Sherif, 1956 #245}. Finally, those 
actors that are able to exploit and benefit from the violence – especially indirectly by, 
for example, controlling the supply of scare goods and services, or those who have 
access and control to weaponry or troops – will try to maintain their power by 
perpetuating violence. 
 
Violence is a dynamic that creates, maintains and acts as a catalyst for the evolution 
of all human behaviour. Networks are delimitated by violence since it possesses, more 
than all other forms of communication, universality. The images of a violent conflict 
on TV taking place on the other side of the globe are so powerful because they do not 
require the proficiency in a different grammar or lexis. They are fascinating and 
revolting at the same time and trigger a reaction in apparently unrelated observers - 
even they will search for a narrative that can explain the events.  
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Communication is about power, not just about friendly exchanges for mutual benefit. 
Rather than limiting network and complexity theory to instances in which nodes 
communicate for mutual benefit, it is necessary to apply the dynamics of complex 
adaptive networks to situations where hostility and rejection dominate.  
 
 
7.	  Conclusion	  
 
The Lebanese trader will determine his behaviour towards his neighbour depending 
on the environment he finds himself in, yet he will be unable to absolutely predict the 
impact his actions will have. Both will greatly depend on the programme of the 
networks both he and his neighbour are associated with. In order for the trader to 
anticipate motivation, behaviour and risks – both in regards to the primary actors as 
well as observers – it would be futile to assume absolute and hierarchic concepts and 
structures since all events take place in complex adaptive networks. Instead, the 
programme of his networks will determine which form of communication he will use 
in order to deal with the challenge to his power. 
 
This first chapter has sought to provide an outline to the topic of this thesis and 
establish basic concepts and definitions. 
 
The second chapter introduces network and complexity theory. In particular, the 
works of Manuel Castells will be applied to the realm of international relations. 
Having first emerged in the middle of the last century in the natural sciences, chaos 
and complexity theory has now slowly made its way into the social sciences and 
applications. Two broad, yet distinct and seldom combined schools of thought have 
tended to dominate the debate: on the one hand is the emergence of the internet and 
wireless communication that has led to rapid changes to human behaviour. On the 
other hand are military actors that are being faced with the realisation that the 
traditional strongly hierarchic structure and nature of their organisations and 
operations is proving vastly inferior to non-hierarchic, flexible and constantly 
evolving systems. The Arab Awakening was initially labelled as the first ‘Facebook 
Revolution’ yet reality has shown that this does not conform to reality – 
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communication is far more multi-facetted than digital interaction pursued for mutual 
benefit. 
 
The central dynamic that has eluded much of the debate on networks is analysed in 
chapters three and four: violence. Since all social links are about power relations, 
violence is at the centre of much communication. The shared experience of violence, 
for both perpetrators and victims, is a powerful dynamic in creating and developing 
identity. Because it is a universal and profound component of social behaviour, 
violence is at the heart of human actions; it provides meaning and shapes social 
networks. This becomes nowhere more apparent than in wars and large-scale violent 
conflicts since at their hearts lies a metaphysical struggle. The difference between the 
digital and analogue world is manifested in the different role violence plays in it. 
Online violence only exists as an abstract concept, and is unable to compete with the 
physical experience provided by the analogue. 
 
While chapter three focuses on the integrative impact of violence – its ability to create 
meaning, identity, to establish and maintain networks and as a powerful social force, 
chapter four studies the disintegrative effects of violence. The individual experience 
of violence provides ample evidence for why human beings reject and fear it. 
Violence causes pain and rejection, takes life and destroys livelihoods and property. 
The struggle to end violence is as old as human society itself, yet the key here is the 
realisation that violence has many forms: the violence found in a rugby match is not 
only socially acceptable and subject to rules and regulations, but can also assumed to 
be of benefit for social cohesion and identity. Yet as the murderous reality of civil 
wars shows, violence can emerge between neighbours and close associates – entirely 
unacceptable for observers but its perpetrators always possess justification of why no 
other method would suffice. When applied to Castells’ approach to networks, 
violence is a component of the programme that determines the behaviour and purpose 
of networks, and since there is a constant process of programming and re-
programming networks violence has to be approached, judged and applied under this 
perspective.  
 
Chapter five analyses the Lebanese Civil War with a Castellian approach; in this way 
the emergence and end of the violent conflict becomes coherent. Instead of trying to 
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find both the causes for the conflict in absolute terms, for example the regional 
history, economic realities, religion or ethnic make-up, the notion that the form and 
method of communication had changed is more promising. Individuals in the country 
were under stress of changing economic, social, political and demographic 
circumstances, and this led to a gradual decline in the number of links into different 
networks. With each network representing a different identity, a situation emerged in 
which key individuals became able to alter their programme in a way in which 
violence became the dominating form of communication. Conversely, the Civil War 
ended not because the assumed causes for conflict were removed but instead the 
programme was altered again to allow other forms of communication to flourish 
above violence. 
 
The violence centred on Afghanistan is studied in chapter six. It dominates the 
programme of social networks, preventing not only many Afghans from improving 
their life but also making the country the base for insurgencies and organised crime as 
well as regional and globally operating terrorist networks. The international 
community, under the leadership of the United States and NATO, have long tried to 
alter this situation and ‘build’ a peaceful and stable Afghan and society as well as 
make the entire region less volatile. Despite having spent vast amounts of resources 
and attention, with countless deaths on all side of the conflict, the situation shows 
little improvement – it amounts to a ‘wicked problem’: unable to determine what 
exactly is causing the events, no actor is able to develop a solution. Violence 
dominates the network with a programme that allows power relations to be played out 
in a non-violent and sustainable manner. Since conflicts are found in every social 
network the key to end the corrosive effects of violence in Afghanistan will therefore 
not be found in military, political, economic or ethnic realities, but instead in the re-
programming of the networks to establish alternatives to violence as a method of 
addressing power relations.  
 
The final chapter applies the lessons learned above: human beings are always 
involved in complex and adaptive social networks that continuously evolve and adapt. 
Changes and challenges that emerge are being addressed not only by the individual 
but also by the networks he or she is associated with. Since human beings are social 
animals networks are fundamental for the sustenance of life, yet rather than focusing 
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on who is connected to whom a different approach has to be taken: what programme - 
essentially its aim and way to reach it – does a network have? The more secure an 
individual feels and the less stress he or she faces, the stronger is their ability to own 
and maintain multiple identities. Following on from this, there is then a lower risk that 
the node will reject all those outside his or her networks. When applying network 
theory to the experience of Lebanon in ending its civil war, and of Afghanistan where 
war continuous to cause misery and despair, important conclusions can be reached. 
Conclusions that seek to establish that network-centric peacebuilding can be a 
powerful tool, not only in ending the war in Afghanistan, but also elsewhere in the 
world where violent conflicts dominate and destroy.  	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Chapter	  2:	  Networks,	  complexity	  and	  international	  relations	  
 
 
1.	  Introduction	  
 
The terms ‘network’, ‘networking’, ‘complexity’ and ‘breakdown of order’ have, in 
recent decades, become increasingly common when analysing and explaining human 
affairs. People are always ‘networking’; we use social network programmes on the 
Internet, make global transactions with minimal specialised technological, cultural or 
linguistic knowledge, and communicate with minimal investment in time or 
infrastructure across borders, social structures and geographic boundaries. The 
profound impact of this ‘networking’ is what Manuel Castells terms ‘the Network 
Society’ in which the position, behaviour and power of an individual depends on how 
he or she communicates with others (Castells, 2010b). It is now easier than ever 
before to make new connections with others, to maintain those connections, and to 
interact much more quickly and with less dependence on physical location, resources 
and skills. As a result of this, it can appear that traditional structures and order are 
being eroded. Aided by developments in technology, human communication and 
interaction is in the process of change, including adaptation to these new tools. 
Reliance on traditional methods of communication and behaviour, such as those rigid, 
reliable and often hierarchical structures used to organise human affairs, is 
disappearing. Modern technology has, for the majority of people, made access to 
information easier than ever before, but rather than facilitating the creation of more 
enlightened, educated and aware individuals, this access has in fact resulted in 
individuals who perceive that they have a lack of control over their own destiny and 
perceive increased risk and instability due to their own increased awareness of the 
existence of dangers and threats.  
 
This chapter will introduce networks and their theory, with a particular focus on 
Manuel Castells’ work on networks and how they affect human affairs. Networks 
exist between organic and inorganic nodes, and a combination thereof. Whilst this 
chapter and this thesis focuses on human networks which make up groups and 
societies, a vast number of other networks exist; for example the internet is a network 
of computers, the weather is a result of a network of physical effects, and life depends 
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on neuronal networks that provide the basis for life and survival, allow for interaction 
with the environment and are the basis for the evolution of life. A common feature of 
all networks is that, in contrast to other forms of organisation, they are non-linear.  
 
This chapter will also introduce human affairs and chaos theory, followed by an 
application of it to international relations and violent conflicts. At the heart of the 
emergence of complexity and network theory, both in the context of social science in 
general and international relations in particular, is technology. Not only is modern 
communication technology changing how human beings communicate and interact, 
but it is also altering how the world is perceived and interpreted. 
 
Finally, the programming of networks and forms of communication used within them 
will be discussed, with the intention of highlighting the need for further analysis into 
the role of violence as a form of communication in social networks.  
 
 
2.	  Manuel	  Castells	  and	  Network	  Theory	  
 
Networks are everywhere: “A Network is simply a set of relations between objects 
which could be people, organizations, nations, items found in a Google search, brain 
cells, or electrical transformers.” (Kardushin, 2012, p. 3). Put even more simply: “A 
network is a set of interconnected nodes.” (Castells, 2009, p. 19) Castells argues that 
today’s world can be described as a ‘Network Society’, meaning: 
“The core activities that shape and control human life in every corner of the 
planet are organized in global networks; financial markets; transnational 
production, management, and the distribution of goods and services; highly 
skilled labor; science and technology, including higher education; the mass 
media; the Internet networks of interactive, multi- purpose communication; 
culture; art; entertainment; sports; international institutions managing the 
global economy and intergovernmental relations; religion; the criminal 
economy; and the transnational NGOs and social movements that assert the 
rights and values of a new, global civil society.” (Castells, 2009, p. 25) 
It is perhaps curious that Castells uses ‘Network Society’ to describe today’s society, 
when in fact it is just as applicable in the context of ancient civilisations - networks 
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are nothing new. The Roman and Greek Empires relied on highly developed 
transnational networks that allowed for the exchange of goods, services and 
information. They also had financial markets, sporting events and social movements 
which were based on an effective and reliable system of communication and law and 
order. The Chinese Empire was equally developed, relying on highly skilled labour, a 
system of higher education, and had in place what today could be labelled a ‘criminal 
economy’. Similarly, the global Great Depression of the 1920s and 30s produced 
global turmoil and an economic crisis of which virtually no place in the world was 
able to escape – the internet was not a necessary pre-condition to this.  
 
Even when one places the internet and modern communication tools (such as mobile 
phones and social network services) at the centre of today’s human affairs (Castells, 
2001), it is clear that only a small, albeit growing, faction of mankind has reliable and 
constant access to them:  
“[T]he uneven globalization of the network society is, in fact, a highly 
significant feature of its social structure. The coexistence of the network 
society, as a global structure, with industrial, rural, communal, or survival 
societies, characterizes the reality of all countries, albeit with different shares 
of population and territory on both sides of the divide, depending on the 
relevance of each segment for the dominant logic of each network.” 
  (Castells, 2009).  
Yet despite Castells’ emphasis on this ‘uneven globalization’, it is also not new - 
these dynamics of unevenness are as old as human civilisation. Equally old are the 
coexistence of several different networks and sub-networks, and the awareness of 
being either inside or outside a network. Every individual has several identities 
relating to their history, interests, sexuality and so forth; therefore they form multiple 
identities which in turn provide links to different sub-networks.  
 
Networks are made up of individual nodes that change, alter and adapt their 
behaviour. Connections between the nodes are therefore constantly being created, 
being eroded and are fluctuating in nature and intensity. Because of these dynamics, 
the networks the nodes are part of are subject to constant change, not only in their 
structure or geography – which the nodes are necessarily connected with – but also in 
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the type, purpose and form of communication that happens along or within the 
connections that link the nodes: 
“Networked individualism is a culture, not an organizational form. A  
culture that starts with the values and projects of the individual but builds a 
system of exchange with other individuals, thus reconstructing society rather 
than reproducing society. […] [I]n a world of values and norms constantly in 
flux, in a risk society, people who feel uncertain or vulnerable as individuals 
seek refuge in communities that respond to their identities, always 
constructed, either with the materials of history and geography, or with the 
desires from which projects are made. These communities often become 
trenches of resistance against a social order perceived as alien and imposed by 
force, when the institutions that used to provide security (the state, the church, 
the family) no longer function properly.” (Castells, 2009, p. 362) 
Castells’ works serve as a basis to understand not only the structure of today’s world 
but also the changes that are taking place on a constant and on-going basis. 
 
 
2.1	  The	  dynamics	  of	  networks	  
 
At the core of Castells’ focus is not the mere existence of networks, but a change of 
dynamics that are centred on them. The internet and mobile communication have 
eroded the principles of “separation between locality and sociability in the formation 
of community” (Castells, 2001, p. 116). In other words, modern technology is having 
a profound impact on how societies are structured and function. It follows that it is 
not networks per se that stand at the heart of this debate, but the dynamics that are 
taking place within them. Networks are more than ‘just’ the depiction of links 
between actors, networks themselves act and change the outcome of any process that 
takes place within it, often with effects that are unintended by the nodes of the 
structure. 
 
Secondly, it follows that what Castells is describing is the mere emergence of the 
realisation of the fact that networks are central to human affairs. Networks and 
interconnectivity have always existed, but because of the lack of technology and 
knowledge, the scope for awareness of the complexity, size and process was much 
	   38	  
more limited than it is today. Castell says: “We are networks connected to a world of 
networks” (Castells, 2009, pp. 139’, italics in the original), meaning that today we are 
aware that human minds themselves are neural networks of neurons which process 
information, and we are embedded within a world of others individuals. Basic neural 
patterns were shaped by the evolutionary dynamics of a species, but while there is a 
basic pattern that allows survival after birth, a great deal of these patterns are shaped 
by learned experience, a process that continues until the death of an organism. 
 
Tied to this point is that networks lack finite borders and limits. On the macro-level, it 
may appear that the human body is a single and self-contained entity, but when 
looking at the detail it is clear that a constant exchange with the environment is taking 
place. Nutrients are ingested and used to create energy and biologic matter, oxygen is 
inhaled and carbon dioxide exhaled and heat is dissipated - the human body itself is a 
network within a network. Without the links to the outside, the individual could not 
survive. The same can be seen in the mental sphere, rather than the physical; 
individuals exchange themselves with others, and social contacts become necessary 
for survival. The capacity of networks to connect individuals is surprisingly powerful, 
as some of the earliest researchers into social networks have shown: mathematical 
models and social experiments on the ‘small-world problem’ showed that every 
individual in the United States is connected to everyone else via fewer than 6 other 
individuals (Milgram, 1967) (Pool & Kochen, 1978). 
 
Interconnection is a global phenomenon that may not always be obvious to the casual 
observer, but can be demonstrated by what is known as the butterfly effect – the single 
move of a butterfly’s wings is able to trigger an unpredictable chain of events leading 
to an hurricane. The existence of this effect is now not only scientifically proven, but 
also necessary for sustaining life and the balance of the entire system (Gleick, 1998). 
The same applies to social networks: 
“If [power] relationships exist in specific social structures that are constituted 
on the basis of spaciotemporal formations, and these spaciotemporal 
formations are no longer primarily located at the national level, but are global 
and local at the same time, the boundary of society changes, and so does the 
frame of reference of power relationships that transcend the national.” 
(Castells, 2009, p. 18) 
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In other words, national borders are becoming increasingly unable to contain the flow 
of power, because networks are no longer accept these political boundaries as solid 
and impermeable. Events that may take place in an entirely different setting, being 
environmentally, spatially and temporally separated may have, or may not have, a 
profound impact on the domestic sphere of a state. With an infinite number of events 
taking place at any given moment, the assumption of stability and isolation is 
mistaken. 
 
This points to the third dynamic: change. “Change be it evolutionary or revolutionary, 
is the essence of life” (Castells, 2009, p. 299). The nodes of any kind of network 
compete over finite and unevenly distributed resources, which causes constant 
conflicts, requires compromise and modifications of behaviour. Regardless of whether 
the network is made up of neurons, human beings or nation-states, over time the 
behaviour of the actors, and the interactions between them, will change and adapt to 
the challenges that emerge from both inside and outside of the network. 
 
 
3.	  The	  agency	  of	  networks	  
 
The discussion above means that networks can be studied in two distinct schools of 
analysis. Firstly, ‘networks as structures’ in which the focus lies on whether, and to 
what extent, any two nodes are linked to each other. This configuration then provides 
the structure that is emergent from the relationship of nodes. Secondly, ‘networks as 
actors’ views networks as “a specific institutional form that stands in contrast to the 
hierarchical organisation of states and to the temporally limited exchange relations of 
markets” (Kahler, 2009, p. 5). At the core of understanding how networks operate and 
interact with each other, in other words their agency, are the dynamics that take place 
within them.  
 
Central to this understanding is power, the most fundamental process in any network. 
Power in a network is relational, meaning that it is not an attribute but a relationship; 
it provides the basis of the connection between nodes. In contrast to non-social 
networks, power relationships are always asymmetrical, i.e. in power relationships 
there is always one actor who is more influential, or has more power, than the other. 
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Because of its relational capacity, power in social networks is never rigid and constant 
but subject to constant change and adaption. Power is also not an absolute that divides 
networks by nodes which have the capacity to exert power, and nodes which become 
subjected to it. Instead, inequalities of power capacities in social networks rely on a 
wider narrative in which acceptance and compliance are factors that are as 
fundamental for the existence of a network as the capacity to exert power (Castells, 
2009, pp. 10-11). What binds social networks together is a shared narrative or 
meaning that justifies the different power capacities of the nodes within the networks.  
 
Today’s society amounts to what Bauman calls a ‘liquid’ phase of modernity: 
individuals can no longer rely on a strong and durable society that uses state 
structures to channel support against personal failures and ill fate. The ability of 
narratives to maintain a dominant grasp of networks is increasingly eroded by a 
process caused by a growing global trend of interconnection and interaction. This 
trend relies on competition and individual advantage, instead of collaboration with a 
focus on short-term and immediate gains. Rather than being based on a rigid and 
formally structured organisation: 
“[S]ociety’ is increasingly viewed and treated as a ‘network’ rather than a 
structure (let alone a solid ‘totality’): it is perceived and treated as a matrix of 
random connections and of an essentially infinite volume of possible 
permutations.” (Bauman, 2007, p. 3) 
The ‘structure’ that Bauman mentions is key here, echoing Kahler who contrasts the 
structure of networks with hierarchical organisations	  {Kahler, 2009 #73}. However, 
both go too far with the assumption that all nodes in every network are equal, and that 
all networks are decentralised systems. For example, in a network of individuals who 
are all members of a karate club, some individuals are more influential and have more 
numerous and stronger links than others; this indicates that there is, possibly only 
temporal and for certain actions, a certain hierarchy visible within every network (D. 
R. White & Harary, 2001).  
 
Instead of using the approach that focuses on ‘networks as structures’ which is trying 
to assess the constantly changing (and difficult to gauge) structure of networks with 
the aim of proving the claim that networks are non-hierarchical structures, a deeper 
study into the dynamics within social networks is more beneficial. What makes social 
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networks so fascinating is not their structure (or supposed disappearance or absence), 
but the non-linearity dynamics of the interactions that take place within them. The 
discussions below invariably will touch on both schools of network analysis.  
 
 
4.	  Non-­‐linearity	  
 
The term ‘dynamics’ in this context refers to how networks change and adapt. 
Dynamics can either be linear or non-linear; linear dynamics are based on a 
Newtonian approach in which change is additive – the result of an equation is the 
addition of its parts. The core assumption of this process is that it can be repeated 
indefinitely, always producing the same outcome. In contrast to this linear approach is 
non-linear dynamics: the result of a process is not a simple addition of its parts, but an 
indeterminate junction of components. Algebra is linear; two apples added to another 
two apples will always make four apples, but most systems that human beings 
encounter on a daily basis are non-linear, or chaotic. For example, the weather cannot 
be calculated by a mere addition of various components we see are present – it is a 
system which is nearly impossible to consistently predict. It is an example of an 
equation that relies on the same components but can have an entirely different result 
every time it is made: 
“Nonlinear systems are highly flexible. Changes that occur in these systems 
are discontinuous, resulting in sudden jumps in behaviour or organisation. 
These changes are unpredictable, and that makes them frustratingly difficult to 
quantify and quite impossible with linear methods. However, mathematical 
mapping methods can give us snap shots of the patterns these nonlinear 
systems create.” (McClure, 2005, p. 2) 
One main discipline of non-linear dynamics is chaos theory which, perhaps 
surprisingly, is at the centre of many social narratives. 
 
While chaos, as a contrasting concept to linearity, is a relatively new concept to 
natural science and even newer to the social sciences, it is in reality an ancient notion. 
The word chaos, or χαoς in ancient Greek, comes from χαινω, which means ‘to open 
wide’. A great number of civilisations state chaos to be the state of nature before or at 
the beginning of a narrative (Bolotin et al., 2013). These societies would argue that 
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their emergence replaced chaos with the ordering of all elements into a harmonious 
and linear system that presented itself with laws and a structure that was ultimately 
revealed in Newtonian physics. 
 
 
4.1	  Human	  affairs	  and	  chaos	  
 
In human affairs, complexity and chaos are closely interlinked. By describing the 
various actors and steps that were necessary to build the Roman Colosseum, Homer-
Dixon points out that complexity has been a component of human actions since the 
emergence of civilisation. The evolution of human societies into increasingly intricate 
structures runs counter to the observations of Bolotin et al. described above; growing 
societies do not mean a greater order or stability but instead because more and more 
actors are increasingly more closely linked, and that these links emerge and disappear 
with growing speed the entire structure becomes more complex. This, in turn, means 
that increasingly small alterations can have via amplification, accumulation and 
multiplication, dramatic and potentially fatal effects on the whole. Homer-Dixon 
points to five tectonic stresses 2: (i) population inequality; (ii) scarcity of energy; (iii) 
environmental degradation; (iv) climate change; and (v) global economic instabilities 
(Homer- Dixon, 2006, p. 11). Rather than a single cause of change that can be clearly 
attributed and addressed, the tectonic stresses affect each other in a non-linear and 
chaotic manner. It is not the issue itself that causes concern, but the linkage between 
sub-networks. The linkages are what Castells calls ‘intersections’: 
“Ultimately, the traditional notion of society may have to be called into 
question because each network (economic, cultural, political, technological, 
military, and the like) has its own spaciotemporal and organizational 
configurations, so that their points of intersection are subjected to relentless 
change. Societies as national societies become segmented and are constantly 
reshaped by the action of dynamic networks on their historically inherited 
social structures.” (Castells, 2009, p. 18) 
Castells’ observations here in the context of networks are similar to the observations 
made within the natural sciences field from the 1950s onwards, when it was found 
that traditional models failed to describe phenomena such as the movements of water 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  italics	  in	  the	  original	  see	  (Homer-­‐Dixon,	  2006,	  p.	  11)	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molecules in a pipe, the oscillation of radio waves or the analysis and prediction of 
weather patterns. An increasing precision in the ability to observe, measure and 
record such matters produced results that could no longer be explained within the 
isolated rigidity of Newtonian physics. Instead the results pointed towards the reality 
that the natural world was a single “dynamical system” (Gleick, 1998, p. 47), in 
which everything is interconnected and has to be treated as such. It was not 
technological developments that changed molecular movements and created radio 
waves or the weather but instead these phenomena were possible to be observed due 
to scientific advances. 
 
In social networks, the same non-linearity of interactions applies. Individuals do not 
behave like a machine, or a network of machines, that is programmed to behave in a 
certain pattern. The field of international relations analyses the behaviour of actors in 
order to study why and how they acted in a situation in order to be able to predict 
future outcomes. However, this method is limited because it largely fails to 
incorporate the dynamics of complex adaptive networks: 
“[…] [W]e cannot understand systems by examining only the attributes and 
goals of the interconnected elements. […] Many crucial effects are delayed 
and indirect; the relations between two actors often are determined by each 
one’s relations with others; interactions are central and cannot be understood 
by additive operations; many outcomes are unintended; regulation is difficult. 
[…] many of the methods that actors and social scientists use to understand 
the world are not suited to dealing with systems.” (Jervis, 1997, p. 29) 
These individual forms of behaviour are the main component of the dynamics that 
take place within a network, and are the cause for the uncertainty that is found by 
Bauman	  {Bauman, 2007 #169} described above. These dynamics found within 
networks give the network a ‘life’ of its own by causing the bifurcation (Byrne, 
2001). Byrne picks up on Nicholis’ {Nicholis, 1995 #215} approach to bifurcation as 
a component of complex systems in the social sciences: bifurcations occur when the 
change of a single parameter causes an equilibrium to change. One example of this 
applied to international relations is the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 
December 2011. This event triggered the uprising in Tunisia and the ‘Arab 
Awakening’ which, in turn, led to the global ‘occupy’ movements demanding more 
democratic rights for the population and reforms of the global financial and banking 
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system (Kempf, 2012). None of these developments were predictable, or even thought 
to be possible, yet precisely because they were possible they happened. Taleb uses the 
analogy of black swans to illustrate this kind of event: they may be rare but they exist 
and, just as it is not possible to predict the sighting of a black swan in nature, it is just 
as difficult to predict when a any rare event will take place because its connection to 
preceding events only becomes visible afterwards (Taleb, 2007). These events 
highlight the role non-linearity and chaos play in human affairs; just as in the natural 
sciences field, the limitations of the Newtonian ‘cause and effect’ in understanding 
the world became evident.  
 
 
4.2	  The	  development	  of	  chaos	  theory	  
 
Early proponents of chaos theory, such as the physicist Joseph Ford or the 
mathematician and meteorologist Edward Lorenz, were faced with intense scepticism 
when they rejected the dominating isolated approach to the study of phenomena. 
What they called ‘chaos’ was in fact not anarchy, but the description of patterns that 
can be found within seemingly random observations. In other words: 
“In some sense they realized, physics understood perfectly the fundamental 
mechanisms of [for example] pendulum motion but could not extend that 
understanding to the long term. The microscopic pieces were perfectly clear; 
the macroscopic behaviour remained a mystery. The tradition of looking at 
systems locally- isolating the mechanisms and the adding them together- was 
beginning to break down. For pendulums, for fluids, for electronic circuits, for 
lasers, knowledge of the fundamental equations no longer seemed to be the 
right kind of knowledge at all.’ (Gleick, 1998, p. 44) 
 
For example, the local weather could be measured, described and analysed 
increasingly accurately, but as soon as the ‘local’ reached a certain spatial or temporal 
size too many factors could have a potential impact on the overall phenomena, 
making it impossible to accurately predict. The dynamics that determine weather on a 
global level have never changed, and limited phenomena such as a rain storm or 
seasonal change in humidity, for example, can be accurately described, but despite 
growing computational power the weather forecast is still very limited in accuracy. 
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This is due to the existence of a virtually unlimited number of factors that may, or 
may not, have an impact on the overall outcome.  
 
As touched on above, Edward Lorenz coined the term ‘butterfly effect’ to indicate 
that arbitrarily small disturbances can influence disturbances on a much larger scale. 
Lorenz described this by linking the flapping of a butterfly’s wings in the Amazon to 
a consequent hurricane in the United States (Palmer, 2008). Byrne transfers this from 
the natural world to the social sciences when he writes: 
‘The issue is that in the social world, and in much of reality including 
biological reality, causation is complex. Outcomes are determined not by 
single causes but by multiple causes, and these causes may, and usually do, 
interact in a non-additive fashion. In other words the combined effect is not 
necessarily the sum of the separate effects. It may be greater or less, because 
factors can reinforce or cancel out each other in non-linear ways.’ (Byrne, 
2001, p. 20)  
Despite the fact that today chaos theory and complexity are a fundamental component 
of the natural sciences, the social sciences continue to struggle with it, as Bauman’s 
approach to modernity as an non-linear phenomenon indicates. 
 
In effect, as Homer-Dixon’s analysis of the construction of the Roman Coliseum 
shows, complexity has always been an inherent component of human behaviour 
(Homer- Dixon, 2006). Societal evolution is nothing more than the ability to connect 
higher numbers and less homogenous nodes and factors in different ways; the ability 
of societies to survive, prosper and evolve has always relied on constant change and 
adaptation. Societies are resilient to man-made and natural catastrophes precisely 
because their underlying structures are not fixed and rigid, but because they 
constantly transform and alter. Instead of being based on a vertical or hierarchic 
structure that relies on the ability of the top to, via a linear process, manage the 
relations of attached nodes, human survival in fact depends on complex and 
constantly changing interactions between a virtually unlimited number of actors and 
factors (Christakis & Fowler, 2011).  
 
So far, the majority of work on complexity has been grounded in sociology (Castells, 
2001; Catells, 2001; Deleuze et al., 2011) (Urry, 2003) (DeLanda, 2006) and, despite 
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the global impact and observation of phenomena, has only been given limited 
attention in international relations (Bousquet & Geyer, 2011) (Money, 1998). 
Moreover, even those recent works that aim to analyse politics under the prism of 
networks are often more descriptive than analytical. For example, Kahler’s study 
‘Networked Politics’ is an important contribution to the field but only describes where 
and how non-linear networks are at play, rather than providing a fundament for 
analysis of the underlying dynamics. In particular, the blurring and increasing 
disappearance of the distinction between traditional institutionalised levels 3 presents 
a challenge for the study of social sciences today. Uncertainty is observed as a 
phenomenon on a global scale, but the relationship between complexity and human 
agency lacks analysis and understanding. On the other side of the spectrum is a 
growing volume of research that focuses on the sociological dynamics of relationships 
such as homophily (Verbrugge, 1977), multiplexity (Beggs, Haines, & Hurlbert, 
1996) or emotional contagion (Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock, 2014). Again, the 
phenomenon of complexity and networking has found its way into the study of 
society and politics, and specific dynamics that emerge within networks have been 
discovered, but there is a gap between these two fields that has not been filled as of 
today. 
 
 
4.3	  Network-­‐Centric	  Warfare	  
 
Interestingly, the most rigid and hierarchic organisations in the context of 
international relations are well versed in observing the impact of uncertainty and non-
linearity: the military. Military operations are centred on the ability to exert power in 
order to force others to act in a certain way. Placing Clausewitz’ famous words “[…] 
[W]ar is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of 
political intercourse, carried on with other means” (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 29) as the 
starting point for analysis, the importance of non-linearity is clearly apparent: an 
individual, or group of individuals, exerts power over others in order to force certain 
behaviour with the aim of gaining control over resources and actions. Historically, 
military action has often been analysed from this strongly linear perspective: the 
strength of actors has been measured in the number of their troops, the amount and 	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size of ordnance that could be fired in a given time, the yield of their nuclear weapons 
or the speed in which their units could be moved. Despite the fact that history 
provides ample evidence that reliance on numbers and hierarchies fails to determine 
the success of military outcome, it remains globally employed.  
 
Arguably the first historian, Thucydides, considered that the fall of ancient Athens 
was so remarkable, and was a story which needed to be heard, simply because it was 
so incomprehensible when considered in terms of numbers alone. At that time Athens 
had the by far the biggest and most powerful navy, outrivaling all other powers in the 
region economically, militarily and even culturally, and was arguably the most 
influential centre of learning of its time. Yet none of these factors were sufficient to 
prevent the defeat and fall of the city-state. What brought an end to Athens’ 
domination of the region was not military defeat brought by a single enemy that had 
managed to amass a military and economic force greater than that of Athens, but a 
combination of factors that were not related in a linear manner (Strassler & Crawley, 
1996). Another example of the weakness in relying on linearity with regards to 
military action is found through an analysis of the causes of the First World War. It is 
often argued that the war was inevitable due to growing German industrial output, 
military expenditure, demographic shifts or developments in military technology or 
tactics when compared to other European powers (Henig, 1995), but the same 
dynamics existed in the wake of the Second World War without culminating in 
violent confrontation within Europe.  
 
This apparent dichotomy is one reason why military organisations are paying so much 
attention to developments in network theory, far more than other sectors of 
international relations or political science. Another could be the obvious contradiction 
in structure: militaries are organisations that are strongly hierarchic, rigid and rely on 
a power structure that is absolute and distinctively linear. Networks, as described 
earlier, posses much more diluted and diverse hierarchies, are flexible and adaptive 
and posses power structures that are opaque and nonlinear. On the basis that social 
networks are becoming decentralised and increasingly influential, both as actors and 
as points of analysis, militaries around the world must begin adapting to these 
dynamics. 
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While the definition of “network-centric warfare” is disputed (Schmidtchen, 2006), its 
roots lie in the principles of a US military driven technology based approach, focused 
on the operational level that, at its centre, is based on information control and its 
application to warfare. The aim of this approach is to remove the ‘fog of war’, i.e. the 
“general unreliability of all information [which] presents a special problem in war” 
(Clausewitz, 2007, p. 89). The approach of relying on technology to address military 
problems has always been, and remains, central to military culture (Cebrowski & 
Garstka, 1998).  
 
Castells may talk about ‘firms’ rather than ‘militaries’ or ‘armies’ but his words apply 
to both:  
“Under the conditions of fast technological change, networks, not firms have 
become the actual operating unit. In other words, through the interaction 
between organisational crisis and change and new information technologies a 
new organisational form has emerged as characteristic of the informational, 
global economy: the network enterprise.” (Castells, 2000, p. 187) 
The lesson then is clear: if networks with their non-hierarchic and constantly 
changing structures are becoming the most influential actors today, then the military 
has to understand the dynamics found within them in order to be able to maintain its 
primacy in power relations. 
 
Because “[O]rganisational hierarchies in institutions control the flow of information 
and direct activity in order to create a sense of certainty” (Schmidtchen, 2006, p. 37), 
militaries are faced with a dilemma: if their adversaries are becoming increasingly 
decentralised and reliant on structures that are able to quickly adapt to changes and 
threats in their environment, then the ability of rigidly structured bodies to dominate 
them is substantially weakened. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 are a powerful indicator 
of how a small group of loosely organised individuals is able to overcome a liner 
organisation such as the security apparatus of the United States. They were able to not 
only effect a surprise attack on several power centres in the United States without 
leaving room for the US military to interfere or protect its citizens, but also to bring 
about a continuing stalemate between the world’s most powerful military on the one 
hand, and a small number of far less well equipped, trained and funded adversaries in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere.  
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Establishing whether insurgent, or terrorist, networks are in fact decentralised, and 
vacant of hierarchies and structures, is difficult, since it is challenging to ascertain 
reliable resources. Additionally, due to their very nature, they are always changing 
and adapting; their structure is bound to evolve according to the challenges being 
faced at any one time (Bousquet, 2012). Decentralised and non-hierarchical 
organisations also face the problem that they lack stability and coherence, making 
differences of opinion leading to internal conflicts likely. Internal disputes are 
probable, and this consequence of their nature could render the entire organisation 
ineffective (Kilcullen, 2009), thereby increasing the stress on the programmers of the 
network in seeking to maintain their primacy. Al Qaida, for example, has been unable 
to retain its position at the helm of global Islamist terrorism because fragmentation 
within the organisation forced it to spend most of its resources in trying to maintain 
itself rather than reaching its goals (Gerges, 2011; Jones & Libicki, 2008). 
 
 
4.4	  Fighting	  networks	  
 
When the United States invaded Afghanistan in late 2001, its military joined forces 
with Afghan groups which had opposed the Taliban-led regime in Kabul. Together 
they quickly defeated their common enemy, which was accused of having provided 
support and refuge to Al Qaida, the organisation behind the attacks of 9/11. What 
followed was not in the United State’s plan: rather than accepting defeat and 
integrating themselves into the ‘new’ Afghanistan, Mullah Omar who had led the 
Taliban before the US invasion, joined forces with a number of individuals and 
groups that shared little in common besides each being opposed to the post-Taliban 
order. Faced with the reality that their military power was far inferior to the US and, 
later, NATO forces, this ‘New Taliban’ (Qazi, April 2011) organised themselves in a 
decentralised and loose organisation, and were able to rely on their ability to mount an 
insurgency and exploit a superior knowledge of terrain, language, culture as well as 
links to providers of funds and resources outside of the country. “Organizationally, 
the Taleban are a network of networks” assesses Ruttig (2010, p. 13); because of the 
structure of their organisation, they are able to effectively operate in a way that 
prevented the NATO forces from defeating them. 
	   50	  
 
General Stanley McChrystal, commander of NATO’s International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) and the US forces in Afghanistan, was also faced with the 
reality of being in the position of having to deal with a structure of command that was 
complex: his political superiors who developed the strategy for the counterinsurgency 
under ISAF did not necessarily place Afghanistan at the centre of their analysis but 
rather the US political system. The resources, tactics and aims of ISAF were not 
exclusively borne out of military considerations, but included many nodes based in 
domestic politics in the United States and its NATO allies. For example, through 
assessing US public opinion, US Vice-President Biden rejected McChrystal’s 
recommendations to increase troop numbers and place them outside fortified bases in 
Afghanistan despite this making sense in regards to counterinsurgency. Equally 
troublesome for McChrystal were orders that were aimed at limiting Afghan civilian 
casualties, put into place because domestic and global opinion, as well as the US 
supported government in Kabul, was seen as harming NATO’s reputation elsewhere. 
The result of this was that in Afghanistan NATO was unable to achieve its stated goal 
of establishing a stable and sustainable peace in the country, whilst at the same time 
minimising the terrorist threat to US and NATO interests (Hastings, 2010). 
 
At the heart of this is what Riddel and Webber describe as wicked problems: 
observers of a given situation do not only differ in their view of how to address the 
issue, but even more fundamentally cannot agree on how to define the challenge in 
the first place, often because only contradictory and incomplete information is 
available (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Levin et al. elaborate this concept and present 
what they call super wicked problems which are characterised by four dynamics: (i) 
time is running out; (ii) there is an absence of central authority; (iii) the problem is, in 
part, caused by those who try to solve it; and (iv) possible future outcomes are 
irrationally discounted (Levin, Cashore, Bernstein, & Auld, 2012). The US and 
NATO deployment in Afghanistan fits all four of these characteristics, with the result 
that there is no solution for Afghanistan that will exist indefinitely, as will be shown 
in chapter six.  
 
Similarly, the war in Iraq has proved to be far from becoming a “strategic success” 
(Ricks, 2009, p. 9). Despite achieving a rapid and overwhelming military victory 
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against Saddam Hussein’s forces in 2003, the situation in Iraq continued to develop 
for the worse. Rather than being able to install a stable and non-violent political 
process in the country, the US forces found themselves in a situation in which their 
military domination became ineffective. Because domestic opinion in the US had 
assumed that, following George W. Bush’s statement of ‘mission accomplished’ on 1 
May 2003, there would no more casualties returning home in body bags, Washington 
became reluctant to put its soldiers at risk. Equally, the financial cost of the war had 
spiralled far past the initial estimates, with the result that much needed further funds 
and resources became difficult to justify. 
 
The situation deteriorated further in unexpected, and non-linear, ways. For example, 
the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by US personnel at the prison complex of Abu Ghraib in 
late 2003 and early 2004, turned public opinion both in Iraq and the United States and 
its allies distinctively against the invasion. The images depicting violent, sexually 
abusive behaviour and torture may mirror historical experiences in many other wars 
and violent conflicts in the past (Eisenman, 2007), but nonetheless caused outrage and 
resulted in great damage to the image of the United States. US forces were no longer 
associated with liberating the Iraqi people from the yoke of a dictatorial regime.  
 
Additionally, the earlier assumption made by the US that the Iraqi public would 
unambiguously support the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime, turned out to be 
unfounded. Due to slow and ineffective attempts by the US to rebuild Iraq, many 
former soldiers and beneficiaries of the earlier regime found themselves without 
income. This led to a rapid growth in crime and instability that the US forces were 
both unable (due to limited resources), and unwilling (due to their view of having 
accomplished their aim of removing Saddam Hussein), to counteract. Small conflicts 
between individuals in the country boiled over quickly and “accidental guerrillas” 
(Kilcullen, 2009, p. xiv) emerged: local fighters who used violence not because they 
were hostile to the United States, but because of the situation of societal breakdown 
that they perceived as a direct threat.  
 
Additionally, the effects of wider dynamics in changes to warfare became felt in the 
country regarding privatisation of conflict. Following the end of the Cold War, and 
the increasing trend of globalisation, private armed forces emerged with new vigour. 
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With the end of the ideological conflict of the superpowers, weak governments were 
no longer supported and growing economic interests around the globe produced the 
need for privately owned, organised and deployed armed/security forces (Shearer, 
1998). This trend towards private military forces has had a profound impact on how 
armed hostilities are being fought, and substantially weakens the control of the public 
sector over the private (Coker, 1999). In Iraq, Private Military Contractors (PMCs) 
emerged as an additional factor which weakened, rather than strengthened, security. 
Whilst their employment to protect US diplomats, officials and assets was politically 
attractive, their often uncontrolled and unregulated behaviour surmounted in a major 
strategic disadvantage for US interests (Fainaru, 2008). Future warfare will certainly 
contain at least some networked, horizontally organised and non-linear actors which 
will continue to have an advantage unless other parties will be able to develop a 
strategy that will eliminate their expediency. 
 
 
4.5	  Insurgency	  and	  counterinsurgency	  
 
It is erroneous that assume that it has only been in the recent past that non-linearity 
and complexity has created a substantial challenge for the armed forces of nation-
states. On the contrary, in his seminal work ‘Counterinsurgency Warfare’, David 
Galula points out the “asymmetry between the opposite camps of a revolutionary 
war” (Galula, 1964, 2006, p. 3). Because of the stark differences in numbers, training, 
resources and equipment between the state on the one hand, and those individuals 
who reject the existing order of a society on the other, the state will easily succeed in 
conventional and symmetrical violent conflicts. Galula references, much earlier than 
Bauman, the concept ‘fluidity’ as opposed to rigidity:  
“The insurgent is fluid because he has neither responsibility nor concrete 
assets; the counterinsurgent is rigid because he has both, and no amount of 
wailing can alter this fact for either side.” (Galula, 1964, 2006, p. 7) 
The ‘concrete assets’ which Galula talks about are at the centre of military tactics and 
strategy - the aim of military operations is the destruction or forced inoperability of 
the adversaries’ personnel, weapons, resources, command and control units while 
protecting one’s own and, by extension, the society in which the military is embedded 
into.  
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On the other hand, insurgents are aware of this and the superiority of militaries to 
project force. Because insurgents are fewer in number and lack resources, the 
existence of obvious assets and a hierarchic organisational structure would make them 
an easy prey. Instead, they rely on decentralised, largely non-hierarchical structures 
that are highly manoeuvrable, enabling them to blend into society in a way that makes 
combatants and civilians indistinguishable and, therefore, difficult to target.  
 
Insurgency, and the tactics employed by insurgents, has evolved at the same speed as 
the societies they emerge from. The ability of governments to analyse an insurgency 
and develop an effective counterinsurgency is complicated, because the concept is so 
broad, increasingly used, and underpinned by a multitude of factors that motivate 
these individuals to rise up against the status quo. The main lessons that were learned 
from the early years of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (but also elsewhere), were an 
increased awareness in the military that an exclusive focus on military operations to 
counter insurgencies is futile. Not only are military operations that rely on massive 
firepower often unable to address the results desired by those who aim to maintain the 
status quo, but efforts to do so can even be counter-productive. The military as an 
organisation is in many cases too rigid and slow to adapt its actions to the 
continuously changing tactics of insurgents. Additionally, conventional militaries lack 
training, equipment and resources to be able to understand and address the underlying 
causes of an armed uprising.  
 
The ability of an organisation to adapt to changes in the wider environment is key in 
this process; contemporary insurgencies are able to, for example, incorporate 
technologies very quickly due to their fluid organisational structure and weaker 
hierarchies:  
“Using the Internet, insurgents can now link virtually with allied groups 
throughout the a state, a region, and even the entire world. Insurgents often 
join loose organisations with common objectives but different motivations and 
no central controlling body, which makes identifying leaders difficult.” 
(Petraeus & Amos, 2006, p. 16) 
Instead of trying to oppose the military forces, insurgencies use their tools to try and 
communicate with the political and social dynamics of a military. Only a fraction of 
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the actions of today’s insurgencies focus on military operations; instead they try and 
defeat the opponent by making counterinsurgency operations politically, socially and 
economically too costly.  
 
The US military reacted to the growing role of technology, and especially information 
technology, by advocating a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA). Precision air 
strikes, GPS guided ordnance, improved intelligence gathering and analysis and 
distribution were hoped to provide an answer to the Clausewitzian ‘fog of war’, and 
provide strategies that would allow militaries to match the capacities of insurgents 
and eliminate their tactical advantage. Yet this approach has failed, since violent 
conflicts are non-linear: “Because of the complexity of the environment and the 
continuous interaction with adaptive enemies, understanding in armed conflict will 
never be complete”(Valcourt & Morton, 2009, p. 17) 
 
Maoist insurgency is arguably the first ‘modern’ insurgency, not because of Mao’s 
skills as a military commander, but because of his ability to place the political above 
the military dimension. Maoist tactics prescribe the inclusion of insurgencies into the 
local population – an ability that armed forces lack in most theatres. Central here is 
the development and maintenance of a shared identity between insurgents and the 
wider population – intelligence, resources, supplies and shelter could be accessed by 
insurgents without having to establish or maintain them. It also allowed for the rapid 
deployment of troops to commit acts of sabotage and weaken the enemies’ morale and 
willingness to follow the orders of its commanding structure.  
 
Since then, insurgency tactics have evolved at a much greater speed than military 
tactics since their most powerful weapon is what Mackinlay calls “Propaganda of the 
deed” (POTD): “the incitement of an animated or potentially violent audience through 
dramatic actions, rather than words” (Mackinlay, 2009, pp. 123-124). The aim of this 
is to use narratives of shared suffering as a tool to strengthen the network that 
supports the insurgents. Images and recordings of behaviour of the opponent are 
shared in within the network with the aim of discrediting the opponent, and increasing 
the number of those who support the insurgency as fighters, donors and sympathisers.  
 
 
	   55	  
5.	  Technology	  
 
POTD relies on communication technology to create, transmit and maintain the 
programme of the network with the internet being central to this. The emergence and 
continuous growth of the internet and communication technologies is changing 
human affairs on a global scale, including war:  
”Deterritorialisation” is an ugly word, but alas it has come to be very useful in 
describing aspects of post-modern society. Nations have become 
deterritorialised, social networks reaching around the world are 
deterritorialised, the virtual communities which exist only on the Internet are 
deterritorialised. […] It was therefore hardly surprising that the modern form 
of insurgency also became deterritorialised, as a response to what was 
happening on a much larger scale in the world.” (Mackinlay, 2009, p. 149) 
Contrary to the perception that an increasingly dense network of global 
communication will increase the exchange of opinion, moderate the behaviour of 
actors and lead to a decrease in hostility and violence, technology is actually a central 
component of wars, violent acts and terrorism: 
“In a sense, almost every contemporary savagery is accomplished with the 
technology of civilisation. In the Rwanda of 1994 the slaughter of the Tutsis 
was mobilised via radio broadcasts. In the attack against the Twin Towers on 
9/11 aircraft were used. […] There is no longer a ‘primitive’ terrorism. Indeed 
there is fear precisely because terrorism is no longer primitive: it is financed 
by flows of international capital; it is organised by electronic communications; 
it will attack airliners, warships, skyscrapers – and is able to destroy or 
seriously damage them.” (Chen, 2009, p. 64) 
This means that in order to understand the concept of networks, non-linearity and 
complexity, an understanding of the impact of the enabling technology is required. In 
fact, the technological developments themselves are the result of networking and the 
cooperation of a multitude of non-hierarchically linked nodes. Technology itself is not 
neutral, but has dynamics that cause unintended consequences – in other words it can 
have non-linear impacts on human behaviour. 
 
Modern forms of communication such as the internet and mobile telephone systems 
not only present new methods for linking nodes within a network, but they are by 
themselves the product of non-hierarchical and non-linear cooperation between 
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different clusters of educational, military and engineering entities. The technology 
itself, the ‘hardware’, was much less problematic than the need to develop a method 
of standardized communication, or a shared language. This shared language was 
developed between 1973 and 1978 by different research groups at two universities in 
California, and remains the standard for the operation of the internet today (Catells, 
2001). 
 
Citing a number of studies, Castells further argues that internet usage has little effect 
on the intensity or nature of links between individuals, but instead allows them to 
remain linked to a higher number of other nodes (ibid). The same author stated 
earlier:  
“[…] networking [is the] decentered form of organization and intervention, 
characteristic of the new social movements, mirroring, and counteracting, the 
networking logic of domination in the information society.” (Castells, 1997, p. 
362) 
This indicates that, by their nature, networks are inherently aimed at making 
themselves more efficient and stable, but it is also clear that this process is not 
centrally planned or controlled, but rather evolves out of the loose and uncoordinated 
cooperation between different sub-networks.  
 
However, ‘information society’ as Castells uses it does not mean that technology now 
allows for a new and truly global structure that connects individuals on an even level. 
Before the technological advancements of the internet, mass communication and 
infrastructure (such as transatlantic passenger air transport), non-hierarchical 
networks already existed and today’s networks are by no means globally uniform. 
Instead, they are uneven and contain fractures and gaps that are often ignored by those 
actors that are network-enabled. The role and nature of face-to-face, or primary 
networks is thus being affected and altered by technology, but not in an even or 
systematic way. While technological advancements allow the establishment and 
maintenance of primary networks on a geographically virtually unlimited scale, the 
image of a single global network as the backbone of the information society is flawed 
- gaps and fractures emerge and continue to exist (Barry, 2001). 
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At the same time communication technology has enabled a new global movement of 
critical citizens. Email and web-based information has created platforms for the 
exchange of ideas, enabling cooperation, publication and the raising of funds, as well 
as organizing resistance and civil disobedience movements. The protests against the 
World Trade Organization’s summit in Seattle in 1999 are argued to be a major 
indicator for the emergence of networks as a political actor, as well as those networks 
being a symbol for protest. The loose and decentralized cooperation of different and 
diverse kinds of networks and organizations relies on technology, most importantly 
the internet, but also on three specific features: (i) they are transnational; (ii) they are 
informational - meaning that they use symbols and tactics that allow identification 
and participation by a wide audience; and (iii) they are based on flexible and 
decentralized networks. These individual components have been used before, but 
combined they produced an entirely different phenomenon, with an outcome bigger 
than the sum of its parts (Juris, 2005).  
 
Another important factor regarding technology, its developments and evolution is the 
growing interconnection and linkage between systems. The power plants that provide 
the energy to maintain the main servers of the Internet are, for security reasons, not 
connected to the internet, but as the Tsunami that followed an earthquake in the 
Pacific of the coast of Japan in 2011 demonstrated, an unpredictable event can cause 
the failure of a power station and disable backup systems. The result of this was that 
many Internet servers in Japan lost power and, together with the rupture of fiberglass 
cables, in much of Japan the internet broke down leading to a freeze of the stock 
market, failures in air traffic control, seemingly mundane loss of control of traffic 
lights, hotel bookings and online social networks. The more complex a network 
becomes, the more likely it is that “x-events” emerge: unpredictable and 
uncontrollable events that can trigger a failure similar to that where a biologic virus 
spreads through the system and triggers further events, leading to a major breakdown 
or even complete loss of capacity (Casti, 2012, p. 14). Just like the initial trigger is 
often unpredictable, so is the course that the system meltdown is taking. ‘X-events’ 
that trigger this kind of cascade are rare, but they do exist and will happen. The only 
chance to try and prevent this kind of system-wide meltdown is to include backup 
systems, redundancies and reserve capacities but, paradoxically, this will further 
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increase technological complexity and expand the number of nodes that can trigger a 
meltdown (Casti, 2012). 
 
 
5.1	  Self-­‐reflection,	  knowledge	  and	  big	  data	  
 
With the continued growth of computing power and data storage, their relative cost 
decreases exponentially allowing for more data to be created, stored and evaluated. 
From complex astronomical models, climate simulation, images, internet search 
engine data to social networks, an increasing amount of information emerges which in 
itself can be evaluated and interpreted. The underlying binary data is regarded as ‘big 
data’, and while this term lacks a clear definition it can be described as follows:  
“Big data refers to things one can do at a scale that cannot be done at a smaller 
one, to extract new insights or create new forms of value, in ways that change 
markets, organizations, the relationship between citizens and governments, 
and more.” (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013, p. 6) 
By decentralising the analytical hardware into giant networks of computers, enormous 
numbers of calculations can now be made, and bigger sets of data than ever before 
can be evaluated and analysed. For example, from the first decoding of human DNA 
in 2003 it took nearly a decade to sequence its three billion base pairs, but today this 
process can be done within 24 hours. Underpinned by the ability to compare the DNA 
of thousands of people, it is likely that medical science will evolve from treating a 
patient after he or she has developed symptoms, to pre-emptive treatment. Also, for 
an individual, the knowledge that you are genetically at risk from suffering a certain 
condition will impact your behaviour, for example you may seek to avoid factors that 
are connected with triggering the development of that condition.  
 
As well as the ability to analyse increasingly large amounts of data, there are two 
additional components of big data that deserve attention. Firstly, rather than focusing 
on a small and limited number of examples, ‘big data’ enables observers to embrace 
data that is much wider and more disarranged, in a way that more closely represents 
the ‘real’ world than a small sample could be. Secondly, it allows a much deeper 
analysis into correlation rather than causality (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013).  
 
	   59	  
When applied to the analysis of social networks, the effects of big data may mean that 
human beings are now much more able to comprehend complexity, and reflect on the 
impact their actions have. The butterfly effect is now no longer an abstract analogy but 
instead can now, due to technology allowing the evaluation of data and a grander 
scale, be observed in connection to actions taken (or not taken) by individuals. In 
other words, big data is changing the way human beings self-reflect, which is a 
fundamental and defining component of our species. Big data has not created the 
butterfly effect but instead is making individuals much more aware of their very own 
role in complex adaptive systems. The agency of individual human beings has always 
been at the heart of any change, but invariably the very same individuals were not 
aware of the potentially global impact their actions were having. Today’s technology 
is changing this and, as a result, is changing how human beings behave. 
 
Castells picks up on this and applies it to communication. What he describes as “mass 
self-communication” (Castells, 2009, p. 55) is the impact of technology and the 
awareness of it by individuals on their abilities to communicate. Individuals can now 
not only communicate interpersonally, or via largely undirected mass-communication 
to many (for example), but also in a way in which the author (the ‘self’) decides who 
he wants to reach. Communication is an important component of identity of an 
individual and, because technology allows the breakdown of the traditional limits of 
human communication, people alter their way of socialising. The radical in Florida 
who threatened to burn a Quran would most likely not have done this a generation 
ago, because he lacked the ability to have an impact beyond his immediate social 
network. Today, however, he can direct his communication in a way in which he 
assumes to receive the greatest audience and, therefore, reaction - the process of 
communication outpaces the message that is communicated.  
 
 
5.2	  Inequality,	  weak	  hierarchies	  and	  self-­‐organisation	  
 
Related to the impact of technology in communication is the on-going weakening of 
structures that determined who could communicate with whom. Traditionally, social 
hierarchy and individual resources determined the ability of an individual to 
communicate with others. Leaders, for example, were judged to be powerful because 
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they had a ‘direct line’ to others - their message was not at risk of becoming lost in 
the corridors of power. Today, this is markedly different:  
“Network designs are diffusing widely, as new technologies power the 
expansion of globally connected, yet locally rooted computer-supported social 
movements. These are increasingly organized around highly flexible all-
channel patterns rather than more traditional top-down political formations.” 
(Juris, 2005, p. 349) 
Juris’ statement is echoed by Castells, who does not see society as the passive 
recipient of technological developments, but instead as a component of a complex 
feedback process in which technology both answers to demands made by society, but 
also in which society adapts and modifies its behaviour according to the available 
technologies. This creates a similar constant change as is seen in the networks the 
technologies, in effect, provide the structure for:  
“Society shapes technology according to the needs, values and interests of 
people who use the technology, Furthermore, information and communication 
technologies are particularly sensitive to the effects of social uses on 
technology.” (Castells, 2006, p. 3) 
At the same time, technology alone will be unable to facilitate a network: the 
software, which is the ability of different nodes to communicate, is equally important. 
Without a shared language as an enabler, and a shared desire to communicate and 
cooperate, the network will not become an actor by itself.  
 
Processes in nature are examples of this: what allows fire ants to assemble themselves 
into a raft enabling whole colonies of ants to remain afloat for weeks at a time? These 
rafts are constructed without tools or materials, but are rather are self-constructing, 
self-healing and self-deconstructing. They allow ants to cross large bodies of water 
without suffering any casualties. A single ant would be unable to accomplish this task, 
and yet a ‘superorganism’ of an ant colony is able to achieve this without central 
command; while individual ants can be observed as a colony, their behaviour can be 
compared to that of fluids (Mlot, Tovey, & Hu, 2011).  
 
Human beings rely on more complex social constructions, and human interaction is 
influenced by the ability to observe and reflect and, to a certain extent, alter the 
environment. At the same time, processes in nature prove that non-hierarchical 
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networks can facilitate cooperation on a large scale even without the existence of 
technologic infrastructure. Simple human effects, such as the initially random, but 
suddenly synchronized, clapping of a large, diverse and previously socially 
unacquainted audience are a great example of social self-organization in the absence 
of central coordination (Neda, Ravasz, Vicsek, Brechet, & Barabasi, 2000). 
 
The result is that technological developments can have unintended consequences, 
both in regards to how they are used and how their use impacts on the behaviour of 
those who operate or are affected by them. RMA, for example, has produced an 
unprecedented system of global surveillance capable of observing, recording and 
monitoring electronic communications, yet the adversaries of the United States are 
able to largely escape this technology by returning to pen, paper and human couriers. 
At the same time, this weakens their ability to communicate with relative speed and to 
reach a potentially global audience. It also limits their ability to create and maintain 
an identity that underlies their actions; this matters because a network’s ability to 
perpetuate itself relies on its ability maintain a unifying identity and narrative. 
Technological developments, both in terms of computing power and network 
infrastructure (the hardware), as well as the logarithms and computer code (the 
software), have a major impact on human behaviour. This process, however, is neither 
universal for all human beings on the planet, nor is it possible to qualify this process 
as inherently positive or negative. The growth of communication and information 
technology is raising a number of new questions and challenges, both morally and 
technologically, that have not yet been answered.  
 
 
6.	  Narrative	  and	  identity	  
 
Because networks are theoretically unlimited in size and have the inherent capacity to 
change (i.e. links between nodes emerge and disappear on a constant basis, they alter 
their character or disappear and are replaced by other nodes), the dynamic that keeps 
them in existence and unified is of great importance. In social networks, this dynamic 
is called ‘identity’.  
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Identity provides a narrative of why and how links exist and what kind of 
communication, and in what form, is taking place along them. Because of the growing 
speed and fluctuation in which entire networks emerge and disappear, the role of 
identity and meaning has grown greatly. Castells defines ‘identity’ as 
“[…] the existence of specific sets of values and beliefs in which specific 
human groups recognize themselves. Cultural identification is largely the 
result of the geography and history of human organization, but it can also be 
formed on the basis of specific projects of identity-building.” (Castells, 2009, 
p. 117) 
‘Identity’ is related to the ability of an individual to self-reflect and to recognize 
themselves in the values, norms and beliefs of those he or she is linked to. Identities 
are not fixed entities, but are subject to conscious and subconscious, or deliberate and 
accidental changes. Individuals refer to their identity to receive guidance and 
justifications for their actions and behaviour, but identities are also altered by the 
actions and behaviour of those who adhere to them. For example, an individual born 
and raised in a specific country may identify so strongly with it that he or she is 
willing to risk life and health to defend it when it is perceived to be under threat. 
Equally so, other identities, such as a person’s religious identity or identity based on 
personal history, can interfere with this. For example, supporting one’s nation, an 
individual may feel torn, arguing that his or her religion does not permit violence; 
this, in turn, can then alter the underlying norms and values that lie at the heart of 
their national identity.  
 
Unless faced with existential threats, individuals may have multiple identities that do 
not necessarily compete with each other. Identities are based on a shared narrative of 
a group; for example the members of a family support each other because they believe 
that their shared bloodline demands this. Identities also provide structure and 
reliability regardless of the circumstances; for example, because they share a 
narrative, children expect their parents to provide security and shelter, and siblings 
generally support each other regardless of the circumstances. At the heart of every 
group or network are norms and values that may not be clearly defined, but are shared 
by those who consider themselves to be part of it. For example, in an analysis of the 
structure of an internationally operating software company, Orlikowski shows that the 
ability of organisations to produce a successful product or service does not depend on 
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a certain technology, infrastructure or leadership, but instead on a shared identity. 
This shared identity allows the company and its employees to adapt their 
organisational structure according to the needs and requirements of a certain project. 
Many employees are involved with multiple projects at any given time and, according 
to them, the cooperation is possible due to the shared experience of the past and 
present (Orlikowski, 2002). 
 
The more an individual feels insecure or under threat, however, the more important 
the identity that ties him or her to a group providing support becomes. At the same 
time, the importance and intensity of other identities, perceived as being less valuable 
or important in the context of the threat decreases. Sen argues convincingly that 
violence, or the threat of violence, forces individuals to shed many of their identities 
which in turn limits moderation and compromise: 
“‘Many of the conflicts and barbarities in the world are sustained through the 
illusion of a unique and choiceless identity.” (Sen, 2006, p. xv) 
Kalyvas points out that identities and narratives are shaped in order to increase group 
cohesion, and to justify the use of violence against those who are perceived to be 
outsiders It is not the existence of different identities that causes and maintains 
violence in civil wars, but the shaping of identities within networks to justify violence 
(Kalyvas, 2006). From this we see that sectarian violence is not the cause of war, but 
the outcome (Kaldor, 2013).  
 
 
7.	  Programming	  networks	  
 
Castells goes further than this when he looks at how and why identities are created 
and maintained. At the heart of every network lies a purpose and aim. In a family this 
may be the survival and well being of its members, in a religious network this may be 
the reaching of salvation and, for a company, it may be the creation of financial value 
through development of a product. This purpose, and the way the nodes of a network 
act in order to reach this aim, is determined by the programme that is basis for the 
network’s identity: 
“A network is defined by the program that assigns the network its goals and its 
rules of performance. […] In social and organizational networks, social actors, 
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fostering their values and interests, and in interaction with other social actors, 
are at the origin of the creation and programming of networks.” (Castells, 
2009, p. 20) 
The individuals who are the nodes of a network are responsible for this programming 
and, in this, way determine the norms and values that are employed to reach the 
earlier defined goal. In a religious network for example, the person who is able to 
convince the other members of the network that he or she has the supreme ability to 
analyse and interpret scripture will be more able than other members of the network 
to determine the behaviour of the other nodes. Power, or the ability to influence the 
behaviour of others should not be measured by the title or seniority of an individual, 
but by her or his ability to influence the programme of a network (Castells, 2011). 
 
In a world in which technology allows the ever-faster creation of links, and therefore 
networks, there is intense rivalry and competition for by whom, and how, a network’s 
programme is created and maintained. Additionally, different networks compete with 
each other both in terms of affectivity and their ability to reach their goal. For 
example, the ability of different companies to create a product will engender 
competition in attracting the most creative minds and resources (such as funding and 
infrastructure). The individual at the helm of the company will be under constant 
pressure, both from the outside of his enterprise and the inside, to show his primacy in 
the creation of value. If he is judged as unable to do so, or if others are perceived to be 
more likely to succeed than he, then he will lose his influence in the network and, in 
this way, his ability to influence the programme of that network.  
 
So, nodes which are more able than others to determine the programme of a network 
are considered to have the most power, but power is also generated by a node 
demonstrating ability to link different networks to each other:  
“Networks (and the sets of interests and values they embody) cooperate or 
compete with each other. Cooperation is based on the ability to communicate 
between networks. This ability depends on the existence of codes of 
translation and inter-operability between the networks (protocols of 
communication) and on access to connecting points (switches).” (Castells, 
2009, p. 20) 
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For social networks, this indicates that they are forced to maintain communication 
with other networks. For example, a terrorist organisation will be unable to reach its 
goals by killing individuals or causing sabotage. Instead, their success depends on 
their ability to communicate with other networks. So in the case of terrorism, it is the 
broadcasting of images and stories of the atrocities with the aim of altering the 
behaviour of those who do not share its identity and narrative which indicates success. 
How important the role of these ‘switches’ which are the nodes that link different sub-
networks, is can also be seen in the growing influence of press officials and 
spokespersons in the political realm: they are the link between the political networks 
and media networks and, in this capacity, are of fundamental importance in 
determining how the two networks (and the underlying sub-networks) are able to 
reach their distinct goals. Simplified, their overall goals differ – for the political 
network its goal is to successfully implement policy, and for the media network it is 
to increase revenue by broadcasting information. However, each network needs the 
other in order to be successful on their own terms.  
 
The programming and re-programming of networks allows them to counter their own 
inherent instability and volatility. Networks will seek to increase their ability to 
survive in a world in which change and fragmentation is becoming increasingly 
powerful a force. Powerful nodes with the ability to shape the programme of a 
network will try and construct a programme for their network that is based on an 
identity that is singular, and does not allow others to exist in parallel. The statement 
“you are with us, or with the terrorists” may come from former US President George 
W. Bush, but applies to all networks. By creating an existentialist threat on the outside 
of their own network, they try to create an even stronger force to bind the nodes in 
their own network together. In reality, this in itself is a cause for violence, since it 
forces individuals to take a side in a conflict in which, in most cases, they do not want 
to take part in (Kilcullen, 2009). The title of Chris Hedges’ book “War is a Force that 
Gives Us Meaning” (2003) could not be clearer: war and violence is the most 
powerful means of creating and maintaining networks. In this light, the impact of 
violence in the creation, maintenance and functioning of networks demands much 
further analysis.  
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7.1	  Violence	  and	  programming	  
 
Castells is not alone when he focuses much of his analysis of networks and their 
dynamics on circumstances where non-violence dominates. Network analysts 
predominately look at how individuals choose to create and maintain links between 
themselves for their mutual benefit. ‘Networking’ is a contemporary buzz-word that 
represents how individuals try to create links in order to communicate and cooperate 
on a voluntary basis, but much ‘networking’ takes place in an environment in which 
no alternative exists. The people of Libya, for example, did not consciously choose to 
suddenly (and without much precedent) risk their lives in order to remove the political 
network dominated by Muammar al-Gadhafi. Instead, the programme created and 
maintained by Gadhafi had become unable to address the challenges of the people 
who were, due to their citizenship and location, part of the programme. When Gadhafi 
proved to be unwilling and unable to alter the programme to address these challenges, 
which ranged from corruption, injustice, and social and economic stagnation, he tried 
to violently clamp down on rivalling networks and their identities. The result was that 
the opposition was forced together, and reacted to the mass-violence with counter-
violence, which ultimately led to the overthrow of Gadhafi’s regime and the 
programme it maintained. However, when the opposition was successful and 
overthrew the old order, it also lost the unifying force that bound it together and 
provided a shared narrative and identity, causing a fratricide of those who had shortly 
before fought together successfully.  
 
Galula’s work on revolutionary war describes the effects well. In essence, he explains 
what Castells would term ‘reprogramming’. When the existing order is unable to 
address the grievances of the population and tries to maintain a programme in which 
the sole goal is to maintain the status quo at all costs, then growing repression of 
alternative programmes follows, ultimately leading to a violent conflict between 
rivalling programmes.  
 
The growing interconnection of the world, assisted by the technological advances 
discussed earlier, has created a virtually global audience for competing programmes, 
in which the programmers are trying to appeal to those who feel left out to join their 
networks. By creating an existential narrative that depicts the programme of their 
network as the only one to address their grievances, and as one which provides 
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meaning and identity, fundamentalists are no longer limited to their immediate 
geographic surroundings for support and resources. Instead, these programmers rely 
on technology to create a global network with the aim of overthrowing the existing 
order. Additionally, because they compete with many other identities and networks, 
including with others found within their own network who may be competing for 
power, they will try to maintain their position by using violence. Violence is used as a 
tool to maintain the existentialist nature of their identity.  
 
In Afghanistan, for example, violence binds all actors together in their struggle for 
meaning. For the NATO forces in the country, violence is central to their identity, not 
only in regards to their attempts to install a programme in the country that secures 
their position as programmers there, but also to show to their domestic audience the 
existentialist nature of the threat there. Without this, the citizens of the NATO 
countries would most likely be unwilling to join their armed forces, or to accept the 
results of the NATO campaign that kills and maims their soldiers in a faraway 
country. On the other side are the programmers in the insurgent networks, who use 
violence as a tool to keep their fragmented and often divided networks bound 
together. Violence is used to maintain their sources of income which, in most cases, 
depend on financial support from outsiders who share the goals promoted by the 
insurgents, or proceedings gained from criminal enterprises such as drug smuggling, 
kidnapping, protection money and ransom. 
 
 
8.	  Conclusion	  
 
Today’s world is not growing more complex than it was in the past but, aided by 
technology, changes happen both more quickly and can be observed more easily. 
Complexity and chaos are dynamics that have emerged together with modern forms 
of communication and the internet, but this is only because technology allows it to be 
more easily observed, and on a global level. Because complexity has always existed, 
it is futile to argue that the development of how to deal with complex adaptive 
systems is the answer. Instead, the approach to complexity has to be broadened to 
incorporate a study of the underlying dynamics, including the challenges faced within 
international relations.  
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Terrorism, for example, has only become the focus of many governments since the 
attacks of 9/11, due to the effects of the attacks being broadcast live on television to a 
global audience. In fact, the use of fear as a tool to gain concessions is much older. 
Today, the risk of becoming the victim of a terrorist attack has only marginally 
increased, but because the images of terrorism are now omnipresent they have altered 
the perception of risk and vulnerability.  
 
Instability and insecurity have equally emerged as defining characteristics of 
modernity, but this is also misleading since, in most parts of the world, life 
expectancy and quality of life are increasing. For example, in China some 300 million 
people have emerged from poverty since the early 1980s. Another example - despite 
the economic turmoil that has affected much of the world since 2007, there are now 
more people than ever covered by health insurance in the United States. Transnational 
cooperation has increased the ability of ‘civil society’ to join forces, and gives a voice 
to those who earlier would have lost out against more powerful governments and 
business actors (Juris, 2005). 
 
The challenge for international relations is to understand both the dynamics of 
complexity and networks, but also how violence impacts the formation and 
maintenance of identity and meaning and, in this way, the programming of networks. 
Communication is central to networks, and violence has to be understood as a form of 
communication in the creation and changes that take place in today’s world.  
 
Just as the natural sciences initially rejected the concept of chaos and non-linearity, so 
do the social sciences need to accept the fact that complexity and non-linearity is an 
inherently positive concept, and one that is fundamental for the maintenance of the 
equilibrium of the system that manifests the basis for societies.  
 
Violence is a central component of human behaviour and communication. On the 
initial view, violence is exclusively harmful, being an unpleasant feeling or emotion, 
and one which indicates a danger or threat. In most cases it forces a change of 
behaviour to avoid or eliminate the danger or threat. Only on further observation does 
the unifying ability of violence emerge. Violence binds social networks together by 
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helping to create a shared narrative and identity. Additionally, technological advances 
are causing an ever-faster emergence, change and fragmentation of social networks, 
and the dynamics that bind these structures together demand further analysis. The 
terms ‘complexity’ and ‘network’ are more than mere ‘buzz words’ of the present, but 
as the discussion in this chapter has shown they contain and represent dynamics 
which need to be understood in order to deal with the challenges the world is faced 
with today. 	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Chapter	  3:	  Networks	  and	  Violence	  
 
1.	  Introduction	  
 
Networks are groups of human beings in which every individual is a node that is 
linked to other individuals. The links between individuals are made up by 
communication in a myriad of different forms, including different spoken languages 
with different grammar and lexis, symbols, music and other forms of human 
behaviour such as touch, look, sound and smell. In this context, it is important to 
emphasise that every individual is an element of several networks that may or may 
not overlap in membership, and that different networks use different forms of 
communication. For example, a human being can be a member of a family, a 
company or firm, a religious group, a sports club and a political party (all networks) 
all at the same time. The association of individuals to certain groups is important not 
only because human beings need social contacts, but also because they help to 
provide the goods necessary for survival, such as food, water, security and, in a less 
visible way, identity and meaning. Group membership provides a means for the 
creation and maintenance of identity, but it is important to be aware of the fact that 
identities are plural, and that one identity need not necessarily obliterate the 
significance of others.  
 
Additionally, every individual or node decides by him or herself how to deal with 
possible diverging loyalties and priorities between identities that may emerge and 
compete for dominance (Sen, 2006). For example, a mother who is working as a car 
mechanic in a family-owned business has relationships that connect her to a myriad of 
different networks that may compete with each other. She may experience 
competition between her professional identity and her role as a mother, or she may 
feel conflict with her identity as a car mechanic and her identity as a woman or as a 
wife. However, since each of these links can be considered necessary for her (the 
node’s) survival and wellbeing, these possible conflicts may not be acknowledged or 
considered to exist. Conflicts, however, always exist, because limited resources and 
an individual’s desire to maximise returns and property predetermine that even the 
most harmonious and homogenous associations to networks contain conflicts. 
However, only in very few instances do these conflicts actually lead to open hostility 
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and violence that, in turn, impacts on identity formation and maintenance. Stress and 
insecurity in the immediate environment damages an individual’s ability to maintain 
multiple identities and affiliations to different networks. In the most extreme cases, it 
can result in only a single identity remaining, defined not by positive association but 
increasingly by opposition to others, which acts only to fuel the perception of stress 
and insecurity (Ibid).  
 
Sen’s analysis can be applied to the aforementioned example of the female car 
mechanic: if her profession as a mechanic is threatened by the establishment of a 
major car dealership in proximity to her family-owned business, she may be required 
to invest more of her time and energy at work, neglecting her family, which will result 
in dissatisfaction. Facing conflicts in both roles, one identity may subconsciously 
replace her multiple identities with a singular that is defined by the hostility towards 
the major car dealership. The singular identity also means that her links into other 
networks – for example, to the network of her family as a wife and mother – 
disappear. As Sen points out, the members of the immediate network in a conflict will 
often demand a change in the form of communication with individuals who are 
outside this network in order to increase group cohesion (Ibid). 
 
Networks are established and maintained by communication between the nodes. If 
there is no communication between two nodes then the links will degrade and, 
ultimately, disappear. However, at the same time, new links may be in the process of 
being established, or existing links may be strengthened or weakened depending on 
internal and external factors. The forms of communication (the ‘how’ and ‘what’) 
depend on the programme or protocol of the network in question - in other words, the 
network determines the ‘language’ and ‘grammar’ of how its nodes communicate. 
The most central, and perhaps obvious, form of human communication is spoken and 
written language and, so far, most analyses of networks and network theory have 
focused on this form. However, there are other ways in which human beings 
communicate with each other, including imagery, music, symbols and rituals, and 
violence. As this chapter will argue, violence is a form of communication that has 
been excluded from the analyses of networks which, thus far, have focused on vocal 
communication.  
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Violence is, and always has been, a form of human communication. Confrontation 
and cooperation may be based on spoken language, but may also be based on hurting 
or being hurt, or simply the threat of hurting or being hurt. The sensation of pain is 
known to all human beings, just as pleasure and satisfaction is, but how pain is 
regarded will depend on the human environment of the individual. This is highlighted 
by Clausewitz, who raises a very important question when he states: “Is war not just 
another expression of their thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its grammar 
indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.” (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 253). To use violence 
as a tool requires there to be a wider system in which it is embedded, which 
Clausewitz calls ‘policy’ (op.cit). War is not caused only by pure hatred, but rather: 
“[P]olicy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa.” 
(op.cit). Policy is a creation of human agency and identity; it depends on the 
interpretation by individuals of the environment around them, leading them to choose 
and shape their reaction and behaviour.  
 
Akbar Ahmed analyses Osama bin Laden’s justification for killing innocent civilians, 
and argues that bin Laden is struggling to balance two distinct identities: on the one 
hand he has his social and kindred links to Yemeni tribes and, on the other hand, he 
has his political and religious affiliation to Islam. The former identity places great 
emphasis on honour, revenge and martyrdom, while the latter prominently focuses on 
the protection of innocents and the categorical prohibition of suicide. In the same 
way, the US’ reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was divided between the rhetoric 
of supporting human rights and democracy on a global level, and the implementation 
of a strategy that allowed countries such as China and Russia to justify violent 
campaigns against domestic opposition as part of the US’ led ‘War on Terror’. 
Ahmed argues that this dichotomy is caused by the struggle between ‘the core’, i.e. 
the actors who shape the discourse at the centre (the Bush government in Washington 
DC), and the periphery, i.e. those who are struggling to make their voices heard 
(generally referred to as ‘The Taliban’) (Ahmed 2013).  
 
However, when applied to the discourse of network analysis, the distinction between 
core and periphery actors is inconclusive, since those actors who Ahmed categorises 
as in the periphery, place themselves in the core. In other words, those who fight 
along Al Qaida’s ideology in Afghanistan and Pakistan see themselves as being at the 
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heart of the ‘War on Terror’, and argue that the US government in Washington is the 
periphery, because it is not directly involved in violence. Instead of a struggle 
between core and periphery actors, it is the immediate environment that determines 
the form of communication that is used by individual actors.  
 
Christopher Coker describes this as “the grammar of killing” – the “articulation of an 
act: how we perceive it, how we reflect on why others do what they do and how we 
tend to experience once done.” (Coker, 2008, p. 115). Violence, says Coker, always 
has two actors: the victim and the perpetrator. Expressive violence can become 
symbolic and may indicate fear, loss and humiliation for the victim on the one hand, 
but create reputation and status for the perpetrator on the other.  
 
An example of expressive violence can be seen in David Kilcullen’s study of the 
motivation for Afghan individuals to join fire-fights between insurgents and coalition 
forces. Kilcullen found that there was little aversion towards violence: “The Afghan 
insurgents and former insurgents I have encountered do love the fight: they like to 
win, and are certainly not averse to killing, but what they really love is the fight, jang 
(battle), for its own sake.” (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 77). Historically, the absence of 
governmental presence, the harsh terrain and life of the inhabitants, and the lack of 
goods to indicate social standing, meant that the reputation and social standing of an 
individual depended on his, often orally transmitted, fighting record. Particularly in 
the absence of rules, medical care and social security, every fight comes at a high risk 
for an Afghan, yet the rewards remain an important motivation.  
 
In a post-modern society, status and personal standing are often displayed in the form 
of status symbols, such as cars or jewellery. Conversely, in a pre-modern society, or 
in any society that is experiencing great turmoil such as a war, these items are either 
scarce or absent. The void is filled with reputation and, in particular, an individual’s 
reputation in his or her immediate social group. This also benefits the network the 
individual is part of: having fierce and feared warriors in the network’s midst will 
ensure that foes are intimidated and refrain from hostilities against the entire group. 
 
Just like in a network, where the connections between nodes enable communication 
between nodes, so do “human characteristics and experience exist only and through 
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people’s relations.” (Coker, 2008, p. 124). As a social animal, mankind depends on 
being embedded in an environment with two-way connections – we influence our 
environment as much as we are influenced by it.  
 
The role of the environment, and the circumstances of the individual, are also at the 
centre of John Keegan’s work in which he questions the origins of war as an activity 
that only primates and human beings share. War is not necessarily always about the 
destruction and control of resources, but it is always about narrative and rituals 
(Keegan, 1993). Hence, violence is not only a form of communication, but also a tool 
of human identity. Sharing rituals and creating a narrative relies on shared 
experiences that are communicated within the network or society. The more that is 
shared, the closer the network becomes and, importantly, it is communication in its 
multitude of forms, including violence, which provides the necessary tools to enable 
this to occur. 
 
In a Hobbesian world, the individual who possesses the greatest ability to cause harm 
will be able to dominate all others and, in this way, ensure his or her own survival and 
well-being. Since communication is so central to human nature, individuals constantly 
interact with each other. In order to be able to carry a message and meaning, however, 
individuals need to agree on a grammar. This grammar is shaped by the individual 
nodes in an on-going process. Just like spoken or written language is able to carry an 
integrative effect – that is, it has a positive and constructive effect - it can also be 
disintegrative – negative and destructive. A spoken expression can be both, i.e. it can 
have the effect of supporting the well-being and survival of an individual, or it can 
have the opposite effect, creating fear and insecurity. Violence conforms to the same 
dynamics; on the one hand it can provide the means to satisfy the needs so central to 
human existence, such as food, shelter and meaning. On the other hand, violence has 
the potential to harm and destroy, including ultimately terminating a human existence.  
 
This dual functionality of violence requires some analysis. In particular, an analysis 
and application of Castells’ approach to the study of communication networks will 
follow, providing the theoretical underpinnings. This will be followed by a discussion 
of analogue and digital forms of violence. On this foundation, there will then be a 
final analysis of the integrative, or positive effect, that violence can have, and 
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likewise, in the following chapter, the negative or disintegrative outcome. This 
discussion will highlight the centrality of violence as a component of human 
interaction, and is intended to demonstrate that in order to fully understand networks 
and power, all forms of human communication have to be applied - including 
violence. Only by understanding the dynamics of the range of all behaviours that 
make up human interaction can network theory be a useful tool for the analysis, as 
well as the modification, of human behaviour.  
 
2.	  Castells’	  network	  theory	  and	  violence	  
 
It is telling that Castells chooses to begins his book ‘Communication Power’ (2009) 
with a description of how, as a teenager in Franco’s Spain, he tried to share 
information that was deemed to be subversive. Having sensed the suffocating and 
negative nature of the regime, he decided to print and distribute leaflets aimed to aid 
the revolution. While Castells uses this as an example in his thesis that power lies not 
in the individual, but in the links an individual has with others, in the same example 
he points out the role of violence: the motivation to join the resistance existed 
regardless of the fact that police repression had severely decimated the opposition, 
that being caught distributing leaflets meant being beaten up by the police, and 
highlights the role of coercion as the underlying dynamic that governs society. 
Castells’ thesis evolves around the concept of communication as the link between 
individuals, and between individuals and the social and natural environment. At the 
heart of his analysis lies the ‘network society’ - “the social structure that characterises 
society in the early twenty-first century, a social structure constructed around (but not 
determined by) digital networks of communication.” (Castells, 2009, p. 4). 
Accordingly, while developments in communication technology are shaping today’s 
society, other, and older, dynamics are still of great importance. Castells himself 
points towards the centrality of violence when he writes: “[T]here is complementary 
and reciprocal support between the two main mechanisms of power formation 
identified by theories of power: violence and discourse.” (Castells, 2009, p. 11). Yet, 
when Castells studies the emergence and formation of resistance and insurgency, he 
bypasses the impact of violence and instead focuses on how dissenting individuals 
organise: 
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“Throughout history, anger has sparked protests, resistance, and even 
revolutions, starting from an aggravating event, and escalating into a rejection 
of the authority responsible, as the accumulation of injuries and insults 
suddenly becomes intolerable. The price of bread, the suspicion of witchcraft, 
or the injustice of rulers have been more frequent sources of revolts and social 
movements than the ideals of emancipation. In fact, it is often the case that 
these ideals only come to life by germinating in the fertile soil of popular 
anger against the unjust.” (Castells, 2009, p. 347). 
Modern forms of communication, especially digital media, only serve as a tool for 
processes that have been central to human interaction since the emergence of 
societies. 
 
 
2.1	  Digital	  and	  analogue	  communication	  
 
Digital communication is based on compliance and acceptance on the grounds that it 
largely lacks the enforcing agent of the physical sensation of pain (the internet does 
not have a component that is able to exert physical violence or hurt). Analogue 
communication is far more diverse in its methods, being based on both violent and 
non-violent forms of communication. Spoken language, for example, can be used as a 
rewarding and constructive tool by presenting a message of encouragement and 
support, and as a punishing and rejecting tool by insulting or threatening. Digital 
communication is much less able to do this. Analogue communication is therefore 
much more persuasive in its ability to create and maintain, as well as destroy and 
prevent, links between individuals, or betweem individuals and society or wider 
networks. When Castells argues for the power of the network society then, he 
emphasises the enabling character of digital communication, the somewhat 
benevolent nature that allows individuals to connect and exchange information based 
entirely on shared sentiments. In other words, the message in a threatening website, 
email or mobile-phone conversation is much weaker than if the same message is 
presented analogue, face-to-face or, in the most extreme case, through direct physical 
violence. The important point in Castells’ introduction is that violence is as much a 
form of communication between individuals as language is - the words on a leaflet 
which aim to stir an individual to a certain kind of action are as much a form of 
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violence as the baton a police officer brings down on a member of the opposition in 
order to discourage him or her from continuing their action. At the same time, the 
action these forms of communication are trying to provoke do not necessarily need to 
intend to change the status quo; a leaflet can equally argue for inaction, just as much 
as for action, just as a baton can be used to encourage an individual into inaction, 
rather than action.  
 
Human beings do not necessarily make a conscious distinction between analogue and 
digital communication, and are often unaware of the different impact the same 
information can have when transmitted through different media. For example, an 
insult made in a face-to-face conversation between two individuals will have very 
different consequences to when the same insult is made in a Twitter feed read by 
thousands. This unawareness of impact is particularly amplified in the digital realm, 
since individuals are often unaware of the network structure they create with their 
online behaviour, meaning most do not fully comprehend the impact of their digital 
communication (Kahler, 2009). Communication is thus not always a conscious 
process, and every form of communication has both intended and unintended 
consequences. Furthermore, while spoken and written language may be the most 
obvious forms of communication, there are other important forms such as pictorial 
and aural. It is possible to transmit both violent and non-violent messages using all of 
these forms of communication since all communication is an expression of human 
agency which has the dual aims of satisfying survival and creating and maintaining a 
narrative. Castells focuses his work on the more obvious component of networks: the 
integrative human behaviour. In other words he focuses on human behaviour and 
communication that is generally referred to as positive and non-violent. 
 
 
 
2.2	  Castells	  and	  violence	  
 
Castells argues that “[…] sheer imposition by force is not a social relationship 
because it leads to the obliteration of the dominated social actor, so that the 
relationship disappears with the extinction of one of its terms.” (Castells, 2009, p. 11), 
to which he adds “It is, however, a social action with social meaning because the use 
of force constitutes an intimidating influence over the surviving subjects under similar 
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domination, helping to reassert power relationships vis-à-vis these subjects” (Ibid.). 
Here, the distinction between ‘social relationship’ and ‘social action’ seems to be the 
defining difference: the relationship indicates a link between the imposer and the 
imposed that is destroyed by the method used by the perpetrator of violence, yet the 
act itself, that is the use of violence, is as much a form of communication as language 
is.  
 
Resulting from this there are two forms of constructing, maintaining and breaking 
links between individuals: violence and discourse (Ibid.). It would be wrong to attach 
a sense of moral or qualitative judgement to either form, since the shared experience 
of violence is as much a binding force as the dividing ability of hurtful discourse. In 
other words, violence can be as much of an empowering dynamic, as a constraining 
one. 
 
The discussion above points to three weaknesses that preclude a full application of 
Castells to the discourse of violence and communication. First, his theory does not 
properly discuss the role of violence as a form of communication. It therefore only 
focuses on how the individual actors establish networks and create and maintain links, 
but much less so on the dynamics of violence in networks. Second, this in turn 
prevents the application of Castells to the realm of international relations, since both 
cooperation and conflict are central in this field. Thirdly, without the inclusion of the 
dynamics of violence, Castells’ network theory is too narrow, and cannot explain both 
transformation and destruction within and between networks. 
 
 
3.	  Violence	  as	  communication	  
 
The utility of violence lies in the universality with which it is experienced; every 
human being is both the victim and perpetrator of it. Already as an infant, one 
understands the pain inflicted by others, both verbal and non-verbal, intended and 
unintended. Equally, the effect of inflicting pain on others is quite likely one of the 
earliest experiences an individual can have. It is very similar to the sensation of 
affection and care. The power of violence is so significant as a shared experience that 
it lies at the heart of basic human social interactions. Compassion, for example, is the 
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ability to feel with another human being and is only possible because of the 
underlying shared experience.  
 
This points to another important dynamic of violence: it does not have to be physical 
in order to cause an effect, but can also be implied or used as a threat. Experiments 
have shown that all living beings can be conditioned to link certain sensual 
stimulations with pain, and react with evasive or protective behaviour even when only 
the trigger is present. All of this highlights the importance of violence in human 
affairs, yet violence is not only a private experience but is a major and timeless 
component of society. In this regard, Arendt’s assessment is of great interest: 
“No one engaged in thought about history and politics can remain unaware of 
the enormous role violence has always played in human affairs, and it is at 
first sight surprising that violence has been singled out so seldom for special 
consideration.”(Arendt, 1969, p. 2). 
Arendt later argues that violence is always negative because it prevents compromise 
and cooperation. Individuals are drawn to maximise their own power beyond their 
own physical strength, and being ‘in power’ means to be chosen by society to 
multiply a single individual’s natural strength (Arendt, 1970). The support of society 
can be gained by both persuasion and coercion, with persuasion being more 
sustainable and positive. Coercion, on the other hand, is often based on either direct 
violence or the threat of its use, and is negative since it prevents compromise and 
conciliation. While ultimately “[A]t the very basic level violence is the deliberate 
infliction of harm on people.”(Kalyvas, 2006, p. 19), far more analysis is demanded 
into the dynamics of this concept. 
 
What Arendt overlooks is that this ‘negative’ nature of violence is only one facet: 
violence can, similarly to language, be used as much for constructive as destructive 
(or integrative and disintegrative) means. Equally, violence can be designed to avert 
an immediate existentialist threat as well as for more instrumental gain. Finally, the 
shared experience of observing, inflicting and becoming victim to violence is a 
fundamental component in the construction of identity, which itself is at the heart of 
human existence (Sen, 2006). Following Castells’ approach to networks, the links 
between individual nodes are being made and eroded on an on-going basis, and these 
links are nothing but lines of communication. Rather than limiting the analysis of 
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networks to the use of language, analogue and digital, or spoken and written, 
networks must also be studied in the context of violence, in both an integrative and 
disintegrative fashion. The impact of violence needs to be assessed both in the 
integrative (that is creating links between nodes) and disintegrative (the destruction or 
prevention of links between nodes). Violence strongly influences the creation and 
maintenance of a narrative which, via the questions of ‘who am I?’, ‘who are we?’, 
why do we live?’ and ‘what is the meaning of life?’, lies at the heart of human 
existence. Returning to Castells, the creation of a narrative, or what he refers to as 
‘the transformation of people’s minds’ (Castells, 2009, p. 27), is the most important 
source of power. The ability to exercise power depends on two different factors:  
 
i) the ability to constitute and program networks (which describes the purpose 
and the protocol of communication in networks) - the nodes are called 
‘programmers’ and they are the ones that focus on the creation of a narrative 
since it allows them to legitimise their position; and  
ii) the ability to connect and maintain cooperation between different sub-
networks - those nodes are called ‘switchers’, which benefit from their 
position by providing the link or bridge that is, as a gatekeeper, used for their 
own benefit (Castells, 2009, p. 46). 
 
With network theory relying heavily on the use of technology, and especially the 
internet, it is paramount to analyse the relationship between violence and the virtual 
world. This is highlighted by the recent political upheavals in Spain, North Africa and 
Brazil, where the role of the internet and mobile communication has moved into the 
foreground. Commentators have argued that the removal of the Egyptian President 
Mubarak in 2010 was the first ‘Facebook-revolution’, and that Twitter and text 
messages now present the new medium to unify the population and coordinate 
protests and attacks against the authorities, but the success of this is doubted by 
Morozov precisely because the uprising lacked a clear leader or leaders. Additionally 
they opposition to Mubarak was so decentralised and loosely organised that it may 
have been able to overthrow the existing order, but unable to establish a new 
governance along their ideals and demands (Morozov, 2013). More than ever before, 
technology permitted real-time communication in a non-hierarchical means of 
communication that requires minimum resources or skills and, in the case of Egypt 
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was able to evade the security apparatus. It is argued that new digital communication 
allows for networks to be even larger, and so efficient and effective in flow that 
hierarchical and centrally controlled structures cannot counter. To assess the validity 
of this, the relationship between the virtual-world and violence has to be analysed and 
compared, and ultimately the question of whether or not the emergence of the 
‘Network Society’ (Castells, 2010b, p. 7) really presents a fundamental shift in human 
affairs must be examined. 
 
 
4.	  The	  distinction	  between	  digital	  and	  analogue	  
 
Castells’ network society relies on digital, rather than analogue, communication 
(Castells, 2009). Digital communication is as much language based as its analogue 
sibling, but rather than phonetic codes it is binary electronic signals (on/off) that are 
the basis of internet protocols. Just as with analogue language, there needs to be, in 
the digital world, an agreed form of grammar and words in order to be able to 
communicate. In other words: ‘[J]ust as cyberspace is communally produced, so in a 
profound sense are all spaces. Whether we talk about medieval conceptions of 
spiritual space, or scientific conceptions of physical space, every kind of space needs 
to be conceptualized, and hence “produced” by a community of people’ (Wertheim, 
1999, p. 305).  
 
What makes digital communication different from analogue forms is the role of 
technology. New technologies alter not only the way human beings communicate 
with each other, but also their relationship with their bodies and how they see and 
value themselves as well as each other. The emotions and biological processes that 
are at the base of life remain the same, but the patterns and actions in which they are 
taking place are changing. The history of the internet and the role technology plays in 
today’s human interactions show that it has become more than just a method of 
communication, such as the telephone or printing press, but has evolved into a 
phenomenon in which the identity of individuals are made, adopted and shaped in 
processes that are increasing in speed, grasp and influence. By providing the 
individual with the ability to access vast quantities of information and to 
communicate virtually without constraints of time and space with almost every 
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individual on the planet, and by allowing information to flow both ways, the internet 
has become the most powerful creator of a hyper-reality. In this realm the distinction 
between the artificial and real are becoming increasingly blurred (Sardar & Ravetz, 
1996). In-process digital communication may cause the establishment of narratives 
that are fantasies - as utopian as religion but, due to its persuasiveness and 
entrenchment in the life of every individual, far more destructive. The weakness of 
technology, then, is the fact that it provides a platform upon which the identity of the 
individual becomes so dependent that the individual loses the ability to distinguish 
between the analogue and the digital, the real and the virtual.  
 
4.1	  Digital	  networking	  
 
The ‘new political order’ which is, arguably, provided by the internet - the 
decentralised, inclusive and anarchist structure without borders and constrains of time 
and access - is a tempting utopia. The reality is not only that the quality and durability 
of ad-hoc and virtual communities lack the stability of analogue links between 
individuals, but also that the internet in itself is becoming increasingly vulnerable. 
The more individuals depend on the internet, the more they depend on the technology 
that lies at the heart of it. This technology, both in terms of hardware and software, 
depends on companies and governments to produce and maintain it. The more 
individuals rely on the internet, the more vulnerable they become to exploitation and 
addiction to even faster and deeper integration (Kinney, 1996). When looking, for 
example, at the role of the internet in the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, it was used as 
both a tool for opposition forces to cooperate and organise, and as a means for the 
state to observe and prosecute them. Voicing discontent on the internet did not help to 
deconstruct the Mubarak regime, but protests by real people in the streets did. In order 
to organise these large-scale protests, the information about them had to be public and 
could therefore also be accessed by the authorities that tried to suppress them and 
prosecute the participants. Accordingly, the internet allows for increased individual 
participation and democratisation, but at the same time allows for, and provides, more 
tools for surveillance and prosecution.  
 
This prosecution is not limited to states and their legal and judicial bodies, but also to 
companies, organisations and ad-hoc groups that pursue a shared goal. The Chinese 
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‘human flesh search engine’ (人肉搜索) is a phenomenon in which a decentralised, 
temporary and unstructured collaboration of individuals researches the internet in 
order to identify individuals accused of misconduct. In the process, individuals use 
the technology of the internet not only to identify the alleged culprits, but also to 
prosecute them by prominently posting their personal information and wrongdoing. 
Even more revealing, perhaps, is the role of the US military in the creation of the 
internet via DARPA (Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency), as a tool to 
protect and manage information for the purpose of national security. Although the 
internet has achieved great success in this context, the internet is also arguably the key 
element in one of the biggest downfalls of the US military: the transmission and 
publication of digital images depicting the torture and humiliating treatment of Iraqi 
prisoners by US forces at Abu Ghraib prison (M. White, 2005). 
 
 
4.2	  The	  digital	  creation	  of	  meaning	  
 
The technology of the internet is not only limited to political and commercial uses, 
but has a great number of other functions. Nevertheless, it has not yet extinguished 
the most human of all behaviours: the question of meaning, of a narrative, of 
answering ‘why are we?’. Schmidt and Cohen even argue: “Identity will be the most 
valuable commodity for citizens in the future, and will exist primarily online” 
(Schmidt & Cohen, 2013a, p. 36) since the more fragmented and unstable the world 
appears, the more pressing and prominently this quest for meaning features in human 
endeavours. The less desirable the world seems to be to an individual, the more 
central the question of meaning becomes. Through all of human antecedents, the 
quest for meaning and identity has been at the forefront of behaviour, shaping the 
activities of the individual as much as those of groups and societies. Religion, 
nationalism and history are all at the forefront of the creation of an identity, intended 
to provide a personalised answer to every individual’s existence. Cyberspace is the 
most tempting of all spaces to search for meaning: it provides not only a vast source 
of information, but also allows the individual to ask personalised questions, to provide 
feedback, discussion and debate, and satisfies emotions such as rejection and support. 
It is the individual who is searching for identity, and the group provides it. The 
virtually unlimited sources making up the internet allow every single individual a 
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personalised environment for their personal quest for meaning – but, by doing this, 
the internet also weakens the investment individuals make in creating and maintaining 
communities. The luxury of recreating oneself in cyberspace is distinct from the 
analogue self, and loses value the moment this alter ego is faced with an unpleasant 
situation because, in that moment, either the alter ego is abandoned (for example the 
individual simply goes offline) or a new ego is created in its place. 
 
Margaret Wertheim compares cyberspace to religious constructs of Heaven where 
technology transcends the body. The internet allows individuals to escape the 
dominant narrative since the age of enlightenment in which the material dominated 
over the spiritual (1999). This is contrasted by Castells’ ‘network society’ which is an 
open community in which, in theory, everybody is able to connect to everybody. 
Without physical limitation the number of connections is unlimited, and without time-
lag information can be transmitted without the constrains of time and space. Yet, 
human beings are driven by trying to find out where they are, in both a physical and 
spiritual space. Cyberspace breaks this up: ‘When I am online, the question of 
“where” I am cannot be answered in fully in physical terms’ (Wertheim, 1999, p. 41). 
This leads to a return to the pre-enlightenment duality of physical and spiritual self: 
‘Once again, then, we see in the discourse about cyberspace a return to dualism, a 
return to a belief that man is a bipolar being consisting of a mortal material body and 
an immaterial “essence” that is potentially immortal’ (Wertheim, 1999, p. 268). In 
other words, the difference between the physical or analogue space on the one hand, 
and the digital or cyberspace on the other, is the absence of physical violence and the 
absolute nature of death.  
 
Physical violence is central to the distinction between the analogue and the digital 
world, since the lack of physical violence in cyberspace promotes the illusion that in 
order to overcome injury or death one simply needs to restart. While it is feasible that 
human life may enter a stage in which it is possible to download the mind and soul of 
a person (or ‘software’) when the physical body dies, and upload it into a new and 
possibly artificial body, the lack of mortality, of unwanted suffering and physical 
pain, are fundamental to the inability of the digital world to take over human 
existence. Arendt’s assessment, which places violence at the centre of human affairs, 
and the fundamental importance of violence in the construction of identity and 
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meaning (Sen, 2006), indicate the weakness of reliance on digital forms of 
communication. Whilst violence can be exhibited in cyberspace, and digital 
information can be destroyed (by flipping the power switch, or through a mere virus), 
it cannot and does not affect human behaviour in the same way as the actual physical 
sensation of pain and loss. Narratives of destruction, of insults or of threats are 
meaningless unless the recipient is able to relate this sensation to an earlier analogue 
experience. Without this earlier analogue experience the meaning of violence, or of 
threats of violence and death, disappear, and with them their formative influence on 
human behaviour. Searching for identity, then, can be guided and influenced by 
cyberspace, but the ultimate power must always lie in the analogue experience of 
violence itself. 
 
Christopher Coker looks at probably the most extreme activity that soldiers are 
prepared for in their training: self-sacrifice. The assumption that certain ideals are 
worth enough to justify risking one’s life for, and to die for, is a fundamental 
component of why war can be considered a ‘sacred’ activity, and yet the impact of 
technology may threaten this: “[A drone pilot] may have greater oversight of the 
battlefield than ever, but this affords him no greater insight into the moral status of the 
man he has in his sight.” (Coker, 2013, p. 122). The use of drones fundamentally 
alters the way these soldiers experience the reality of battle. Because the risk of injury 
or death in battle no longer exists, the experience of war is entirely different. As soon 
as a drone is damaged or destroyed the pilot can, just like in a computer game, restart.  
 
The existence of a ‘delete’ or ‘escape’ function is the most important difference here 
(these functions can only exist in cyberspace) but, since it is becoming increasingly 
difficult for human beings to distinguish digital and analogue life, the risks of this 
growing disjunction are obvious. The human mind is based on sensations of sound, 
sight and touch which can, and are, being created digitally – the line between these 
and analogue experiences is becoming blurred. Conversely, the ‘delete’ or ‘escape’ 
functions cannot always be translated from the digital realm over to the analogue 
realm. The more convincing the digital impressions become, the more individuals will 
expect that the analogue world will perform along the same lines. Of course, crucially 
however, there is no sacrifice in the digital; a death in cyberspace is temporary, but 
the analogue death is final.  
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Coker also highlights the importance of culture in the process that links digital and 
analogue violence: empathy. Without the ability to imagine, and empathise with, the 
experience of another human being, there can be no meaningful interaction. “[T]he 
ability to experience another person’s pain is a central part of emotional intelligence 
as too is the ability to read other people’s emotional status.” (Coker, 2013, p. 133). 
Technology enables empathy in a manner removed from direct contact with another 
being, but with major limitations; we can distinguish the sight and sound of war in a 
Hollywood movie from recordings of actual fighting or even the first hand experience 
of war because we are able to differentiate between the temporarily limited 
experience of a movie and the continued actions of a war, even when special effects 
are becoming increasingly able to fool our senses. 
 
Only one dimension of the civil war in Syria, for example, is being fought online, but 
the destruction of lives and property is exclusively occurring on the street. Mobile 
phones, the internet, digital imagery and chat protocols may exacerbate the blurring of 
territorial boundaries of the conflict and, while it is undeniable that information 
technology is THE link between Syrian and non-Syrian actors, or actors in Syria itself 
and outside of the country, this technology is not involved in the actual killing that is 
taking place on the ground.  
 
Schmidt and Cohen argue that technological developments will further increase the 
duality of digital and analogue, or physical, worlds. Because technology provides 
access to more information, people will benefit by being able to make more informed 
decisions, but the same information can be used to diminish their security by 
subjecting them to increased surveillance and possible exploitation by criminals and 
authoritarian governments. Especially in the realm of foreign policy, actors will 
develop an increasing duality in which actions online and offline will differ since they 
are created for different audiences (Schmidt & Cohen, 2013b). 
 
An additional factor that further complicates the analysis of information technology is 
the geographic conditions of cyberspace. While the term ‘space’ indicates a 
geographic location this is no longer the case. The physical infrastructure necessary 
for the relay of information does not necessarily coincide with the location of the 
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author or audience. An individual no longer needs to be physically present in order to 
document an event or communicate information, but instead can do this from any 
place that facilitates access to the relaying technology. For example, “Radio 
Télévision Libre des Milles Collines” (RTLM) is considered to have been the most 
influential tool in the organisation and process of the Rwandan Genocide in the mid-
1990s. The owners and editors were using the private radio station to both transmit a 
narrative of why Tutsis and moderate Hutus were to be killed, and to relay which 
individuals should be hunted down and where to organise roadblocks and the mob. 
The radio station allowed a small group of Hutu extremists to organise the genocide 
without themselves having to enter the field or be actively involved in the slaughter. 
A radio station was easy to establish, simple to maintain and had the ability to reach a 
massive audience in real-time; because the technology is so simple and readily 
available, it does not require literacy or wealth to access it (Metzl).  
 
In contrast to radio as a form of communication, where communication predominately 
flows in one direction from the station to the audience, the internet provides the single 
medium that enables communication to flow in all ways. Radio and television are 
forms of ‘mass communication’ through which information can be relayed to an 
audience without geographical distance presenting a hindrance. In contrast to this, the 
internet is a form of “mass self-communication”(Castells, 2009, p. 58) in which the 
distinction between provider of content and audience is no longer valid. Content on 
the internet is unlike newspapers, television or radio where content is dominated by 
the author. Rather, the content of the internet is constantly altered, linked to or edited 
by every individual who accesses it. In the words of Castells: “[…] any post on the 
Internet, regardless of the intention of the author, becomes a bottle drifting in the 
ocean of global communication, a message susceptible to being received and 
reprocessed in unexpected ways.” (Castells, 2009, p. 66). The result is that the 
technology of the internet enables every individual who is online to create content and 
transmit it largely unimpeded by the limitations of time and space. The faster the 
internet connection and the better the available computer and technology, the more 
persuasive and life-like cyberspace becomes. As the role of radio in the Rwandan 
genocide shows, technology does not necessarily mean that people are better 
informed or make more humane decisions. While the internet and cyberspace become 
more convincing to human senses, they remain only a medium for the transmission of 
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human behaviour. In other words, the internet does not kill but it does transmit the 
violence perpetrated by humans around the world. The effect is that the dynamics and 
effects of violence, and violence in networks, rather than the digital nature of the 
communication, need to be analysed in more detail. 
 
 
5.	  Integrative	  Violence	  
 
The shortcomings of relying on digital forms of communication are apparent when we 
consider that its abilities to construct identity and meaning are limited without the 
underpinning analogue experience. This can be applied in particular to the experience 
and sensation of violence. In the realm of human interaction, war is the most powerful 
experience of violence, or in other words the ultimate experience of violence is war. 
The struggle to define war and differentiate it from other forms of violence has been 
troubling academics for some considerable time. Diamond bases his definition of war 
on this difficulty and proposes that violence, in order to be classified as ‘war’, 
requires three core elements: 
 
1. The violence is carried out by a group, not an individual. 
2. The violence is exerted by individuals who belong to two or more different 
political groups. 
3. The violence must be sanctioned by the whole group, even if only some of 
its members carry it out. 
 
Or: “War is recurrent violence between groups belonging to rival political units, 
sanctioned by the units.” (Diamond, 2012, p. 131). 
 
What Diamond fails to answer conclusively is why groups go to war with each other. 
He argues that tribal societies were, aside from “the excitement and the prestige” 
(Diamond, 2012, p. 148), fully aware of the misery caused by war, yet until colonial 
powers intervened these societies were unable to break the cycle of revenge killings. 
New Guineans boast of having killed enemies because they grew up in a society that 
does not condone violence. In contrast, US soldiers experience Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) after killing someone because their society is based upon non-
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violent interaction. An attempt to try to explain the single reason for the use of 
violence is as futile as trying to explain why human beings talk. Violence is a mere 
form of communication and has as many functions as language has. Especially in 
relation to groups, violence and language are both fundamental in defining the group 
and providing a narrative. Additionally, like language, violence has further functions 
that address instrumental and existential needs. For example, the conflicts between 
radical followers of opposing football teams would fit into Diamond’s definition of 
war: very often not all members are perpetrators of violence but sanction it, and in 
many cases the different football teams have a tendency to attract followers of a 
certain political, ethnic, economic or religious group. While the argument can be 
made that there are ‘wars’ between football hooligans, this is entirely different from 
the violent conflicts Diamond had in mind. His approach focuses on violent conflicts 
in which the death of the adversary is not only accepted as an outcome, but in most 
cases explicitly desired and sought after. 
 
 
 
5.1	  Sacrifice	  and	  war 
 
What makes war so fascinating is its ability to stipulate human sacrifice, or in other 
words: “[N]ormally society cannot condone one person taking the life of another, but 
in war the question of legal censure against such acts does not come up”(Gelven, 
1994, p. 4). Yet to limit war to killing or being killed is to overlook many of the 
realities of war, and to do injustice to those who lose their possessions, families and 
health, those who are the victims of rape and mutilations, and those who become the 
refugees and survivors. Sacrifice then is not only death in war, but all of the suffering 
related to the violence found within. Death with its finality is simply the most 
powerful component of war, but ultimately what distinguishes war from peace is the 
systematic use of violence in the social discourse. Whilst death and violence have 
similar power - the mere threat of it causes a reaction - they differ in the fundamental 
component that in theory war can be fought without death, but not without violence. 
Further, the concepts differ in their communicative power since death ends the life of 
the victim, meaning that without a narrative attached it does not have any further 
effect. Violence, on the other hand, is committed with the explicit desire of altering 
the behaviour of the victim. A prisoner is kept alive during torture in order to 
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influence his behaviour after release, and a victim of systemic rape as part of ethnic 
warfare is permitted to survive in order to influence society even after the war has 
ended. 
 
Coker’s conceptualisation (2004) serves as base for further analysis. Firstly, as an 
instrumental concept, war is used as a rational instrument to gain specific concessions 
or interests. For instance, a state will occupy an opponent’s territory with the aim of 
exploiting natural resources that are deemed fundamental for the aggressor’s national 
security. A good example of this is the Japanese expansion into south-east Asia in the 
late 1930s, in which rubber plantations were targeted by Japan. The resource-poor 
country depended on the continued import of natural resources in order to maintain 
the life its people had become accustomed to. Without being able to control the access 
to rubber and other resources the Japanese government believed it was at the mercy of 
hostile foreign powers that intended to destroy the country. 
 
Secondly, war is used as an existential concept that is used to counter a threat against 
national security by a hostile enemy. For example, the British defence against the 
aggression by Nazi Germany in the Battle of Britain in 1940. The German leadership 
decided to bomb Britain in an attempt to create discontent in the population, and to 
force the country to ally with the Nazis. If this proved unsuccessful, then Germany 
would prepare the invasion and occupation of the country. The defence against the 
German attacks was thus judged to be necessary to protect the existence of Britain as 
a sovereign country.  
 
Finally, the third and most abstract, yet most important concept: the metaphysical. 
Death and dying, the suffering and the destruction, creates a meaning. By sacrificing 
individuals, war renders itself different from other forms of affliction: it becomes 
sacred. The death of a kinsman is celebrated by those who survive. The paradox is 
that the destruction of lives serves to construct meaning and identity, not for those 
who die, but for those who are left behind. This metaphysical aspect is the most 
difficult to approach, since it appears to be the most irrational one. From the 
willingness of Japanese soldiers to sacrifice themselves rather than to become 
prisoners of war, to the individual who would rather burn to death than leave a 
burning house without wearing trousers, the influence of the narrative and the 
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association with the group becomes so powerful that it takes precedent over an 
individual’s drive for self-preservation (Neitzel & Welzer, 2012). For an outsider, it 
appears to be an irrational choice, but for the person and other members of his or her 
group, the decision is fully logical if not even encouraged.  
 
 
5.2	  Instrumental	  and	  existential	  purpose	  of	  war	  
 
Instrumental war is the most rational of these three concepts, since at its core is the 
satisfaction of human needs. In order to gain what is judged to be necessary, all living 
creatures have the ability to cause pain; war is merely the translation of this activity 
into the political sphere, or group. If an individual believes that another individual is 
in possession of something that is desired, or perceived to be necessary for survival, 
or an action has to be instigated or terminated, then they will communicate this need. 
In most cases, the initial means will be vocal, but if the response is not satisfactory the 
use of force will be announced, followed by the actual use of violence. Since human 
beings are social animals, both the initial perception of need, as well as the 
subsequent form of how this need is communicated, will be intrinsically linked to the 
prevailing patterns of behaviour within the group. For example, a child will simply 
take whatever it wants from its parents, but if the item is taken back the child will cry 
or even use force to regain it. Another example of this pattern can be found in the 
interaction of criminal gangs where a certain form of unwritten codified behaviour 
can be observed. A gang member will demand a certain action or good, and will 
initially announce this without using violence, but at the same time using a form of 
communication that directly implies the urgency and necessity of compliance. If his 
demands are not met, then the individual will either threaten force or use it. As 
Gilligan points out, violence is used by those who feel that there is no other way to 
achieve what they perceive to be just and justified (1996, pp. 11-12). 
 
Closely linked to this instrumental use is the existential use of violence. If, for 
example, a victim at the hands of the gang member perceives the nature of the 
demand as an immediate threat to his or her existence, he or she may feel that a non-
violent reply is insufficient to avert an existential threat. An alternative could be to 
seek to retire from the disagreement, but if this is neither possible nor likely to be 
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successful, then defensive force will be used. The extent of the force will depend on 
the context, and if the supposed victim of aggression communicates that they are 
willing to use force for self-defence, or uses force, the gang member in turn has a 
choice to either abort his demand and leave, or to agree on the challenge and return 
either the threat of violence or violence itself. In both instrumental and existential 
forms of violence, the identity of the individual strongly determines which form of 
communication will be chosen. While other factors also influence how far an 
individual may go, and at what point non-violent communication becomes violent, it 
is clear that the identity of the individuals is central. Both instrumental and existential 
uses of violence highlight the communicative nature of violence, and the fact that 
violence does not take place in a vacuum. ‘We are meaning-seeking creatures’ writes 
Karen Armstrong, and what distinguishes human beings from all other creatures is the 
existence of human imagination, which allows us to search for explanations for 
experiences we make (Armstrong, 2005, p. 2). 
 
 
5.3	  War	  as	  a	  metaphysical	  concept	  
 
The quest for meaning, a narrative, an answer to the questions of ‘why are we alive?’, 
‘what is the purpose of life?’, ‘where do we come from?’, ‘why do we live like we 
do?’ or ‘what should I do in this situation?’, is engrained in every human being. While 
some are more conscious than others, when addressing these questions there is no 
single answer. The absence of a simple and comprehensible answer to these 
questions, and in fact the absence of a single question, means every individual is left 
alone to deal with it. Since human beings are, as all humanoids, social animals, the 
group or network of fellow beings provides guidance in this fundamental quest. The 
network, be it based on family ties, religious affiliation, political conviction, shared 
sports or hobbies or bare survival, neither provides the question nor the answer, but 
provides a metaphysical playground where the question must be asked and the answer 
becomes obvious: ‘I am alive in order to be part of this group’. It is necessary for a 
group to feel coherent communication between the individual members. The 
evolution of spoken language allows groups to invent a common identity or narrative, 
or in Castells’ words ‘a programme’. Since spoken language is only one form of 
human communication, gestures, mimic and finally violence are all important 
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components of the creation and maintenance of networks. Inner-city gangs, for 
example, have their own language, signs and ritualistic behaviour that are used to both 
create and deepen bonds between its members and, at the same time, indicate to 
outsiders that they are not a member of the network. The shared threat of violence, 
and the shared committing of violent acts, is both a method to satisfy needs and to 
create a shared identity and meaning. 
 
Even in relation to societies that are arguably the most peaceful and non-destructive 
are not without violence. What actually sets them apart from other societies is not the 
complete eradication of violence, but rather their ability to codify violence into 
rituals. Sacrifice is morphed into rituality, and the most telling example is the 
existence of sports; more often than not, even linguistic components of war are used 
to describe a boxing match, different positions in team sports are labelled ‘offensive’ 
and ‘defensive’, and even chess-matches are heralded as ‘battles’. The explanation for 
this is that violence is not neutral, but depends on the context and narrative. Returning 
to Diamond’s definition of war discussed above, the definition could, and often is, 
satisfied by sports teams and their supporters. They are organised groups and as a 
group sanction violence. Yet this phenomenon is not limited to the sporting 
entertainment sector but, as John Keegan shows in his seminal book The History of 
Warfare (1993), a great number of societies have succeeding in eradicating the 
destructive use of violence by codifying and ritualising it. Thus, what is sanctioned by 
a group - to continue Diamond’s approach to war - is not recurring violence for the 
sake of violence, but the narrative creating power of a shared experience of a group 
vis-a-vis another.  
 
Stromberg’s analysis of the role elites and intellectuals played in the onset of the First 
World War highlights the role these individuals played in causing Europe to go to 
war: violence and destruction, so they argued, was the necessary tool to cleanse, to 
destroy the old and replace it with a new and meaningful construct (Stromberg, 1982). 
Here, again, the communicative role of violence is highlighted and the perception of 
the individual versus the group re-emerges: only due to the construction of a higher 
meaning, of an identity that stands above the person, could violence have been sold as 
necessary. Instead of a threat to the life and well-being of the individual, violence, and 
in its extension war, was transformed into a positive force. The moral bankruptcy of 
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fascism lays not in that it used violence, or even that it relied on increasing amounts 
of violence to create and maintain its identity, but that the violence ultimately 
destroyed those who wielded and relied on it the most. Take the tactic of shouting in 
order to be heard: this initially works as a tool to attract attention and make gains, but 
if one overdoes it in terms of volume, duration or reason, then the recipients of the 
shouting will develop methods to counter it. This comparison demonstrates that more 
violence does not equal more meaning or a stronger narrative, but rather that there is a 
certain threshold from which violence destroys more than it creates.  
 
Linking this discussion to Castells’ work on networks, it becomes apparent that 
networks are kept alive and active by the shared narrative of the nodes involved. 
Networked power, as the relational capacity of one actor over another on the basis of 
structural capacity (Castells, 2011), is central to the functioning of societies since it 
provides a structure. On the one hand, this structure must be rigid enough to function 
without the need to be constantly reaffirmed (and thus becoming too inefficient), but 
at the same time it must provide stability whilst being able to adapt to changing 
narratives. Networks are created and programmed by the same dynamics that harm 
and destroy them: violence and language.  
 
 
5.4	  Conclusion	  
 
The discussion above shows the apparent oxymoron of violence; despite its obvious 
destructiveness and ability to create human suffering, it is also a major component of 
human identity and meaning. This can be seen particularly through violence in its 
most destructive notion: war. War has been at the centre of society since the earliest 
tribes emerged, and remains central today. Both violence and war have the ability to 
create meaning, but since war is not a universal experience (being limited to those 
who directly experience it), this is most marked with violence, which is universally 
experienced by all human beings. Continuing this argument runs counter to Arendt’s 
approach, which argues that all violence is illegitimate; to the contrary, violence can 
be integrative, which is demonstrated by the separation of violence into instrumental, 
existential and metaphysical components. 
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The disintegrative dynamics of violence contradicts this assessment and it does so 
with utmost clarity; when violence is experienced by an individual directly, rather 
than in an abstract manner, it is nothing but destructive. However, the more remote 
and abstract violence becomes, the less human beings seem to shy away from it, and 
the more compliant they are to facilitate violence for their own interests. This can be 
demonstrated by returning to the example of football fans: in the safety of the group, 
in a familiar setting, the language, gestures and threats aimed at an opponent group 
tend to be far more aggressive and ritualistic compared to when two individuals of 
opposing teams meet in person. Equally, the way past confrontations with supporters 
of rival teams are discussed differs greatly depending on the situation. In a group 
setting, the language often mirrors descriptions of war (‘battle’, ‘let’s kill them all’ or 
‘we’ll cut their throats’), whilst in a setting composing of two individuals, the 
discussion of past events use language of unfairness, injustice and pain (‘they 
ambushed us’, ‘they really hurt him bad’ or ‘if they would have fought like men we 
would have won’) (King, 1997). Human beings cannot isolate themselves from these 
experiences because, as social animals, we depend on being embedded in a network 
that links us with others. The links are created and maintained by communication, but 
this communication is not limited to integrative or positive messages. 
“These connections may take many forms: chance encounters, kinship, 
friendship, common worship, rivalry, enmity, economic exchange, ecological 
exchange, political cooperation, even military competition. In all such 
relationships, people communicate information and use this information to 
guide their future behaviour. They also communicate, or transfer, useful 
technologies, goods, crops, ideas, and much else. Furthermore, they 
inadvertently exchange diseases and weeds, items they cannot use but which 
affects their lives (and deaths) nonetheless. The exchange and spread of such 
information, items, and inconveniences, and human responses to them, is what 
shapes history.”(McNeill & McNeill, 2003, pp. 3-4). 
Violence is simply another form of communication and, just like other forms of 
communication, exists both as a direct action between two individuals as well as an 
abstract concept that can be used for other purposes. The more remote the experience 
of violence becomes, the more it can be used as a tool to increase the inner cohesion, 
narrative and identity of a network and, in this way, become a metaphysical force that 
is integrative. On the other side of the coin is the disintegrative function of violence 
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that is much less abstract and immediate; yet each side greatly depends on the other. 
The fact that human beings choose to wage war and try to destroy each other’s 
identities and societies has been at the heart of the establishment of states. Those 
societies who were victorious benefited greatly and were able to promote civil 
security, benefit from trade and natural resources, increase the prosperity and well-
being of its people, establish domestic peace, stability and develop political and legal 
structures. The price for this was paid in blood and suffering by individuals, and not 
only by those who were defeated. While states benefit from war (especially when 
victorious) the individuals who fight them and are most affected by them lose 
(Morris, 2014). This dichotomy requires deeper analysis: if violence creates meaning 
then why are human beings so adverse to it?  
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Chapter	  4:	  Disintegrative	  Violence	  
 
1.	  Introduction	  
 
As discussed above, the utility of violence as a concept lies in its universal 
experience. Every individual regardless of their age, history, cultural background, 
political or social affiliation or religion is able to both feel hurt and cause pain in 
others, including through the perpetration of violence. Pain can be experienced 
through all moments of life, and is significant in that there is no sensation that can be 
neatly said to be its opposite. For example, when someone is feeling cold he or she 
can, in opposition, equally feel warm, or the opposite of feeling tired is feeling awake 
or alert. This makes pain a very powerful signal in raising alarm and indicating that 
harm is imminent, or that something is amiss, and that there is a threat to the 
wellbeing or survival of a person. Violence is therefore one of the most powerful 
triggers for initiating action to seek to eliminate the cause of pain, or to remove 
oneself from the situation in which pain is experienced. Pain is the release of neurons 
by nerve cells that, in turn, cause an electric signal to run along an axon via 
intersecting synapses to another cell which, in turn, is connected to a vast network of 
other cells in the human body. Pain differs from other sensory information such as 
touch, smell or light because of its strength. Even the most primitive organisms 
appear to feel pain, sharing the same reaction as human beings to an unpleasant 
sensory stimulation such as blunt force, electric current or heat. Because of the 
strength of the signal it overrides most other common sensory experiences such as 
exhaustion, sleep or hunger, and can trigger a reflex that bypasses the consciousness 
of the individual. It is considered to be one of the most important actors in evolution 
and behaviour since it causes organisms to try and avoid harmful situations in the 
future (Berntson & Cacioppo, 2008).  
 
Past pain has been shown to be a component of human communication precisely 
because it can be communicated, but also because the sensation of pain is not limited 
to physical sensation, but can also be felt on an emotional basis. Pain is not 
necessarily caused by a physical trigger - the mental image relating to an unpleasant 
or threatening experience is sufficient to trigger the same neurological action as a 
physical sensation. Because violence and pain are experiences that are universal, they 
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can be communicated to and understood by others – just as any other form of 
communication, the universality of violence and the pain it can cause is fundamental 
to mutual understanding. When violence is communicated, it provides an important 
component for the creation of identity and group cohesion, but can also trigger pain 
and suffering. This will cause an individual to endeavour to avoid a situation or 
confrontation.  
 
In contrast to the integrative function of violence, it is also important to analyse the 
disintegrative function and the effects this can have on human beings, as well as, 
importantly, on how social networks deal with violence. Particularly important in this 
context is what Castells calls the “programming of networks [which is] the 
instructions inscribed in their [the network’s] operating system, and become[s] 
capable of self-configuration within the parameters of their assigned goals and 
procedures.”(Castells, 2009, p. 20). Because power and violence are intimately 
related, they play a fundamental role in human affairs, ranging from intimate affairs to 
international relations. When and how violence is communicated depends on how 
individuals deal with the sensation of violence and the ability of human organisations 
to differ between acceptable and unacceptable forms of violence. 
 
 
2.	  Disintegrative	  Violence	  
 
Every single individual first experiences violence in the most private and intimate of 
settings, the family. Whether as a child who is being disciplined by its parents, or as a 
result of conflicts between siblings, violence is found in every family in multiple 
forms: from physical to mental, from being a victim to being a perpetrator, from being 
an actor to being an on-looker. Violence is used as a method to solve conflicts 
between individuals, but also between groups, societies and states. However, Gilligan 
echoes Arendt’s reflection on violence when he states:  
“Human violence is much more complicated, ambiguous and, most of all, 
tragic, than is commonly realized or acknowledged. Much of what has been 
written about violence, even by those who study it - criminologists, criminal 
lawyers, forensic psychiatrists, moral philosophers, political scientists, and 
historians - comes only from the point of view of their own specialties, which 
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tend to preclude the tragic dimensions of violence. But those who deal with 
individual violence on a daily basis, judges and lawyers, criminologists and 
forensic psychiatrists, law-enforcement professionals and prison 
administrators, are fully aware of how tragic violence is, not only for victims 
but also for the perpetrators. Yet the conventions of the professional discourse 
leave little room for the articulation of the tragic point of view, even for those 
who see the phenomenon itself most clearly.” (Gilligan, 1996, pp. 5-6). 
This warrants a deeper study into the tragedy that violence creates, the destruction and 
suffering it causes and the disintegrating dynamics unleashed by it. While the 
discussion in the previous chapter shows the power of violence in creating meaning, it 
remains clear that violence is nevertheless one of, if not the most, destructive of all 
human behaviours. Any kind of violence that is experienced by an individual and is 
perceived to lack a narrative that justifies it, is destructive (Blok, 2001). The 
‘senseless’ violence that is so often argued to be present when the parties involved do 
not share the narrative that explains its existence is inconclusive. In other words 
violence, just like language, always has a purpose (Pinker, 2011). Blok explains the 
apparent irrationality:  
“There are no direct connections between intentionality and the outcome of 
pragmatic choice, decision-making, active calculating and strategizing of 
individual actors. This is so because, first, plans and intentions are drawn up in 
specific historical contexts and cultural settings (which reduces the presumed 
autonomy of individual actors to zero). Second, plans and intentions, efforts 
and implementations are mediated, refracted, thwarted, distorted, transformed 
by powerful cultural forces, human dependencies, contingencies, 
imponderabilia, and chance.” (Blok, 2001, pp. 3-4). 
Equally so the role of organisation, with the prime example being the nation-state, is 
also overvalued: Weber’s famous analysis of the centrality of violence in the 
construction and existence of the state is too narrow, since the state is only a fairly 
recent invention. The surrender of violence by the people to the organs of the state, 
with the aim of creating a distinction between illegitimate and legitimate violence 
(with the ultimate aim of creating a setting in which the state has the absolute 
monopoly of violence), is intimately tied to the philosophy of the nation state, that 
itself, is closely linked to the Eurocentric and technologically most advanced 
countries which supports Blok’s assessment (2001). Furthermore, Weber himself 
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points out that a monopoly of violence is not necessarily an indicator of the strength 
and durability of a state: “[…] the masses can nevertheless be decisive for a powerful 
sentiment of solidarity, in spite of the greatest internal antagonisms” (Weber, 1946, p. 
177). This emphasises the earlier argument that violence is not simply a stand-alone 
experience, but is highly dependent on the wider context, attached narrative and 
explanation, and the situation in which it is taking place.  
 
 
2.1	  Physical	  violence,	  threat	  and	  fear	  
 
Physical pain is a sensation that all human beings both cause and experience at an 
early stage in their life, and this experience is so powerful a memory that, later, the 
simple threat of using violence has a similar effect in shaping behaviour. The link 
between analogue and digital, between physical and abstract, between direct 
experience and later narration is created by the earlier actual physical experience of 
violence. The importance of this is demonstrated by the fact that in many 
jurisdictions, not only is the physical act of violence a crime, but to threaten violence 
is also a crime with equally weighty penalties. When faced with the threat of violence, 
human beings alter their behaviour before they are physically hurt, and even seek to 
avoid becoming the victim of the mere threat in the first place: “People need 
protection against physical threats, and protection often takes the form of counter 
violence.” (Blok, 2001, p. 9). Extending this thought. i.e. that the threat of violence is 
sufficient to alter or influence behaviour on a universal level, highlights the difficulty 
in determining when violence is a creative force that constructs identity and meaning, 
and when violence is negative and purely destructive in nature. The originating act 
itself becomes secondary and violence takes centre-stage. 
 
This difficulty was the cause for James Gilligan, a psychologist who worked 
extensively with violent criminals, to try to find out why these individuals could 
commit crimes that the vast majority of a society could not comprehend, to the extent 
that they would be labelled as ‘inhumane beasts’ or ‘monsters’. Gilligan discovered 
that a vast majority of these individuals had, earlier in their life, been victim to 
mistreatment, grave injustice or violence. If these experiences are grave and sustained 
enough they can create neuronal and behavioural changes that can lead the individual 
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to commit atrociously violent acts against themselves, animals and human beings for 
reasons that, to themselves, make sense. For the wider society, and very often even 
the immediate families and friends of the perpetrator, these extremely violent acts are 
incomprehensible and shocking, especially since they were invariably inflicted with 
remarkable calm and peace. This kind of behaviour is often used as an additional 
indicator of the ‘inhumane nature’ of such individuals. Interestingly, however, there 
appears to be a strong popular interest in individuals who are able to hurt and kill 
others. While in some circumstances, such as wars, the perpetrators of these acts are 
considered to be selfless heroes, when similar acts are committed in other 
circumstances, especially those Gilligan describes, the individuals are considered to 
be the exact opposite. Yet how Gilligan regards the behaviour of wider society is 
fascinating when he writes: “The “pornography of violence” - the sensationalizing of 
violence - is a means that by which we distance ourselves from it, perhaps render it 
less frightening and more manageable by reducing it to the dimension of titillation 
and entertainment” (Gilligan, 1996, p. 30). Another angle for analysis is the 
propensity of violence to denote tragedy. We watch and observe suffering not because 
of a somewhat morbid Schadenfreude, but because we are fascinated with the 
unknown that may await us. The continuing attraction of Greek tragedies and 
Shakespearean dramas to audiences is explained by Nattal as an attempt to improve 
our ability to “understanding in advance thereal horrors we may meet” (Nuttal, 1996, 
p. 104). The emotion of empathy may not be caused by a subconscious attempt to 
understand more about suffering that may lie in the future. The curiosity that all 
human beings display helps us to understand our environment better and, in this way, 
may increase our chances of survival. However, because this behaviour is largely 
subconscious, few are aware of it. This lack of awareness is why audiences are often 
unable to state why they observe murder trials or watch a play beyond feeling 
emotionally ‘touched’ by it, but the depiction of violence makes it difficult to look 
away. Viewed at home from the safe distance of the television or computer screen, 
stories and images allow the observer a close and intimate look into other people’s 
tragedies. Geographical or linguistic differences do not hinder the relay. Violence and 
suffering is known by all human beings just as language is; what prevents 
understanding is not the inability to communicate but a differing of grammar. Just as a 
sadistic murderer may be unable to relate the motivations for his crime to the 
audience, so people who speak different languages are incapable of understanding 
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each other through the spoken word. This inability is not caused by the absence of 
communication, but the absence of a shared grammar or structure to the 
communication. What continues to keep violence central to communication is its dual 
function as a means of direct and one-on-one action. For example, the primary 
function of a police officer using his baton against a demonstrator may be to prevent 
the person from entering a building. The secondary function is that this instance of the 
use of violence is then transmitted to others. In the first instance, violence is a method 
of direct action and involves the harming, or at least risk of harm, to a human being. 
In the second instance, violence becomes an abstract tool to transmit a message; 
because the description or imagery of violence is able to ‘touch’ the audience, it is a 
very powerful means of creating a reaction; as described earlier the ‘pornography of 
violence’ makes it difficult for observers to look away (Nuttal, 1996, p. 104).  
 
In the secondary instance of the function of violence, technology plays a much bigger 
a role than in the primary. Weapons to cause harm and pain may have evolved greatly 
in the course of human evolution but in their function and application they remain 
elementary: all they need to do is to hurt or kill. In contrast, in the secondary instance 
technological developments, especially in news media, have greatly changed the 
nature of the function, while the reaction of the audience remained largely stable. 
Stories of violence, imagery of war and of victims of aggression can now be relayed 
in real-time from and to virtually every place in the world, but the emotional reaction 
of the audience is the same as ever because the very image of violence is all that is 
needed to fascinate the audience. 
 
The technology may continue to change but the underlying dynamics remain the 
same: the primary function of violence carries only a very limited message - its aim is 
to force or elicit certain behaviour. With the secondary function of violence this is 
much more convoluted, since its abstract nature, that of a message, demands a 
narrative to be attached. A newsreel depicting a police officer wielding his baton at a 
person needs to be accompanied by further information. Just as sound and grammar 
are the mere tools for spoken and written language to carry a message, violence is a 
tool to relay a narrative. Similarly, and as pointed out earlier, it is the surrounding 
network that determines both grammars; the spoken and written one as well as that of 
violence. Castells would call this the ‘programme’ of a network and this is of 
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fundamental importance: depending on the message, the bat-wielding police officer 
becomes either the protector of law and order – and in this sense the violence he uses 
is considered integrative – or he represents the brutal force employed by an unjust 
authority – the violence is disintegrative. In both cases the situation, the actors, the 
recording and the violence involved remain the same, yet the programming 
determines the outcome.  
 
Returning to James Gilligan’s work on violent criminals, we can use this to 
demonstrate that the same crime could either trigger demands by the audience for the 
strongest possible prosecution of the accused, or conversely trigger compassion and 
support for a person perceived as acting not because he is inherently evil but instead 
has himself, in earlier times, been made a victim (Gilligan, 1996). This underlines the 
communicative act of violence: as with spoken language it depends on the 
environment (in other words the ‘programme of the network’) as to how that violence 
is ultimately judged and regarded. 
 
 
2.2	  The	  tendency	  of	  violence	  becoming	  perpetual	  
 
The major distinction between non-violent forms of communication and violent forms 
is the possible finality of the outcome: a disagreement addressed with words is far 
more likely to end in a compromise, or a continuation of the disagreement at a later 
stage. All parties to a conflict will remain active and involved, and where the 
disagreement cannot be solved with a compromise, either continue to interact or one 
side will eventually accept defeat and withdraw. Countering this approach is the 
seeking of an outcome through the use of violence; not only does physical pain 
increase the urgency of the matter - the use of violence is far stronger in provoking an 
reaction than the use of words – but the use of violence also introduces the risk that 
the conflict escalates until one or several of the parties involved are killed. In the 
dramatic escalation of a conflict that shifts from non-violent to violent 
communication, it is often observed that the initial issue that instigated the conflict 
becomes entirely secondary, and that the mutual pain replaces it as the driving force 
underpinning the conflict. The relatives of victims of violent crimes, as well as the 
wider community, often call for retaliation and revenge to be taken against an 
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(alleged) perpetrator, and considerations that concern the mental health and 
responsibility of the executioner are often not simply rejected, but are viewed as a 
further insult to the victim (Gilligan, 1996).  
 
The question of rationality of human behaviour in this regard is futile, since the 
perpetrators would argue that their acts are rational and justified. The question of 
what kinds of violence are justified and which are not, or the question of which uses 
of violence are integrative and which are disintegrative, depends on moral 
considerations that are easily dominated by reference to the ‘common good’ and at the 
expense of the individual. The atrocities committed by Nazi Germany against 
individuals as part of the Holocaust were argued not only to be morally justified, but 
even necessary in order to protect the German people against the threat of the so-
called enemies. It wasn’t only political bodies that supported this ideology, but also 
religious bodies and, most remarkably, the supposedly most rational actors found in 
science and industry (Bauman, 2000). Here, again, the link to integrative violence is 
obvious: violence was committed predominately because there was a threat against 
the wider network, but also in order to strengthen the heterogeneity of the group and 
the influence of the nodes that Castells calls ‘programmers’ and ‘switchers’. That this 
debate has not come to a final conclusion is evident in the recent question of the 
legality of the use of torture against individuals who are suspected to be involved with 
terrorist attacks – again, violence is argued to be justified because there is a threat 
against the wider societal group.  
 
 
3.	  Accepted	  and	  rejected	  cases	  of	  violence	  
 
Returning to Sen, he disputes the existence of rational choice in identity creation and 
regards the attempts to predict an individual’s behaviour based on his or her identity 
as gratuitous. By studying numerous examples of violent conflict, Sen concludes that 
the existence of different identities and narratives is not enough to explain every 
incident of violence; there are far more examples of human beings with different 
religions, political and social convictions and identities living peacefully together. On 
the contrary, the latter vastly exceeds the former. Furthermore, he argues that under 
moral and rational considerations violence can never be justified (2006). However, as 
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the debate on the legality of torture of individuals linked to terrorism shows, this 
argument is not always taken into account. To declare a ‘War on Terror’ was, for the 
Bush Administration, a rational decision following the attacks of 9/11 but the methods 
and tactics employed turned out to be counterproductive - they were not only 
ultimately unable to ‘defeat’ terrorism, but they also permitted other actors to justify 
their violent actions by referring to the US’ behaviour.  
 
Bauman makes a further point in relation to the European nation-states which are 
argued to have very successfully turned the repulsions individuals have against 
violence into a virtual elimination of violence from daily life. Instead, they have 
securely anchored the legal and unquestionable monopoly of its use in the authorities, 
or in Bauman’s words: “Daily manners mellowed mainly because people are now 
threatened with violence in case they are violent - with violence they cannot match or 
reasonably hope to repel.” (Bauman, 2000, p. 229). Here he should have clarified his 
position, since this argument only refers to violence that is not accepted as part of the 
narrative or programme; the societies that Bauman is describing are still prone to 
violence much more than Bauman’s “[…] somewhere in the wings [of society] 
violence is stored” (Bauman, 2000, p. 228). In sports in particular, violence is not 
only accepted but often a fundamental component. For example, in the sport of 
boxing, competitors are both voluntarily the perpetrator and victim of violence. For 
many of the football fans mentioned earlier, violence is more important a component 
than their interest in the game itself. Additionally, computer games and movies, as 
well as literature and news media, are full of violence and violent imagery. 
 
 
4.	  Violence	  as	  programme	  
 
These observations need to be included in the analysis of networks: whether and how 
a human being will act, both consciously and unconsciously, to the observation of a 
violent act depends on the programming of the network. For example, in many cases 
of domestic violence the victim remains convinced that the pain she or he is subjected 
to is justified and deserved; even extreme attacks are often forgiven despite the victim 
being released from the fear of potential further attacks or reprisals. So, here, the node 
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acts this way because the surrounding network is programmed to create such 
behaviour.  
 
This discussion shows that every human being can relate to violence because they 
have experienced it from an early stage in their life. When a small child falls and is 
hurt, the sensation of pain triggers a neuronal process that is geared towards self-
preservation. The same self-preservation process is that which makes people resort to 
using violence when they feel threatened by another human being or situation. A 
small child will look for support and protection from the parents or known family 
members and, equally, the parents or family members will protect and support the 
child. This protection and support stems from communication, which can take many 
forms, including violence. For example, the parent may use violence, or the threat of 
violence, to prevent the child from placing him or herself in a dangerous situation, 
and so a violent act is committed for the common good. The child will also observe 
the communication occurring within its family and, where it observes cases of 
domestic violence (as a form of communication), will assume that committing such 
violent acts is a normal and acceptable form of behaviour. This kind of observation 
amounts to what Castells calls ‘programming’ (2009, p. 20), since it influences how a 
node interacts with the networks it is linked to.  
 
What makes Castells’ work so valuable in this context is his approach to how 
networks are being programmed and re-programmed, in other words how actions are 
being interpreted and relayed, and especially under the light of growing technological 
developments. Individuals interact with their environment with the aim of satisfying 
their personal needs and, by accessing information, to improve their ability to make 
decisions. The language they use for this depends on the sources they connect with; a 
Spanish speaker will most likely predominately use Spanish but there are numerous 
nuances that will depend on the location, age, profession and social background as 
well as the source’s characteristics. The programming of this communication is based 
on a shared approach to grammar and words that is largely not superimposed on the 
actors, but changes and adapts to their needs. Furthermore, vocal languages can be 
learned - for example a native speaker of Spanish will be able to learn Arabic, in 
relation to which the most successful means would be immersion into an entirely 
Arabic-speaking environment - and over time different languages that come into 
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contact with each other start to share and exchange expressions and forms of grammar 
(Castells, 2011). 
 
Violence performs in a similar way: its grammar and message is dependent on the 
programme in order to be functional. It means that a punch can be a form of friendly 
greeting between two adolescents, a part of a boxing match or a fist fight that will end 
with the death of one of the fighters. The difference is found in the condition that, 
because of its universality and relative simplicity, violence easily dominates a 
situation by having an immediate effect that is then interpreted by the actors 
depending on the narrative of the situation. Because violence is so universal, easy to 
employ and highly reactive, it is an important tool for the structure of societies that 
exist in order to protect the individual from threats of all kind. In order to function, 
societies are based on the maintenance of a certain power structure that has great 
influence on the programme of this network.  
 
Benjamin Ginsberg (Ginsberg, 2013) argues that violence is the most fundamental 
tool for the creation and upkeep of these structures. There are four factors that make 
violence the source of political power: 
 
1. Violence usually dominates all other forms of political action. Insurgencies 
aimed at altering or overthrowing the existing order are generally more 
successful when employing violence, and once they dominate the discourse 
they can often only be overthrown themselves by violence as in contrast to 
elections, opinion polls or other form of political expression.  
 
2. Violence, or the mere threat of it, because of its centrality in human 
existence, tends to dominate the political agenda. Following its emergence 
other issues are pushed out of the centre of interest. This, for example, is used 
by terrorists who aim to elevate their cause into a global debate in order to 
raise awareness for their cause.  
 
3. Depending on the level of intensity, violence either helps to maintain the 
status quo, or transforms or destroys it. Police may use batons and teargas 
against demonstrators in order to prevent them voicing their opposition. While 
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the police may be successful in achieving this goal, the same violence can also 
help to create solidarity within the demonstrators themselves but also with the 
audience of other members of a society. The more violent and prolonged a 
conflict becomes, the more it forces the dominating actors to transform.  
 
4. Violence can serve as a catalyst for political mobilisation. Small skirmishes 
and demonstrations in eastern Libya led to increasingly widespread actions of 
the people against the existing political order, ultimately culminating in the 
overthrow and replacement of the government with most of its order and 
bureaucracy within a very short time. (Ginsberg, 2013, p. ch. 1). 
 
Violence is a dynamic that creates, maintains and acts as a catalyst for the evolution 
of social networks. On the one hand it functions as a force that creates meaning and 
guidance for individuals and a feeling of community, as war journalist Chris Hedges’ 
aptly named book “War Is a Force that Gives Us Meaning” describes (Hedges, 2003). 
On the other hand, it is the most destructive form of human behaviour. It is 
responsible for the destruction of life, property, rape, and torture and is responsible 
for an indeterminate amount of pain, suffering and injustice. The same violence that 
brings a band of fighters closer together separates families and destroys communities, 
just as a match of rugby unites a team but may cause severe injury to a player.  
 
 
5.	  When	  is	  violence	  accepted?	  
 
Castells errs when he assumes that destructive violence only emerges when there is no 
common language (2009, p. 37), since he limits his definition of ‘communication’ to 
spoken language. Since violence is also a form of communication, the dynamics 
within networks cannot be understood without its inclusion. If the programme of a 
network relies on the use of violence for whatever reason then this will have an 
impact on the surrounding nodes. Football hooligans, for example, may be separated 
into different groups of networks depending on their affiliation to a team, but since all 
of them are also nodes within a wider ‘hooligan network’ they share violence as 
means of communication. Thus, the connection between the fans of rival teams relies 
on violence rather than spoken language. This violence, and the resulting negative 
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consequences, then creates the link with public security officials such as the police. 
The complexity of the situation becomes apparent when two rival groups of hooligans 
are confronted by the police since, in many cases, the police are considered to be even 
more of an enemy than the rival group. Different in this case is not the use of 
violence, but the context or narrative it is being used in. Often, the internet is involved 
and used to organise temporary alliances between rival groups against a shared foe, 
coordinate fights and display footage of clashes (Campbell, 15 July 2001). While only 
a small faction of football enthusiasts supports violent behaviour, the impact of their 
actions is felt across the whole sport with enormous costs to clubs, who lose revenue 
from non-violent supporters staying away from matches, to the taxpayers, for 
policing, and to the general public, who are affected by the destruction of property. 
The use of violence by hooligans is their dominant form of communication, but this 
alienates them from all other football supporters because those supporters do not 
share this form of communication or language. The extent of the use of violence as a 
form of communication, often amplified through the use of media and the internet, is 
so powerful that the simple threat of it causes a reaction: the constant threat that 
hooligans may attend a match is sufficient for many families to choose to follow a 
game on the television, rather than enter the stadium itself.  
 
The example of sport is also helpful when explaining the cultural dimension of the 
use of violence: rugby or boxing are sports that are, by definition, violent with 
athletes often being hurt, yet these sports are considered by some of the least violent 
societies as a positive and inspiring activity. The violence in these sports endures, due 
to both their formal and informal codification; and this is in strong contrast to the 
violence used by some of its supporters. Additionally, violence used by the 
competitors outside of the agreed rules and norms, for example by hitting certain parts 
of the body in a boxing bout or by directly kicking an opponent in a rugby match, are 
punished not only because of the existence of a referee and a regulatory authority, but 
by the awareness that while some forms of violence are acceptable, or even beneficial 
and necessary, other forms are not. This is not limited to physical violence, but also to 
spoken language and gestures. Because violence has these two distinct forms, i.e. 
acceptable and unacceptable, it carries the dual function of immediate and 
interpretative forms. When sporting events are described as ‘epic battles’, then the 
analogies with war emerge – they are deliberate. The opponent has to be ‘crushed’ 
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and deserves nothing but ‘an annihilating defeat’ despite the fact that he or she can be 
an old friend of close acquaintance who has lived in the same town or area and speaks 
the same language.  
 
This often sudden rupture of identity in which the distinction between friend and foe, 
between insider and outsider, ally and opponent may, in the case of a sporting event, 
only be temporary and applicable only in the limited context of it, yet it is but a mirror 
of what happens in the onset of violent conflicts. Especially civil wars, in which 
friends and families may find themselves divided by the battle lines only become 
possible after the programme of the network has been altered in a way in which ‘the 
other’ is being created and made into an entity that has less or no value in contrast to 
those who are considered to belong to one’s own group. Returning to Coker’s analysis 
of war having not only instrumental and existential reasons, but also playing an 
important metaphysical role shows why the latter can easily dominate the discourse – 
the ability to create and alter meaning and narrative is found in violence (Coker, 
2008).  
 
This behaviour may sound, especially to a post-modern mind, alien and extreme. The 
thought of de-humanising a fellow human being and establishing and maintaining a 
system of behaviour that has the explicit aim of the extinction of ‘the other’ appears 
perverted and un-human, or inhumane. Yet, the underlying dynamic has always been 
a part of human behaviour. Human creativity, curiosity and the ability to remember 
the past and reflect on events, forces the individual to make sense of a situation that 
appears to be out of control; to explain – even if it is only to ones self – why and how 
an event could, and did, happen. Distant events, chance, complexity and everything 
that is unknown or appears incomprehensible to the observer, requires an explanation 
and narrative that enables the individual to make sense of his or her world. Human 
beings are driven in their aim of discovering timeless truths that present themselves as 
instructions of how to live and how to make sense of events that are out of reach for 
the individual (both geographically and physically – for example the stars in the sky, 
or death). Karen Armstrong struggles in her attempts to draw the line between a 
materially more sophisticated life that is built on logos and rationality which strives to 
question everything and advertises a life in which choices are made by basing them 
on verified facts on the one hand, and on the other the continuing susceptibility of 
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mankind to myth and the inexplicable: “[…] logos had never been able to provide 
human beings with the sense of significance that they seemed to require.”(Armstrong, 
2005, p. 122). How thin and flexible the boundary between logos and myth is 
becomes apparent in Zygmunt Bauman’s Modernity and the Holocaust: an educated, 
modern, non-isolated community readily accepts an ideology based on evidence that 
is remarkably easy to discredit, and did not, and does not now, hold up to slightest 
form of logos or rationality. However, its followers are willing to commit 
unspeakable crimes and murder in its name (Bauman, 1989).  
 
The Holocaust was made possible not by a change in human behaviour, genetic make-
up or technological or scientific developments, but by a change in programming: the 
minister of propaganda Joseph Goebbels was able, through speeches, newspapers, 
cinema and heavily promoted private radio sets to reprogram the behaviour of most 
Germans. Suddenly, it seemed, the culprit for all that was wrong had been found and 
the severity of the situation not only justified, but demanded, the most severe 
punishment for those labelled as responsible. As it was argued by the Nazis, “they” 
had started a war of extermination on Germany. The enemy, so the Nazis believed, 
was so wicked that they only operated clandestinely and dishonourably, and thus 
operated hidden from the general public (Herf, 2006). The pseudo-science employed 
by the Nazis was full of errors, it was irrational, had conceptual flaws and none of the 
evidence presented was able to withstand scrutiny, yet it became the basis for 
systematic violence and genocide. What the Nazis had done was to establish a 
programme that made violence acceptable, with the Holocaust being the most extreme 
case. In education, labour, the penal system and ultimately war, violence became so 
normal and accepted that only the complete destruction of the German political, social 
and economic system was able to alter this programming. Even then, it took the 
catastrophe of the Second World War to do so. Thus we see that it is not violence per 
se that is irrational and abnormal, but the programme of a network that fails to 
distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable forms. In wars, but especially in 
civil wars, violence appears, especially to an outsider, as irrational and perverse as the 
atrocities committed by the Nazis. The difficulty of distinguishing acceptable and 
unacceptable forms of violence supports the argument that lies at the heart of Stathis 
Khalyvas’ work on the logic of violence in civil wars.  
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6.	  Civil	  Wars	  
 
Khalyvas points out that the violence in civil wars appears to be irrational and illogic 
because if, for example, Sunnis are killing Shiites in the Iraqi civil war, then why can 
Sunnis and Shiites live together in, for example, the city of London without using 
violence against each other? What matters here are the rules and codes in the differing 
situations, in the same way as the role of rules and regulations in sports: they codify 
and sanction violence and how it is to be used in certain situations. Every sport has its 
own codification and set of rules and regulations, and every network has its own way 
of dealing with violence.  
 
Fundamental to the distinction between integrative and disintegrative violence is 
whether violence is the only form of communication. For example, without other 
shared forms of communication such as language, norms and rituals, a rugby game is 
not a sports competition but a violent brawl to which non-participants have great 
difficulty in relating. The direct violence found in this brawl is the same as that found 
between two antagonistic groups with a strong internal cohesion - without this they 
would be unable to defend themselves against the violent attacks of the other team - 
and both antagonistic groups are connected by the violence that they use against each 
other. In this case, the violence plays such a dominating role that all of the 
participants are strongly influenced and defined by it. The links between the 
individuals involved which connect them to their team mates are strengthened to a 
remarkable extent, up to the point at which an individual is willing to sacrifice his or 
her life for the other. In order to survive, the members of one team have to trust each 
other blindly and communicate effectively and reliably. Parallel to this, the links to 
the antagonist only relay violence that results in a self-perpetuating dynamic, out of 
which the only escape appears to be the complete annihilation of the other group. The 
threat of becoming a victim to the violence, or even the experience of violence at the 
hand of the other, becomes the dominating narrative for the metaphysical, or identity 
of every individual involved. Finally, the links to any node that is outside this 
immediate confrontation, are strained, since the fight between the two antagonistic 
groups does not appear rational and the violence within horrifies the outsider.  
 
Amartya Sen argues that it is this dynamic that lies at the heart of the existence of 
violent conflict, and that a harmonious world lies in the plurality of human identity 
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(Sen, 2006). If the word ‘identity’ is substituted with ‘network’, then Castells’ 
analysis of the power of networks can be applied; only when an individual is free of 
the fear of becoming a victim of violence, then the communication power Castells 
talks about can be utilised, and only when an individual is living free without 
immediate existentialist threats will he be able to create and maintain links with nodes 
that are outside the immediate group. These dynamics run both ways, since violent 
acts need a justification. The violence in civil wars, for example as Khalyvas shows, 
is only remotely connected to the overall explanation that is given for the conflict 
(Kalyvas, 2006). The power relations that Castells talks about are what fuels 
individuals to try and maximise their influence and resources, and in order to do so 
they resort to violence which, in turn, is justified by connecting it to a greater 
narrative. For example, if Sunnis and Shiites are somehow predetermined to use 
violence against each other, then why does this only happen in the Iraqi civil war but 
not in the city of London or New York that is home to large number of both? Or if 
Muslims and Jews are ‘supposed’ to kill each other, how could they share the same 
regions in Persia and Morocco for centuries? 
 
This comes down to the often asked question of whether there will be an end to war. 
For those who live in post-modern societies, it is demanded that the answer to this 
question is a clear ‘yes’. Violence must be minimised and should only exist in a 
tightly codified context, seen by the continuing attempts to further tighten the 
restrictions on when violence is judged to be acceptable and/or necessary. Even the 
use of threatening and insulting language is increasingly restricted, because this form 
of coercion is considered inappropriate and harmful not only in relation to the 
individuals involved, but in relation to society at large. What is overlooked in this 
context is how recent many of these developments are. This is because the abstract 
use of violence in the narration of history allows for a very selective use. Societies 
often evoke wars and great battles as a means of telling their great and glorious past, 
creating cohesion and solidarity in the present and future. Schmidt and Cohen argue 
that much of the future’s battles may move online because harassment of opponents is 
cheap and perceived to be much less a risk for prosecution or physical punishment by 
authorities than in the analogue sphere. It also opens another battlefront: “Modern 
communication technologies enable both the victims and the aggressors in a given 
conflict to cast doubt on the narrative of the other side more persuasively that with 
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any media in history.” (Schmidt & Cohen, 2013a, p. 190). There are two challenges to 
this approach: firstly, it only applies to liberal and post-modern societies and, 
secondly, it will always be tainted by ‘victor’s justice’. This will not change even if 
the conflict will appear to be predominately fought online since all parties to the 
conflict will try to destroy any evidence that may imply their involvement in 
atrocities. Hopes that this will work as a deterrent against barbarous behaviour by the 
actors involved(Schmidt & Cohen, 2013a) are most likely overly optimistic since the 
same ‘victor’s justice’ will be at play when assessing and interpreting online data 
subsequently.  
 
 
7.	  Disintegrative	  violence	  and	  network	  theory	  	  
 
The above analysis demonstrates the corrosive effect of violence on human 
behaviour, with humans employing violence as a means of altering behaviour and, in 
this way, power relations. It is erroneous to assume that violence prevents or destroys 
links between the nodes of networks, but it does shape them. For example, a US 
soldier in Afghanistan will be embedded in a network that links him with insurgents 
who aim to destroy the Afghan government allied to the US. Their connection is 
defined by violence rather than spoken language but, nonetheless, there is a 
connection which most analyses of networks in a theoretical setting fail to examine. 
For example, Miles Kahler focuses on the relations of actors in networks with the 
twin conception. Firstly, he looks at ‘networks as structures’, which aims to provide a 
map of how nodes are linked to each other, with the aim of showing power 
relationships. Secondly, he examines ‘networks as actors’, focusing on how networks, 
in contrast to hierarchical organisations, provide an explanation for policy outcomes 
(Kahler, 2009). This approach works well in a setting where the links between nodes 
in a network are based on a mutual agreement to cooperate or, in other words, in a 
setting in which two actors decide on their own terms that they can mutually benefit 
by communicating.  
 
This is mirrored by most other studies on the dynamics and functions of networks. For 
example, friendships in karate clubs (D. R. White & Harary, 2001), the marketing of a 
novel (Leskovec, Lada, & Huberman Bernardo, 2007), or the strength of relations in a 
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social network (Freeman, 1992). What each of these studies have in common is that 
they focus on how people create and maintain networks where it is in their interest to 
do so. Even Berg Harpviken in his study of social networks in refugee communities in 
Afghanistan, focuses on the dynamics within a social group faced with a threat 
coming from what is perceived to be ‘the outside’. The study does not include in its 
scope the fact that the individuals in the refugee networks are linked to perpetrators 
by violence (2009). Castells himself also places the active and intentional 
communication between individuals at the centre of his approach to the study of 
networks and their dynamics (Castells, 2010b, 2011).  
 
Because violence in all its forms has a strong impact on human behaviour, it also 
greatly affects how networks behave. The US soldier in Afghanistan feels threatened 
by the possibility of being harmed by an insurgent because he is placed in the same 
situation and geographic environment which has an impact on their behaviour. The 
same soldier will approach a situation he perceives to be dangerous or threatening in a 
distinctively different way in Afghanistan compared to when he is on leave in the US 
or elsewhere, for example. The difference here is the distinction between different 
programmes: in Afghanistan violence is so dominant that the soldier will be far more 
likely refer to violent and aggressive behaviour than in the US, where the violence 
will have a much weaker ascendancy over non-violent forms of communication.  
 
Due to the potentially existential threats faced by an individual in Afghanistan on a 
daily basis, his or her behaviour will differ greatly from that of someone elsewhere. 
This behaviour is determined not predominately by the character of the individual, but 
by the situation he or she is faced with. In this regard, network theory requires a more 
extensive study of how violence behaves in networks and its impact. For example, 
this could be achieved by furthering the studies of Anton Blok (2001) and James 
Gilligan (1996), who focus on what motivates some individuals to commit violent 
crimes, and how their environment reacts to them. The motivations for individuals to 
fight in Afghanistan differs and is prone to change; whether a young man decides to 
join the US military or an insurgent group will depend on their social networks, which 
are subject to change and adaptation; but once they are embedded in a network in 
which violence dominates the discourse, they will act with the same form of 
communication as others in the network, i.e. violence. This makes it possible for the 
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same individual to be a loving and caring member of a social network on the one 
hand, and to be a ruthless and determined fighter in another. 
 
 
8.	  Conclusion	  
 
The violence between rival groups of hooligans makes little sense to an outsider, 
because the primal and initial reaction to the neuronal sensation of pain is to withdraw 
and seek to avoid the pain caused by the violence. For the insider (i.e. someone who 
identifies as a hooligan), however, the dynamics of violence have been so powerful in 
shaping their identity and behaviour that it has a huge effect on the structure of their 
networks, and how links are created or prevented from emerging. Because all human 
beings are able to experience pain, its experience can be shared and related to within 
social networks. It can even be argued that, on an evolutionary basis, individuals 
formed groups because of the realisation that others held the same goal of avoiding 
unpleasant sensations, and that cooperation could help to limit the risk of pain and 
harm. Equally, human beings are not passive creatures who simply react to their 
environment, but we also shape and alter it. Human beings are social animals, and 
relate experiences to each other - this is the basis of communication. Violence, hurt, 
pain and suffering are universal and very strong emotions and, accordingly, they are 
important components of communication and behaviour. In general terms, human 
beings avoid pain and suffering and alter their behaviour in order to prevent the same 
harmful situation recurring in the future. 
 
As a social creature in a non-violent environment, an individual has multiple identities 
and is tied into multiple networks with different programmes and behaviours. Once 
violence becomes an existential threat to the individual, then identities and networks 
are reduced to the absolute minimum and the creation of many other potential links is 
impeded. A hooligan would not talk to a member of a rival group, but rather avoid 
coming into contact with this individual unless there is a clash in which both groups 
are present, even if this runs counter to their personal interests; both may, for 
example, have the same profession, education or interest in music and by 
communicating with each other, they could help each other and mutually benefit.  
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When applied to the realm of international relations, the role of sports provides three 
important conclusions: Firstly, violence is a human activity and whether it has 
positive or negative effects depends on the context, rules and norms of the situation. 
Violence is as much a component of human communication as spoken or written 
language, and as a form of the flows or messages that are found in a social network, it 
has to be included in order to understand the dynamics or ‘programme’ of the 
network. When violence becomes the only form of communication, then it can only 
be destructive and will cause harm - human beings organise themselves in networks 
precisely to avoid the threat of becoming a victim of violent acts. Not only does 
human progress depend on the existence of a network that is programmed to codify 
violence and protect the individual from arbitrarily suffering from the actions of those 
who have the strongest capacity to cause hurt and pain (Hobbes, 1960), but also 
human nature compels the individual to create meaning in their existence. This is 
done via communicating with others, by creating a narrative that is shared and 
reflected upon, and as Girard points out, the origin of religions lies in the desire to 
control and channel violence; or in other words, to prevent forms of violence that 
have the power to destroy communities while regulating other forms of violence. The 
acceptable forms are those where violence is used to strengthen the narrative of a 
community or network (2007).  
 
Secondly, violence has both positive and negative effects; it is positive when it is 
constructive and integrative, and negative when it is destructive and disintegrative. 
The violence in a boxing bout is positive since it takes place in a network that is 
programmed to codify the violence that is taking place within it. The athletes measure 
themselves in a fair and controlled manner that is full of rituals such as the ring, the 
bell, the boxing gloves and the names for different punches. The neutrality of the 
referee and the fairness of the two boxers is assumed by both competitors, because in 
their absence both boxers could seriously injure or even kill the other. In the sphere of 
international relations, the same applies: nations and groups compete with each other 
for resources, or simply over the strength of the narrative that keeps their networks 
coherent and unified. The simple existence of violent sports and the rhetoric that is 
used in virtually all forms of competition points to the natural role violence plays. 
Similarly to this, military parades, manoeuvres and rhetoric are only the modern form 
of traditional group behaviour in which uniformity of dress, movement and martial 
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gestures plays the important twin role of defending territory and resources, as well as 
strengthening the inner cohesion of a group or society (Keegan, 1993). 
 
Thirdly, violence is a form of communication similar to spoken language. As much as 
language only works as a form of communication when there are shared norms of 
grammar and lexis, so does violence depend on a narrative or structure. Language 
without norms is simply sounds with no meaning, and violence without a context is 
equally nonsensical. Violence depends on the existence of a narrative and 
explanation, but very often the explanation only appears to make sense to the 
perpetrator. The demonisation of violence as such is counterproductive, since it 
defines the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. Just as language does 
not function without agreed grammar, syntax and lexis (all of which are constantly 
evolving and adapting to the changing needs and realities) so does violence require a 
narrative and context in which it manoeuvres and interacts.  
 
The need for network theory to include violence as a dynamic is fundamental because 
it includes human behaviour that is against the initial understanding of ‘networking’, 
but that is inherent. While at first sight, individual nodes connect and remain 
connected because they share a common interest and language that allows them to 
cooperate and create a mutually beneficial outcome, at the same time there is potential 
for conflict over resources and narratives. Human cooperation is as much a natural 
phenomenon as human conflict, which means that an understanding of networks must 
include not only the dynamics that create and maintain links, but also those that 
corrode and prevent links. The difficulty in this aspect is that violence appears 
initially only as a behaviour that is counterproductive, but as the discussion above 
shows, violence is actually also crucial in creating and strengthening other links 
between nodes. The shared experience of violence, both as a ritual and sacrifice, and 
in fights, battles and competitions is a very important component in the creation of a 
narrative and meaning. When Castells writes about the ‘programme’ that lies at the 
heart of a network, he has to include all forms of human communication, both 
constructive and destructive, or integrative and disintegrative. This highlights that 
network theory, and the understanding of the dynamics in social networks, needs to 
address not only vocal forms of communication, but all forms of human behaviour.  
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In a civil war, the ‘programme’ of the network is dominated by the existence of 
violence. The identities and narratives that explain and shape the conflict are 
determined by this form of communication, with its very specific impact on how the 
links between nodes are created, facilitated and removed. This means that in order to 
diminish the disintegrative effects of violence, and to increase the integrative results 
of this form of communication, the programme has to be altered from within the 
network itself. The key here is that this can be, and is, done without all actors 
referring to violence in their attempt to either alter or contain the status quo of the 
programme. There are other ways to re-programme a network that do not rely on 
violence or, at least, minimise it. Civil disobedience, strikes, demonstrations and 
boycotts are only some of the methods that are successfully used to confront 
opponents and either force or prevent change. Paradoxically, in these tactics, often the 
fear of becoming the victim of violence brings the group closer together, creates 
identity and increases cohesion and cooperation. The internet, as well as other 
information and communication technologies, facilitates this process, but also 
promises to render the group’s effort more effective by providing possibly global 
links, and by opening up venues for information, resources, publications and fund 
raising. 
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Chapter	  5:	  Lebanon	  	  
 
1.	  Introduction	  
 
The Lebanese civil war which rocked the country from 1975-1990 (the “Civil War”) 
is an indicator of how violent and non-violent forms of communication are found in 
networks, and how these networks shape the domestic and international relations of 
the country. Lebanon is home to a multitude of different groups or networks that are 
centered around, for example, historic, ethnic, religious and professional identities, 
and while its territory has been settled for millennia it has only been an independent 
country since 1943. With fertile soil, well-established trade hubs, comparatively high 
levels of education and good infrastructure the country became a regional and global 
hub that provided a bridge between the oil exporting countries and countries that 
offered consumer goods, technology and services.  
 
In this regard it is fascinating to study Lebanon, not only because of the sheer number 
of different networks and identities, but because it also reveals the dynamics that 
dominate them. Especially in the light of violent and non-violent forms of 
communication, Lebanon has been in the past and present the place where 
cooperation and confrontation defy the assumptions of many. Liberal commentators, 
for example, would argue that the existence of many different identities provides the 
basis for exchange, cooperation and development in which interaction creates value 
for all. According to a more conservative view, on the same indicators the country is 
prone to conflict, and even a breakdown. When looking back at the eighty years of 
Lebanon’s history since independence both camps can find ample evidence for their 
position, with that produced by the camp predicting anarchy and a pessimistic future 
for peace and non-violence being convincing: 
 
‘Lebanon and the city of Beirut are microcosms of our cockeyed world - an 
incredibly complex mosaic of religions, ethnicities, and ideologies that’s 
fractured by culture, political interest, and economic disparity. Shiite and 
Sunni Muslims, Druze, and Maronite Christians - seventeen different sects in 
all - are packed together in a land that has few natural resources and that’s rife 
with ancient rivalries and enmity. Lebanon sits at the intersection of East and 
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West, Islam and Christianity, and the rich and poor worlds. It’s also squeezed 
between dangerous neighbors: to the north and east lies Syria, an avaricious 
meddler, and to the south is Israel, an insecure regional superpower. In 1975, 
the combination of internal and external stresses proved too much, and the 
country spiraled into a fifteen-year civil war that cost 150.000 lives and 
reduced much of Beirut to rubble. The day I arrived in the city, everyone was 
talking about whether the country would slide back into that horror.’ (Homer- 
Dixon, 2006, pp. 298-299) 
 
Today does not look much different and especially the political and civil unrest that is 
taking place in the wider region continues to fuel the feeling of insecurity and 
instability in Lebanon. The civil war in neighbouring Syria is no longer a Syrian 
domestic affair but includes religious extremists declaring the aim of establishing an 
Islamic caliphate that includes the entire Levant. Arms and supplies are purchased by 
the emirates in the Arabian Gulf and channeled though Lebanon to factions opposing 
President Assad in Syria which has led to Syrian incursions and has divided much of 
Lebanon into supporters and opponents of Assad. Refugees have poured into Lebanon 
and Turkey straining social services and providing an enormous resource of illegal 
but cheap labour on expense of the local population. In the south the conflict between 
Israel and Hamas flares up on a regular basis leading many in southern Lebanon to 
voice their support of Hamas that is accused by many to be a terrorist organisation. 
Domestically the global economic turmoil that emerged in 2008 has increased 
unemployment and destitution further straining an already fragile and fragmented 
social net. Finally property speculation and real estate investments are blamed for a 
substantial increase in living costs in the major urban centres, but growing un- and 
underemployment in the rural areas continue to fuel continuous waves of 
urbanisation.  
 
There exists a large number of volumes of academic works on Lebanon and the 
Lebanese Civil War, presenting different explanations for the descent of the country 
into violence. Harris blames the elites and influential families that projected their 
conflicts and scheming over the entire population (Harris, 2012). Firro largely agrees 
with this analysis but argues that colonial and post-colonial Europe supported the 
different factions with the aim of maintaining their influence in the region (Firro, 
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2003). Other authors, for example Tom Najem, go even further and claim that it the 
reason for Lebanon’s tumultuous history and present solidly lie in the actions of 
regional powers which use Lebanon as the staging ground for their conflicts (Najem, 
2012). Imad Salamey blames the domestic sphere divided along sectarian lines and 
international conflicts that are fought out on Lebanese soil for having prevented the 
emergence of a strong and unifying Lebanese identity able to consolidate and stabilise 
the country’s groups (Salamey, 2014). Other, perhaps less academic accounts, see 
evidence for organised crime colluding with intelligence services as force that 
perpetually destabilises the country and manipulates the public (Blanford, 2006). In 
contrast to this Sune Haugbolle presents a well-researched study that highlights how 
Lebanese themselves were struggling during and after the war in trying to explain its 
origins and course. He proclaims that precisely the absence of a clear, credible and 
systemic narrative for the Civil War not only helps the process of conciliation and 
healing, but also helps to prevent a recurrence of the conflict (Haugbolle, 2010).  
 
All these observers are trying to present a convincing explanation for the Lebanese 
Civil War. Most likely in an attempt to not only decipher why the war broke out, what 
happened during the fighting and how it ended, but also with the aim of by 
eliminating the causes preventing its resurge. Yet they all fail in answering an 
apparently simple question that emerges in every civil war: how could people that 
have often for generations lived together all of a sudden turn against each other with 
unparalleled viciousness and hatred, and subsequently – and perhaps even more 
challenging – how could they cease their violent confrontations and learn to share the 
same geographic, social and political space again?  
 
 
2.	  The	  Civil	  War	  
 
What stands out in the history of the country is the experience of the violent and 
destructive civil war that plagued and devastated the country from 1975 until 1990. 
Some 120,000 people lost their life in the fighting, thousands more were made 
homeless and had to flee the country, vast parts of major cities and infrastructure was 
destroyed and the political, social and commercial system of the country broke down.  
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Yet at a closer look the Lebanese Civil War reveals that there is no clear, neat and 
understandable explanation based simply on religious and ethnic rivalries or the gulf 
between rich and poor. Neither the outbreak of the armed hostilities, nor the 
progression of the war, nor the end of it can be explained by reference to the 
description provided above: the many different sectarian groups had lived in the 
territory for a great number of generations, and there were many points in which 
different groups and identities had interacted and interconnected. The distinction 
between rich and poor had existed for a long time and was not exacerbated enough to 
account for such a complete societal breakdown. Education, health care and 
employment were improving and, for the majority of Lebanese, this did translate into 
their daily lives. Finally, while the Levantine region and the wider Middle East were 
experiencing large-scale wars and conflicts - for example between Syria, Israel and 
Egypt, or between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation - these conflicts 
were neither a new phenomenon, nor would they cease with the end of the Lebanese 
Civil War. In other words, as aptly expressed by Picard: 
“Towards the latter part of 1990, when the weapons fell silent owing to the 
utter exhaustion of all military forces and the collapse of the social structure, 
the hostilities ceased as illogically as they had begun.(Picard, 2002)” 
The civil war, or its vicious and destructive nature, can also not be explained by the 
role of sectarianism in Lebanon and the structure of the political system; the changes 
seen before and after the Civil War are simply too small and nugatory. In his seminal 
work ‘The Logic of Violence in Civil War’ Stathis Kalyvas points out that the 
Lebanese Civil War followed patterns of other civil wars: in most cases violence and 
a perceived existential threat forces individuals to take up an identity that is 
characterised by two factors . One, an identity that is most promising in providing 
protection against the perceived threats and, two, one which excludes those who do 
not adhere to the same single identity. So, rather than multiple identities clashing and, 
in the wake, causing a large-scale violent conflict, it is the violent conflict itself that 
causes strict and exclusive alignment of those who find themselves in the middle of it 
(Kalyvas, 2006). 
 
Many of the most important themes that emerge from the history of the country, such 
as sectarianism, lack of firm political processes and wider regional instability, tend to 
be identified as being at the heart of instability and hostility. Those same themes, 
	   124	  
however, are at the same time at the heart of Lebanon’s prosperity, cultural wealth 
and why it frequently is referred to as the ‘Switzerland of the East’.4 ⁠  
 
This chapter will make the argument that networks exist in Lebanon and that they 
play a fundamental role, but the significance of this lies elsewhere. It is not the fact 
that networks exist but how they are structured, how they change, emerge and 
disappear, and how they interconnect which is fundamental to our understanding of 
the conflicts that have, and continue to, exist in this diverse country, whose 
circumstances, setting and history are mirrored in many other places in the world.  
 
The first part of the chapter will analyse a study by Seurat which sought to explain 
and explain the violence that took place during the Civil War. As demonstrated in the 
earlier chapters, violence does not exist in a vacuum and even the extreme and vicious 
violence found in the urban warfare of this Civil War (one which seemed to pit 
everybody against everybody) allows for observations regarding the narrative of the 
war to be made. In fact, urban neighbourhoods studied during the war indicate that 
violence was not an outcome of the reality that different networks were present, but 
that it was a tool for certain actors within those networks to shape the programming of 
the networks according to their interests. Castells touches upon the emergence of 
violence in situations in which the most influential actors believe that they are losing 
control:  
“[…] when their control of communication fails, authoritarian regimes evolve 
towards their demise, with different levels of violence and human trauma 
depending on the circumstances of political change.” (Castells, 2009, p. 194). 
While Castells is correct in linking the failure of control to the emergence of violence, 
as demonstrated earlier he too easily argues that violence is the absence of 
communication, and is automatically destructive or, as he states here, ‘evolve[s] 
towards their demise’ (ibid.). The study by Seurat shows that violence did not predate 
the demise of the authoritarian regime; in other words violence emerged parallel to 
the regime’s perception that it was losing control, not because of this. Thus, violence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  term	  was	  coined	  by	  the	  French	  travellers	  Lamartine	  and	  Gerard	  de	  Nerval	  to	  describe	  and	  compare	  the	  landscape.	  Later	  it	  became	  a	  synonym	  to	  also	  describe	  the	  banking	  sector,	  financial	  institutions	  and	  political	  structure	  of	  a	  federation	  of	  cantons	  and	  finally	  the	  exploitation	  of	  its	  nature	  by	  tourism.	  See	  Traboulsi	  (2007)	  p.92	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determined the communication within and between networks and shaped their 
programming, i.e. violence molded the purpose and behaviour of the networks.  
 
The second part of this chapter will show that the existence of different networks and 
identities (according to Castells’ this ‘networks of networks’(Castells, 2009, p. 73)) 
has been both beneficial and detrimental for the development of Lebanon. Instead of 
studying the history of Lebanon as one single and linear timeline it will point out how 
different networks have determined, and still do determine, the country. This is the 
case both in the period before and during the Civil War and, in this sense, Lebanon is 
a great example of how ‘networking’ can be both advantageous and detrimental.  
 
The third and final part of this chapter will argue that it is not the existence of 
networks per se that causes violence to emerge, but the centrality of the programming 
of the networks that determines their form of communication, and whether this is a 
violent form or otherwise. Since the programming of networks is largely invisible to 
the observer, he becomes convinced that it is the networks themselves (such as those 
ethnic or religious networks discussed above), which are much more visible, that 
create an unstable situation which will therefore lead to Lebanon again breaking down 
into anarchy and mayhem. The final part of this chapter will, therefore, argue that it is 
the programming of the networks that determine their purpose, form of 
communication and relationship to other networks. By applying the insights gained 
into the structure and dynamics of networks, and the different forms of 
communication that exist within them a more convincing analysis of the Lebanese 
Civil War will be introduced. 
 
 
3.	  The	  reasons	  to	  fight	  
 
The Civil War that raged in Lebanon from 1975 until 1990 was most acutely fought in 
the urban centres of the country. Tripoli, as the second largest city, was no exception 
to this and the confusing and often changing front-lines of the war caused an almost 
complete cessation of normal civic life. As an ancient city with a rich history in trade 
and commerce, as well as a social and political centre dating back to ancient Greece, 
come 1975 Tripoli had some 350,000 inhabitants. Its history also meant that Tripoli 
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was home to large numbers of groups embroiled in the struggle for influence which, 
at the same time, were not limited by regional borders but instead were deeply 
connected by personal links across the urban centre. In this, Tripoli mirrors the whole 
of Lebanon with its myriad of different groups, each linked to a specific territory such 
as a town, neighbourhood or settlement, as well as to groups outside the country via, 
for example, religious or economic association. Aside from this, of course, there are a 
host of daily and personal interactions taking place.  
 
Seurat (1985) aimed to understand the underlying motives for the civil war in 
Lebanon in general but most specifically why individuals were turning to the use of 
large-scale and deadly violence against each other. Generally, the existence of the 
Lebanese Civil War was attributed to the existing hostility between different ethnic, 
religious and political groups, which meant that a minor incident would spark a 
vicious violent struggle in which all entities tried to exterminate one anther. Within a 
very short time the previous reality of the different groups coexisting in the same 
space had become untenable, and was instead replaced with a violent struggle in 
which almost all actions were placed in a context of absolute hostility.  
 
Seurat tried to understand the motivation of individuals in suddenly turning from 
mutual acceptance and coexistence, to ultimately dehumanising each other. The 
sudden breakdown of non-violent communication to almost exclusive use of violence 
between different groups was puzzling. Seurat interviewed individuals living in the 
Bab Tebbane neighbourhood of Tripoli seeking to understand this, looking at how the 
use of violence had been sanctioned and justified. Using Castells’ approach to 
network analysis, Seurat was searching for what had caused the reprogramming of the 
networks that existed in Tripoli. 
 
 
3.1.	  The	  Creation	  of	  Narratives	  in	  Neigbourhoods	  
 
Seurat’s study found that the narrative used by individuals to explain their behaviour 
in the war was closely tied to the physical neighbourhood, but also that the level of 
influence on the construction of the overall narrative strongly depended on the 
relevant individual’s position within the immediate social group. More senior 
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individuals in the neighbourhood, who could be described as ‘traditional leaders’ or 
‘elders’ had, in the times predating the Civil War, solved conflicts within the group, 
provided guidance and advice, aided social cohesion and had served as 
representatives for the neighborhood when interacting with other groups. These 
individuals were fundamental during the Civil War in establishing and maintaining a 
coherent identity that would be used to define the neighbourhood as a group. The 
position of an elder does not necessarily need to be a formal one, such as a priest or 
mayor, but is more often informal and attained through both heritable and meritocratic 
paths. Especially in societies that are undergoing stress or major changes, these 
influential individuals are very important since they provide and distribute services 
and goods necessary for survival and wellbeing. Tripoli shared the experience of most 
Lebanese cities after the Second World War, and saw rapid and prolonged 
urbanisation which led to a shortage of housing and an oversupply of low and 
unskilled labour. These were only two of the sectors in which community leaders 
were paramount in managing and trying to improve. Therefore, the community 
leaders were already in an established and influential position within those networks 
before the outbreak of violence and obviously interested in cementing their 
importance following the outbreak of hostilities.  
 
A second group of individuals which was key in establishing a narrative and acting to 
maintain it along their interests, were people who connected different neighbourhoods 
through their profession or position. While the first group of influential individuals, 
the community leaders or ‘elders’, would highlight the components that supported 
their elevated and influential position by, for example, referring to religious texts or 
family ties, this latter group would base their influence on their profession and their 
position that linked different groups and networks across the divide of 
neighbourhoods. Cities and urban settlements depend on a constant supply of food, 
fuel, water and raw materials for trade and industries, as well as infrastructure to 
transport and trade manufactured goods. Additionally, the exchange of information 
and funds as well as the transfer of people to and from neighbourhoods depended on 
people that could work as links between different networks and social groups. For 
example, the supplier of cooking oil to the neighbourhood would, by his profession, 
be linked to producers and traders who were based outside the neighbourhood. In the 
absence of a neighbourhood being able to produce sufficient cooking oil to satisfy its 
	   128	  
own demands, the market forces of supply and demand would determine the supply 
and value. If the supplier would charge too high a price for the commodity, a rival 
individual would emerge and replace him.  
 
Contrast this with the position of an ‘elder’, whose status was based on kinship and 
had been cemented over a long period of time. Community elders, therefore, had a 
generally more stable position than those who presented links between different 
groups. The influence of the individuals who could link different neighbourhoods 
(these ‘linking individuals’), however, was substantial due to their financial resources, 
benefit of their position and the key services they offered to neighbourhoods. A small 
micro-loan provider could, for example, offer lower rates of credit in exchange for 
representation within a neighbourhood outside his own. 
 
Seurat’s study found that the neighbourhood of Bab Tebbane reacted to the onset of 
violence in a manner similar to other communities within the city: following the 
sudden sensation of fear and insecurity, most connections to people living outside of 
the immediate neighbourhood were broken off, and a disappearance of all but the 
strongest links followed as a reaction to the perceived insecurity and hostility of the 
world outside one’s immediate neighbourhood. When narratives emerged that 
delegitimised and dehumanised other groups based on ethnical, political or religious 
identity, all forms of non-violent communication such as language or trade were 
almost immediately replaced with hostility and an existentialist argumentation that 
called for the eradication of the opponent. The earlier described key individuals of the 
community, i.e. elders and individuals who in effect linked different neighbourhoods, 
reacted to the breakdown of non-violent forms of communication in very specific 
ways. Importantly, their reactions served to both increase their respective importance 
within the neighbourhood and their ability to create and maintain a narrative of the 
conflict. 
 
 
3.2	  Community	  elders	  
 
Community elders were empowered because, in the absence of alternative structures 
to solve conflicts within the neighbourhood and to manage and distribute resources 
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and goods necessary for survival, they stepped in. Police and the legal services, social 
services such as education and health care and, finally, trade and the supply of goods 
and services, broke down rapidly as soon as a few incidents of violence led to the 
cessation of peacetime relations and services and sense of security in the whole of 
Lebanon. Community leaders were fundamental in taking over these services with the 
aim of providing for the welfare of their neighbourhoods. At the same time, however, 
leaders were put under increasing stress to deliver: simple hereditary justifications 
were no longer sufficient to keep the individual in his social position. Rather, his 
standing depended on his ability to support, protect and develop the group he was 
leading. His position was equally put under threat by rivals who tried to increase their 
own influence vis-a-vis the established leadership, and the instability and precarious 
nature of Tripoli caused a large number of power struggles within neighbourhoods. 
According to Seurat’s research, this furthered the radicalisation of the narrative since, 
in many cases, rivals would try to increase the hostilities towards other groups in 
order to increase the pressure on the existing leadership. The result of this was an 
increasingly inward looking identity in the neighbourhood that created a utopian 
narrative in which the neighbourhood was seen to be under constant existentialist 
threat from all other groups and neighbourhoods in the city. The by-product of this 
dynamic was that attempts to negotiate between neighbourhoods and to try to find 
common ground between warring parties were labelled disloyal and characterised as 
betraying the group. Seurat found that the community elders would favour a narrative 
in which their position in the group would be elevated and protected and, almost as an 
unintentional side effect, this meant that the hostility towards the outside was 
maintained.  
 
The prominent position of the ‘elders’ allowed for a strong influence of the overall 
group identity and behaviour of every individual of the neighbourhood. On the one 
hand, the insecurity and hostility found outside the neighbourhood made group 
members depend more on their own association for support and protection. On the 
other hand, that same perceived outside insecurity and hostility also meant that the 
individuals inside the neighbourhood would look to emulate the behaviour of its 
leaders. Behaving in a non-sanctioned way would place the individual at risk of being 
expelled form the group and thus having to face physical and psychological insecurity 
and danger without the support of the group. 
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3.3	  Bridging	  individuals	  
 
The link between different neighbourhoods was also affected by the second group of 
key individuals able to affect the narrative or ‘program’ of the networks found in the 
civil war. These individuals who were providing goods and services necessary for the 
survival of each neighbourhood, benefited economically during the Civil War. 
Returning to the example of the supply of cooking oils, the hostility between groups 
within the city would limit the number of suppliers that, in turn, would allow the 
traders to increase their prices and thus returns on their investment. The existence of 
instability directly supported the economic interests of suppliers of goods necessary 
for the survival of every neighbourhood in Tripoli. From food-stuff to energy and 
weaponry, to information and news, medical supplies and modes of transport, those 
who were in the position to be able to link different networks of providers and 
consumers would be able to increase their returns manifold. What Seurat found was 
remarkable in regards to how these individuals would almost cynically promote a 
narrative that demonised the ‘other’, since this meant a maximisation of individual 
returns. The profits made by certain key individuals who linked different 
neighbourhoods was several times those which they had made before the insecurity 
and hostility of the Civil War. While these individuals also had a great capacity to 
function as messengers between different neighbourhoods and were, due to their 
profession and position, in between hostile parties, they would actually try to prevent 
the re-emergence of any kind of non-violent communication that would bypass them 
since this would threaten their current position and livelihood. What Seurat did find is 
that they would provide channels of communication and broker services such as safe 
passage or the release of prisoners between different warring parties, but would try 
their best to prevent non-violent direct contact.  
 
The inherent interest of these two groups of influential actors, the elders and the 
linking individuals, was to maintain their elevated position. Once the genie of 
violence had escaped its bottle, it shows that these people determined the programme 
that managed the communication and identity of the networks. In this way they 
sidelined anyone who argued for reconciliation and strengthened those who facilitated 
violence against the perceived outsiders. Utilising violence increased the power of the 
elders since it caused the polarisation of individuals: anyone who accepted the 
leadership of the elder was a friend and received support; anyone who did not was an 
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enemy and was to be killed. Similarly, the individuals who served as links between 
neighbourhoods and provided goods and services, promoted violence in order to 
protect their own interests. Since violence and the perception of threat and instability 
are closely linked, the economic benefits of providing goods and services was far 
greater. Additionally, the dependence on the supplies was greater and there was far 
less competition compared to settings in which non-violent forms of communication 
prevailed.  
 
 
3.4	  Castells	  and	  the	  Civil	  War	  
 
Employing a Castellian analysis of Seurat’s study, it can be argued that he isolated the 
‘programmers’ of the network of people that were linked to the neighbourhood of Bab 
Tebbane. The programme is fundamental in understanding both the identity and the 
behaviour of these individuals, and lies at the heart of the immediate front lines of the 
Lebanese Civil War. Seurat’s study is remarkable because it shows that the link 
between an individual’s identity and behaviour is far more complex than the 
assumption that every individual has one single and unitary identity that determines 
his behaviour. In other words, the violence of the civil war was not caused and 
maintained by pre-existing hostilities between different groups, but by the facilitation 
of violence by certain individuals to further their own interests.  
 
The ability to programme networks becomes, therefore, of great importance here and, 
as Kalyvas (2006) argues in his remarkable study on the logic of violence in civil 
wars, it is not bloodthirsty madmen who senselessly use violence against anyone, but 
it is the privatisation of violence that allows individuals to use it for their own 
interests that is key. He finds precisely the same factors to be at work as Seurat does 
(Kalyvas, 2006, p. 364), and argues that there is a profound disjunction between 
violence and a justifying narrative. 
“[C]onflicts and violence “on the ground” often seem more related to local issues 
rather than the “master cleavage”(Kalyvas, 2006, p. 364) that drives the civil war at 
the national level” was the position from which Seurat set out in his study. Kalyvas 
argues that: “[d]uring the [civil] war, political actors make concerted efforts to 
mobilize the population around the cleavage dimension they represent, because they 
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know both that the population is divided in a multitude of contradictory ways and that 
civilians tend to avoid risky commitments” (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 78). Kalyvas then 
continues with a quote of a Lebanese student who states that he detected a sudden 
shift in mentality that forbade him to see half of his friends since they were of a 
certain confession (Ibid). This had never mattered before.  
 
Also, Kalyvas looks at the relationship between the kind of irregular warfare and 
geographical space. In contrast to conventional wars, the boundaries separating the 
different sides in a civil war are blurred, and maps depicting the fighting are 
confusing and inconclusive. Together with the absence of uniforms and an inability to 
distinguish between different actors, this makes the situation confusing to analyse and 
difficult to understand. The individuals Seurat had interviewed were found inside this 
zone of confusion which, in turn, created insecurity and forced everybody to take 
sides in the conflict.  
 
Both Seurat and Kalyvas found a multitude of motivations that could entice an 
individual to align with a certain group or network, but it is important to observe that 
this only happens after the prevailing programme has already been altered to one in 
which violence had become the most prominent and influential form of 
communication. Kalyvas highlights the role of control and information in a society, 
while Castells focuses more on the dynamics found within networks but, in the 
concrete example, a deeper study of the history of Lebanon, and the Lebanese Civil 
War is necessary in order to address the questions that lie at the heart of the debate: 
what is the origin of the networks that can be found in Lebanon? What is their nature 
and how did they interconnect? What explains the switch from predominantly non-
violent forms of communication before the Civil War to the violence Seurat describes, 
and then the end of the armed hostilities? Is there the risk that the violence of the Civil 
War will return to Lebanon and, if so, can this be avoided? 
 
 
4.	  A	  historical	  introduction	  to	  networks	  in	  Lebanon	  
 
While Lebanon is a relatively young country - before gaining independence in 1943 it 
had been a part of a province of the Ottoman empire since 1299 - its territory as part 
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of the Levant is one of the oldest continuously settled places on the planet. Cradled on 
the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, and with Mount Levant at its centre, the 
country has fertile plains and an abundance of water in a hot and arid region. Two 
ancient trade routes that link North Africa with Asia, and Europe with the Silk Route 
that crosses from East Asia to Europe and North Africa, intersect here. All major 
monotheistic religions have strong links to the country, with the ancient city of 
Jerusalem containing holy places of Jewish, Christian and Islamic worship. 
Agriculture, but later also silk production and commercial activities, made the region 
rich and subject to both overt and covert influence from the outside. Greek settlers, 
Roman administrators, Phoenician traders, and Arab farmers were only some of the 
different people who made the Levant their home. Both history and historiography of 
Lebanon are closely influenced by this and Traboulsi finds three main themes that 
dominate: sectarianism, an outward looking liberal economic system and problematic 
relations with its regional setting (Traboulsi, 2007, p. vii). All of these factors could 
today be argued to be ‘networking’: sectarianism means placing importance to 
perceived differences between subdivisions of groups or sects, but because no group 
was able to exist autonomous it requires the creation and maintenance of links with 
others. Equally so the economic system depended on maintaining economic and 
financial links to sustain trade and investment with actors outside the country. Finally 
the regional setting also indicates the inability of Lebanon to create barriers to cross-
border influences and exchange with its regional neighbours.  
	  	  
4.1	  Sectarianism	  
 
It is important to note that sectarianism is only one of several themes, and a reduction 
of Lebanon’s history to sectarianism is too simplistic; sects serve the twin function of 
resisting the inequalities of the market and enlisting outside support for power and 
survival (Traboulsi, 2007), but sectarian affiliation is but one form of identity and 
often other interests such as trade, industry, language and ethnicity are present. At the 
same time sectarianism describes a very important component of human behaviour 
because it generally refers to a supernatural ideal that provides identity and structure. 
Precisely because of the supposed absence of human agency in its creation most 
sectarian identities are based, in some form of the other, on the assumption that they 
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are based on an absolute truth to which only those who adhere to it have access to. 
Because it is focused on the supernatural, creation, life and death and the spiritual it 
allows it to be used to create and maintain the idea of being ‘the chosen people’ which 
are destined to succeed. In Lebanon the constant influx of different identities and 
sectarian convictions is the base for many groups, but because of the supposed 
absence of human agency they are very difficult to moderate or accommodate(Rabil, 
2011). Because of its reference to the supernatural sectarianism is part of human 
nature and fundamental for the creation of group identity and cohesion, two dynamics 
at the heart of survival. 
 
In the absence of geographic barriers that serve as natural borders, and with social 
links across the region and political and economic links on a global scale, a history of 
Lebanon has to contain both international and domestic sway which in turn is 
important to understand how the country ended up in the throes of a vicious and long-
lasting civil war. Similarly, Khalaf finds three ‘aberrations’: protracted hostility, 
communal solidarity and dependence on foreign intervention and patronage (Khalaf, 
2002, p. ix) which are very similar to Traboulsi’s analysis.  
 
In order to offer an alternative and more convincing explanation to the logic of the 
civil war, the following analysis will be divided into the three themes that Traboulsi 
argues dominate Lebanese history, followed by a study on how the networks of 
sectarianism, economics and regional setting overlap and interact and how this in turn 
ties into Seurat’s study of neighbourhoods during the civil war.  
 
First of all, the sectarian component is of great importance: the basis on which the 
National Pact of 1943 was built formalised the organisation of the political system 
along sectarian lines. Despite its fragile nature, the fact that it survived more or less 
unaltered for over 30 years indicates that the people of Lebanon agreed to a system 
that was based on sectarian population (Haddad, 2002). Even earlier during the 
approximately half a century of Ottoman rule, sectarian affiliations not only mattered 
in regards to the political spectrum, but also greatly influenced social and religious 
behaviours such as marriages and legal and civil procedures. Especially procedures 
such as inheritance, marriage, inter-familiar disputes and petty crimes were generally 
managed not by Ottoman officials or the provincial courts but internally within the 
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various groups. This system was stable since both ordinary members of a group 
would have little contact with authority outside their group, but also community 
leaders such as those mentioned in Seurat’s study preferred to deal with matters 
directly. With little demand for authorities above the group, no identity above the 
sectarian level could emerge which in turn explains the short history of Lebanon as an 
independent country.  
 
Sectarianism is not idiosyncratic to Lebanon or the Ottoman empire; human beings in 
their quest for the meaning of life, as guidance for their actions, and in order to create 
group cohesion often rely on a metaphysical mystique (Sen, 2006). Historically the 
term ‘sect’ designates a religiously separate group that is defined by a set of methods, 
traditions and doctrines which provide guidance and structure to groups of 
individuals. Since most sects argue that their approach is guided by a superhuman 
power, they demand an exclusive and unquestionable position vis-a-vis others 
(Wilson, 1982). Historically sects have provided not only answers to the metaphysical 
questions of ‘where do we come from’ and ‘what happens before and after death’ but 
also provided traditions and venues to structure daily life such as weddings, legal 
proceedings and solution for disputes within the group, health care and social services 
and education. It is also obvious that when two or more different sects or religions get 
into contact, a struggle for supremacy of meaning, or in other words the demand for 
exclusivity in both metaphysical but also social functions and traditions creates the 
potential for conflict. Especially before the establishment of states and nations, the 
sects would provide the only venue for social and legal affairs in towns and 
settlements and in the absence of alternatives and the dynamics of groups, most 
settlements would be almost exclusively adhere to one or the other religions 
conviction.  
 
The existence of strong sectarian identity also explains the limit of links between 
different groups. Since most of the legal and social structures were aimed at solving 
conflicts within members of a distinct group, there was little basis for communication 
or cooperation between different groups. Financial or commercial transactions, for 
example, could not be guaranteed, or possible financial conflicts could not be 
mediated in the absence of mechanisms above a group. It is interesting to note that 
theological distinctions play very little role here; instead the shared religious or ethnic 
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heritage was perpetuated by social and political norms and behaviours to a stage in 
which the different religions themselves played no great role at all. This is captured 
by Haddad: 
“Belonging to a religious group limited, and still does in a sense not only 
one’s contact with others but also the kind of occupation that was open to the 
individual. The term religious community, group, or sect is used in order to 
emphasise its social and political functions and significance. It is not so much 
the religious principles or theological differences (the faiths) that matter. 
Rather, it is the fact that they are religious communities which act as social 
reference groups.” (Haddad, 2002, p. 295) 
In other words, the initial shared doctrine or faith that lay at the heart of a group’s 
identity was being increasingly replaced by social, political, legal and cultural patterns 
that made one group distinct from another and in turn hindered cooperation and 
communication - or linkage - between one group and another.  
 
 
4.2	  Sectarianism	  and	  identity	  
 
The evidence Haddad presents is a questionnaire handed out in 2001 to a wider cross-
section of Lebanese, which asked them about their sectarian identity. Across the range 
of different sectarian affiliations there was a strong and consistent sense of attachment 
to the respective sect and outspoken pride in membership. Equally so, most 
individuals stated that their sect would be able to serve the whole of the country better 
than any other but also that many did prefer not to interact with members of other 
groups (Haddad, 2002). The conclusion that can be drawn from this is two-fold: first 
of all, group identity and affiliation has a fundamental impact on how networks are 
established and maintained in Lebanon, as well as the opposite: possible links and 
connections are prevented from being made because the nature of immediate 
networks of individuals prevents this. Secondly, the absence of any form of 
communication between the groups includes the absence of violence. The distrust and 
hostility between different groups in Lebanon indicates the difficulty of establishing a 
common Lebanese identity and, as will be shown later, hinders economic activities 
and opens the door for foreign intervention. It is not, however, a sufficient 
explanation for why the country could so suddenly plunge into the Civil War, and 
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subsequently emerge out of it again with the same sectarian groups present and 
identities intact. 
 
Since Lebanon only gained independence in 1943, the notion of an identity that was 
shared by all Lebanese, and which supersedes their various sectarian structures, is 
weak. Especially under stress - that is when existing patterns of behaviour and 
practices are threatened by sudden changes and events - people tend to rely on links 
that are closest and which appear to be better positioned to satisfy their needs. The 
perceived distance between the Lebanese national government and the people of the 
country is thus easily utilised by actors who aim to increase their own power and 
influence. This phenomenon is demonstrated by the unwritten basis of Lebanon’s 
political system, the National Pact of 1943: next to the written constitution that 
established judicial, political and civic equality, the parliamentary democratic system 
was to have a Maronite Christian as president, the speaker of parliament was to be a 
Shiite Muslim and the prime minister was to be a Sunni Muslim. As a basis for this, 
the division was an agreement by the leaders of the three largest sectarian groups that 
was to stabilise and protect their interests, both in regards to their own groups and 
nationally.  
 
 
4.3	  Networks	  and	  identity	  in	  Lebanese	  Politics	  
 
While many sectarian networks traditionally rely on kinship and informal links that 
connect individuals, the same dynamics are used by more formalised and wider, even 
international, networks. The national borders of Lebanon do not necessarily conform 
to the boundaries of these networks. The most notable example for this in Lebanon is 
Hizbollah, ‘The Party of God’. With logistical, financial and military support by the 
Syrian and Iranian government, the organisation was established in southern Lebanon 
in the early 1980s and aims to protect the interests of the Shiite population that are 
threatened by other sects, as well as the Lebanese state and Israel. It does this by 
providing social and legal services, religious and political guidance and support, and 
by maintaining an armed militia aimed at countering Israeli aggression. Hizbollah has 
changed its aims and patterns of behaviour multiple times since its inception, but the 
underlying notions remained the same: it is geared towards the maintenance of 
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influence and power of its leadership both within and outside Lebanon, and to play a 
vital link in two wider conflicts: firstly the Arab-Israeli conflict and secondly the 
Shiite-Islamic conflict (Azani, 2009). On the domestic level, Hizbollah justifies its 
existence and actions by defending the actions of a specific sect, the Shiites, but 
within Lebanon the group has shifted from open warfare against other domestic 
groups to a party that is fully integrated in the day-to-day political process, while at 
the same time internationally remaining an autonomous actor that is heavily involved 
in hostility towards Israel and allied to the Iranian government and Assad regime in 
Syria (Alagha, 2006). Hizbollah carefully manoeuvres its use of ideologies and 
actions to employ sectarianism as a basis, but also balances its rhetoric and behaviour 
towards other sectarian groups in Lebanon. Reflected in its name as ‘The Party of 
God’ but not ‘The State of God’, sectarianism guides the actions of its members but 
does not dominate it in a way that dehumanises those Lebanese who do not share the 
same sectarian affiliation. While Hizbollah continues to refer to the use of violence 
against those it perceives to be its enemies, it does this because of a situational 
analysis and not because of its religious ideology.  
 
Thus, the example of Hizbollah demonstrates that the alleged close connection 
between the violence of the Civil War and religion is unconvincing, and that 
especially the connection between sectarianism and violence, although the two appear 
to be closely related, is overly simplified and misleading. Religion provides guidance 
to human behaviour but is abstract and requires interpretation to allows it to be 
applied to a context. 
 
Kalyvas also warns against the argument that different religious convictions 
automatically lead to conflict. It simply fails to explain why in most parts of the world 
people with different religious convictions are not only able to coexist without 
violence between each other but also how they can often cooperate and communicate 
for mutual benefit. Furthermore, the argument that people direct violence against 
others not because of their actions and behaviours but because their identity, 
affiliation and religious convictions and traditions is unconvincing in most cases 
(Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 24-25). However, religion is often the basis of identities that lie at 
the heart of networks, but it is not the existence of different religions or identities that 
stipulate that conflict is inevitable. Instead it allows, just like Seurat’s study has 
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indicated, key individuals to exploit these different identities for their own interests. It 
is therefore the networks that the different identities create and how those networks 
are programmed, not the identities themselves, that are key. As will be shown later 
developments in other sectors, most notably economic and political, made 
sectarianism a powerful tool for exploitation. 
 
The crucial point here applied to Lebanon, then, is that the different sectarian groups 
of Lebanon are today linked to each other and form networks within networks. Links 
outside the sectarian identity allow for an exchange of communication and 
cooperation beyond the violence that often emerges when singular identities are 
exploited by key actors. Historically, economic development and prosperity had often 
aligned with sectarian groups. This was because, for example, skilled trades were 
passed along families and certain communities were better positioned that others in 
certain economic sectors. However, growing complexity in the commercial sector was 
driven by the economic liberalism that gradually replaced the feudal system of Mount 
Levant and weakened long established patterns of behaviour.  
 
 
5.	  Traditional	  economic	  structure	  
 
The second theme mentioned by Traboulsi is Lebanon’s long history of economic 
liberalism that has had a strong influence on the development of the country not only 
financially but also socially and politically. There are numerous indicators of how 
sectarianism and the economy overlap and influence each other. In the Ottoman 
period, most of the territory was dominated by the iqta’ or tax farming system in 
which families, the so-called muqata’ji, would largely autonomously rule a piece of 
land in exchange for a fixed amount of payment, supply men in times when requested 
by the authorities and keep order and peace in their area. As simple as this system 
may sound, it presented many issues that remain at the heart of the conflicts found in 
Lebanon today. Firstly the iqta’ system advantaged Muslims since all Christians and 
Jews had to pay an additional ‘protection’ tax and were barred from military service. 
Political participation and the legal protection heavily favoured Muslims forcing 
Christians and Jews to focus on the commercial sector that provided a bridge to 
territories outside of the Ottoman system. Thus, outside links to other networks were 
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necessarily established At the same time, many of the muqata’ji families were in 
constant conflict with the Ottoman government in Istanbul in an attempt to gain as 
much independence and pay the least for their iqta’ while struggling with intra-
familiar feuds for domination and altercations with the subjects of their iqta’ resulting 
in a weakening of previously dominating structures.  
 
The fertile soil and climate of Mount Levant favoured agriculture, and the geographic 
position offered a great base for cash crops. In particular, the introduction of silk 
production to Mont Lebanon in the 16th century changed the economic as well as the 
social and political realities of Mount Levant. The great demand for silk in 
renaissance Europe empowered the non-Muslims who were able to amass wealth 
quickly thanks to their position as merchants. Religious affiliation also meant that 
many Christian merchants would use their new-found wealth to send their children to 
Italy and France for education which added further layers to their links outside the 
region. The value of silk in Europe and the shared religious and social convictions 
provided the previously disadvantaged non-Muslim subjects of Mount Levant with a 
position in international networks and elevated their influence in Mount Levant.  
 
 
5.1	  Changing	  economic	  patterns	  
 
Trade and commerce with the world outside the Levant increased and with it the 
traditionally dominating system of iqta’ and its ruling families gradually lost ground 
and influence. The role of the agricultural land ruled by the noble families quickly 
shifted vis-a-vis the new commercial centres in the urban areas outside the absolute 
control of the mugata’ji. The changing patterns of production and consumption led to 
a shift of employment opportunities from rural farming to urban manufacturing, since 
the manufacturing of silk was more labour intensive than the mulberry leaf cultivation 
on which the silk worms feed. This subsequent rapid urbanisation required use of 
different social and judicial institutions than those people would have found in their 
rural communities, creating new links to new networks, and traditionally influential 
families and individuals were suddenly unable to provide their services. The new 
settings also created new challenges, with poverty, crime and low paid manual labour 
being some examples of these. In the absence of a strong state that is able and willing 
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to moderate between the ‘haves’ and the ‘not haves’, a small group of well-connected 
individuals was able to amass great wealth through the ownership of urban factories 
or near-monopolisation of trade. Commerce and transport were also in the hands of a 
limited number of families and the majority of the population could barely survive as 
subsistence farmers or manual, often un-skilled or low-skilled labourers. This led to a 
gap between rich and poor in the population that greatly widened after the Second 
World War (Winslow, 1996). 
 
So, parallel to the increase in links in the networks of the predominantly non-Muslim 
merchants and the growing influence of their networks in regards to commercial 
activities not limited to trade - for example money lending and urban property 
development - came a decrease in the importance of the links of the mugata’ji and the 
traditionally most dominant actors. This occured not only at the expense of the 
predominant Muslim notables but other sects as well. Additionally, because 
urbanisation allowed for better education facilities and a proliferation of arts, 
literature, newspapers, publishers and music (to name a few), many identities were 
challenged and, whilst previously certain professions had often aligned with villages 
and rural areas, this was no longer the case (Traboulsi, 2007). In the absence of 
unions and guilds, there was very little that provided stability in the life of the people 
of Mount Levant and economic links to the outside provided, sometimes more 
psychologically than otherwise, stability and security to the people who were 
experiencing great changes in their daily life. Parallel to this, outside actors gained, 
via economic cooperation, greater influence in Lebanon’s domestic sphere: France as 
the main customer of Lebanese silk would support those it depended on and would 
seek to strengthen their position. Until the First World War, Beirut became a major 
centre for maritime transport, insurance and banking, and reached a position in which 
it rivalled the until then dominating British Empire, who became an important 
supplier for machines and technology that in turn provided the basis for the 
manufacturing of goods for export. Within a short period of time Lebanon had 
emerged as the regional economic centre and hub for commercial activities that linked 
Europe and Arabia (Winslow, 1996), and it can be argued that the existence of shared 
cultural, religious and sectarian identities in Lebanon (and the subsequent forced links 
to new networks which were created) provided an important basis for this.  
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Just as in the First World War forced a sudden end to this commercial expansion, so 
did the Lebanese Civil War cause major changes in the economic networks that 
centred on Lebanon. Wealthy and well-connected individuals used their international 
links to relocate to the relative safety of elsewhere, and left the poorer Lebanese 
citizens stuck in the realms of the war and, importantly, open to the economic 
exploitation by the key individuals that Seurat identified in his study. The dynamics 
of the hardship caused by war led to an accelerated urbanisation because cities 
provided both the promise of increased security by the group and a more reliable 
supply of goods necessary for survival.  
 
The main theme of the change within Lebanon, especially urbanisation and a growing 
gap in economic fortune between the cities and the countryside, is still present today 
and is closely related to Traboulsi’s third and final theme in analysing the history of 
Lebanon, the regional setting. In the Lebanese heartland surrounding Mount Levant, 
the fertility of the soil and the intersection of the ancient routes linking Africa and 
Europe with Central Asia and the Mediterranean Sea was the natural territory for 
different groups of people, with their different religious or sectarian convictions, to 
get into contact with each other. Conflicts over the ownership of land and resources 
occured often, and the arrival of a new group could lead to violent conflicts with 
already established ones. Furthermore, instability and conflicts in neighbouring 
territories and countries forced many people to flee, and Lebanon’s history of being 
the destination of people who flee poverty, prosecution and violence means that this is 
most likely to continue. A side-effect of this, as mentioned above, is a further strain 
on the stability and cohesion of established groups. Lebanon also benefits from the 
close relation between Lebanon’s liberal economic system and its geographic setting:  
“Lebanese prosperity also had much to do with the fact that Lebanon had a 
jump start in economic and social developments over neighboring countries 
rich in resources but relatively poor in skills, world contacts, and 
developmental experience. The advanced educational system in Lebanon and 
the extensive connections the Lebanese had garnered with the West bestowed 
on Lebanon some real advantages in its ability to act as the indispensable 
middleman in much of the contact of the Gulf and other Arab countries with 
the West.” (Kubursi, 1999) 
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The former colonial powers of France and Britain who ultimately decided on the 
boundaries of independent Lebanon, tried to establish centralised nation-states in 
areas where they had not existed before. After the implosion of the Ottoman Empire 
the question of national identity emerged, and while some territories enjoyed relative 
stability, for example Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, others, such as Syria, did 
not with different groups struggling for influence and domination. Equally so, the 
former colonial powers Britain and France that had earlier benefitted from the 
breakdown of the Ottoman empire, had their own approach and vision of how the 
region should be structured, and had their own definition of political, religious, ethnic 
and social groups that were to provide the basis for the newly independent states: 
“In a postwar period dominated by the right of nations to self-determination, a 
principle invoked with equal force by Woodrow Wilson’s America and 
Lenin’s Soviet Russia, the legitimisation was rooted in the age-old minorities 
policy, focused on ethnic and religious communities. France justified its claim 
to Syria by the necessary defence of the Christian, Druze, `Alawi and Shi`i 
minorities, while Britain claimed Palestine in order to create a ‘national 
homeland’ for the Jews. The text of the Balfour Declaration of November 
1917 is a striking example of this ethnicisation of the peoples of the region. 
Whereas the Jews are assumed to be a people and a nationality, since the aim 
was to establish a ‘national home’ for them in Palestine, the Arabs, the 
majority of the inhabitants of the country, were negatively defined by their 
non-Jewishness and reduced to the status of religious communities (Muslim 
and Christian) whose only rights were civil and religious, that is, neither 
national nor political.” (Traboulsi, 2007, p. 76) 
 
 
6.	  Lebanon’s	  regional	  setting	  
 
The region has remained full of disputes and conflicts since, and in particular 
Lebanon’s two geographic neighbours, Syria and Israel, have held great sway over the 
country. Many Syrian nationalists argue that Lebanon is but a province of Syria and 
have treated it like this. Relying on cultural, ethnic, commercial and kinship ties, the 
politically and militarily far more powerful Syria has long had great influence over 
Lebanon. Additionally, the leaders in Damascus worried that the other neighbour of 
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the country, that is Israel, could exploit its military strength vis-a-vis Lebanon and 
establish itself (Chaitani, 2007). Lebanon has suffered and benefitted from this in 
almost equal terms because of the underlying networks that connected the different 
domestic groups (e.g. ethnic, religious, professional) to others, both regionally and 
further afield, and while it can be argued that Lebanon’s sovereignty was weakened 
by events and actions of its neighbouring states, it also gained from these. For 
example, the Syrian military intervention in Lebanon following the 1967 War led to 
the occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights by Israel and the expulsion of thousands 
of Palestinian refugees into southern Lebanon, but this at the same time helped 
different communities within Lebanon to balance each other by preventing one group 
from dominating the domestic discourse. This in effect indicates how different 
networks interact and create a balance.  
 
It can also be argued that the wider population of Lebanon agreed to this dynamic, 
since it provided a certain level of protection from intervention by foreign groups 
allied with different communities (Haddad, 2002). Non-Lebanese events and political 
movements, for example the rise of Pan-Arabism, was also cited as a reason why it 
was so important to maintain the balance of different domestic actors against each 
other (Ayoub 1994). However, the Israel-Palestine conflict and especially the role and 
influence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is cited to be a main factor for the onset 
of armed hostilities within Lebanon in 1975 which ultimately led to the Civil War 
(Winslow, 1996). This highlights the relative weakness of analyses of the Lebanese 
Civil War that argue that predominately domestic causes were to blame for the 
outbreak, and underlines the general inability of networks to be interrupted by 
national borders. 
 
The discussion above shows that networks of different kinds, structure and 
programming have always been at the centre of Lebanon’s history, and that limiting 
this explanation to ethnic identity is insufficient; it does not and cannot of itself 
explain Lebanon’s past, present and future. To sum up, networks of various kinds, 
nature and background continue to evolve and adapt to changes in patterns of human 
behaviour. Networks adapt themselves in order to satisfy the needs of the individuals 
that they are composed of, both in regards to the emergence and erosion of nodes and 
links, as well as their programming. The survival of human beings depends on the 
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balancing act between those two factors and this is Lebanon’s fortune. The different 
networks, including ethnic, economic and regional (among others), managed to 
balance each other not because of a centralised power maintaining an equilibrium, but 
because their flexibility and ability to adapt to changes in the domestic, regional and 
international environment. The arguably greatest collective trauma that Lebanon’s 
people experienced in recent history and appears to work as a counterargument to the 
nature of networks to maintain a balance and equilibrium is then the Civil War and 
will be studied in the following section.  
 
 
7.	  The	  Civil	  War	  (1975-­‐1990)	  
 
This same flexibility of networks that allowed for the prosperity of many Lebanese 
and propelled the country ahead in the region, also lies at the centre of what can be 
argued to be the most traumatising experience in Lebanon’s modern history, the Civil 
War. Over the span of 15 years, battles, massacres, assassinations and attacks between 
ever shifting alliances and groups took place, and caused tens of thousands of deaths, 
destroyed the cities and infrastructure and led to repeated waves of emigration. Yet, 
when comparing the sectarian structure, economic and regional situation of Lebanon 
before and after the war, very little change can be observed. The political structure of 
the country, especially the domination of sectarian association within the political 
system, has remained in place with minor changes. Equally so, the liberal economic 
system is persistently dominated by a small minority of individuals, whilst 
unemployment and the increase of living costs remain a challenge for the majority. 
Finally, the wider region remains one in which instability and conflicts prevail. This 
leaves observer searching for not only an explanation for the emergence of violence in 
the country in 1975 but also, and maybe even more importantly, its disappearance in 
1990.  
 
Just as the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand is credited for having started 
the First World War, the Lebanese Civil War started with a seemingly unrelated and 
innocuous demonstration by fishermen in the southern city of Sidon on 26 February 
1975. The demonstration was against the growing domination of the fishermens’ trade 
by a company owned by members of the ruling classes. The military was called in to 
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restore order, shooting at and killing a number of the demonstrators. When the 
Lebanese government refused to investigate the incident, shooting and fighting broke 
out between different leftist and nationalist groups, but also between the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) on the one side, and the military on the other. The 
violence was not only an indicator that the stress on the Lebanese society had become 
too much for the weak political system to moderate or control, but also served as a 
catalyst for worsening relations between different factions. For the majority of the 
Lebanese population, the years between 1975 and 1990 were defined by an almost 
daily struggle for survival in which only the most intimate and close relationships 
promised protection and support. Recurring massacres, attacks and assassinations 
maintained an atmosphere of fear and existentialist threats within the country, which 
was also being further destabilised by repeated interference by Syria, the PLO, Israel, 
the European countries, the US and other Arab states. The Lebanese Civil War lacked 
clearly defined adversaries and all actors, both Lebanese and foreign, therefore had 
little inhibition to break alliances and turn against co-religionists, ignore or even 
provide support to massacres on civilians, and often successfully try to exploit the 
violence in Lebanon for their own interests.  
 
The length of the war and the continuous changes in allies and adversaries not only 
added to the confusion that is found in every violent conflict - the Clausewitzian “fog 
of war” (Clausewitz, 2007) - but also indicated that there was no coherent narrative. 
Groups were not fighting each other because of their religious, ethnic or sectarian 
accounts, but because of short term goals that were tied to real-life necessities rather 
than more abstract ideological, historical or religious confrontations (O'Ballance, 
1998). This absence of a coherent underlying motive made the violence appear 
illogical and senseless, and both contemporary and historical observers struggle to 
produce a coherent account or explanation of the Civil War. What is clear, however, 
is that an explanation based on the uneasy or hostile relationship between different 
groups within the country can neither account for the outbreak of violence, nor the 
duration and, finally, the cessation of it. An analysis that focuses on the overall 
situation of the country on the one hand, and the perceptions of those people who 
found themselves at the frontline of the fighting on the other hand, is therefore 
necessary. Seurat’s study of the neighbourhood of Bab Tebbane discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter satisfies the latter, but the former is less conclusive. In other 
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words while for the people at the frontline of the fighting the narrative for the war was 
closely related to their social connections, the reasons for the breakdown of the 
Lebanese state and society as a whole are far less obvious.  
 
The Six Day War in 1967 between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria, but not 
Lebanon, had reverberations for the whole region in the years to come. Lebanon had 
neither the ability to close its borders nor could it agree on a policy regarding how to 
deal with the influx of tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees who fled the fighting 
and established camps and guerrilla bases on Lebanese soil. The Cairo Accords of 
1969 formally provided the PLO with extra-territoriality and the right to bear arms in 
Lebanon. It opened the door for foreign fighters to enter Lebanon and set a precedent 
for the establishment and maintenance of armed militias that were not under control 
or even influence by the government. Not only this, it also imported the, at times, 
violent conflict between Fatah and the PLO to Lebanon and finally allowed all other 
countries in the region to expel Palestinian refugees. The same refugees were 
welcomed for their cheap labour skills by the Lebanese bourgeoisie, and this added to 
the plight of the majority of the Lebanese population that was becoming increasingly 
frustrated. Rather than simply being a conflict between different cultures, sects or 
religions, all of Lebanese felt the increasing tension and stress and reacted by relying 
on links that were perceived to be more stable and reliable than the Lebanese state 
(Khalaf, 2002). The Yom Kippur War of 1973 was fought again without direct 
Lebanese involvement, but the subsequent oil crisis further increased the cost of 
living that hit the poor in particular. The economic situation alone was enough to 
create great hostility: “Even without the war, the uneven sectoral, regional, and class 
development was bound to create social tensions, contradictions, and conflicts.” 
(Kubursi, 1999). As soon as the hostilities of the Civil War began, the economy was 
even further weakened by inflation, debt, and disappearance of revenue. The only 
factors that prevented the country from collapsing outright were the continued 
remittances of overseas Lebanese, a bartering system that functioned largely without 
money or financial institutions, and finally because a large percentage of unemployed 
were absorbed by the various militias (Kubursi, 1999). 
 
The fact that Lebanon avoided the financial and economic collapse is closely tied to 
the ability of social networks to work as venues for cooperation. Remittances for 
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example show that even those who left the country because of the growing hardship 
of life there would maintain social ties and be willing to share their income with those 
members of their network that remained in Lebanon. The informal economy relied on 
word of mouth, communication and interaction to provide goods and services that 
would move in non-hierarchical or rigid flows across the entire country and region. 
Equally so could the militias not assume trust, reliability and sacrifice of its members 
in confrontations if they limited themselves to simply paying their members. Instead 
they tried to appeal to its members by creating and maintaining and narrative that 
would make them the defender of their communities, real or imagined. Parallel to this 
were many militias depending on international links to provide them with funds, 
supplies and arms.  
 
Leenders also places economic inequality at the centre of his study of the breakdown 
of the Lebanese state; the permanent temporariness of the political system that was 
controlled by a very small group gave rise to endemic corruption and nepotism. From 
the Second World War onwards, the economic structure of the country influenced the 
political system in a way in which legitimacy was less and less based upon merit. The 
countries’ elite would use the political system to stabilise their own position vis-a-vis 
others, and the national interest or reconciliation between different classes, clans or 
sectarian groups was not made a subject (Leenders, 2012). Instead of the Lebanese 
state becoming more consolidated and establishing an inclusive political system that 
could address the interests of the majority, Beirut remained weak and divided. With 
the people relying on informal, traditional and sectarian alliances, the system was 
bound to break down sooner or later and pit the different groups against each other, 
regardless of their make-up, philosophy or structure (Bulloch, 1977).  
 
A further indicator of the almost complete absence of debate of the national interest 
on the political system was the weakness of the military. Beirut feared that a strong 
national army could become a domestic political force of its own that would escape 
the control of the elites, and in this way weaken their position or even stage a coup 
d’etat as had happened in many other countries in the region. This meant that 
Lebanon lacked the ability to isolate or at least distance itself from the volatility in the 
region because it could not match the armed forces, both state militaries and armed 
militias. “The official philosophy was expressed by Pierre Jumayil’s famous formula: 
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‘Lebanon’s strength lies in its weakness’. Lebanon was desperately trying to extricate 
itself from any responsibility for belonging to a region dominated by the Arab–Israeli 
conflict. The army was there to defend the system, not the homeland.” (Traboulsi, 
2007, p. 174). Similarly, the military weakness of Lebanon also gave Syria reason 
enough to send troops into Lebanon. Never having accepted Lebanon’s independence 
in the first place, the Syrian government feared that the conflict between Israel and the 
PLO could lead to an invasion of Lebanon by Israel, and in this way give Israel a 
staging ground for an attack on its enemy Syria. With the global Cold War being at its 
height, both countries found that they had the support of one of the two antagonistic 
superpowers for their actions, and since the Lebanese government was both unable 
and unwilling to focus on national, rather than factional interests, Beirut found itself 
at the heart of proxy war by global powers without defence or strong allies (Harris, 
1997).  
 
Over the course of the fifteen years of the Civil War, most of these factors remained 
the same or even gained in urgency: the hostilities within the country had crippled the 
already troubled economic system in which the elites had been able to leave the 
country, often with their wealth and assets intact, but still maintaining a strong 
influence on those who lacked the ability to flee themselves or to extricate themselves 
from the violence. As demonstrated above, the Cold War and the hostility in the wider 
region also remained a constant destabilising factor; the conflict between Palestinians 
and Israel, the struggle for regional leadership between Egypt and Syria, the 
destabilising influence of the Iraq-Iran war, the emergence of Saudi-Arabia as 
international actor following the 1973 Oil Crisis and overarching superpower rivalry, 
meant that every faction within Lebanon could count on foreign support. While it may 
be too far to argue that these outside actors were responsible for the violent conflict 
within Lebanon, they certainly kept it from coming to an end since a weak and 
divided Lebanon was more in their interests than a peaceful and stable player in the 
region.  
 
 	   	  
	   150	  
7.1	  Ending	  the	  Civil	  War	  
 
The first attempts at bringing to an end the armed hostilities in Lebanon took place as 
early as 1976, when Lebanon’s President Suleiman Frangieh called for Syrian 
intervention on the grounds that further economic damage would be inflicted on Syria 
by the fighting in Lebanon. Syria agreed to send in troops and, in doing so, ended its 
longstanding support of the Palestinians in their struggle against Israel. One of the 
major problems that this, and subsequent attempts of reconciliation efforts were 
facing, was the difficulty of establishing who exactly was fighting, and where and 
with what aim, resources and motivations. The only shared ground, it seems, was the 
use of the violence that had become commonplace. The Civil War underwent a 
number of phases that were subject to, at times, more and, at times, less fighting, but 
since violence had almost entirely replaced the non-violent methods of dealing with 
issues and problems it appeared as if no end to the fighting was possible. 
 
The agreement that is ultimately credited for having ended the Civil War, the Taif 
Agreement signed in October 1989, initially also appeared to be unable to stop the 
carnage that was taking place in Lebanon. After the end of the Iraq-Iran War in 1988 
and following a massive influx of weapons by Syria and Iraq to their respective allied 
factions with Lebanon in early 1989, saw some of the heaviest fighting and highest 
number of civilian casualties in the war. The ‘troika’ of the Saudi-Arabian, Moroccan 
and Algerian heads of state called for a cease-fire in May of the same year but this 
was not observed by any of the adversaries until September. The negotiations turned 
out to be much more difficult and time-consuming than anticipated, and 
assassinations of influential individuals and journalists continued to take place in 
Lebanon. Even after the approval of the peace accord by the Lebanese Parliament in 
November 1989, the faction of the former head of the military Michael Aoun would 
continue to fight the government, leading to the most destructive fighting of the war 
in the first half of 1990. What seems to have ultimately ended the Civil War was the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990. With regional and global attention 
shifting away from Lebanon and towards the Gulf, none of the fighting factions could 
any longer count on foreign support and supplies.  
 
The conclusion of the ‘Document of National Understanding’ in Saudi-Arabia in 1989 
was aimed not only at ending the Civil War, but also at providing a basis for a new 
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constitution for Lebanon. By this stage, all of the Lebanese factions had exhausted 
their resources and could no longer count on the willingness of people willing to risk 
their life and fight (Picard, 2002). The sheer exhaustion is expressed by O’Ballance: 
“There were no outright winners […] only survivors.” (O'Ballance, 1998, p. 223), and 
while some state that Lebanon as a country may have emerged even stronger than 
before (Salibi, 1988) the end of the war is as discombobulated as its beginnings. The 
society remained as fragmented as it had been before and maybe, due to the 
viciousness of much of the fighting, was even more divided than before. Many of the 
people who lacked the ability to leave the region and the fighting had had social 
contact with anyone other than those who made up their immediate group, and with 
the destruction of the cities and infrastructure, and the ‘brain drain’ of the majority of 
skilled and educated Lebanese poverty, destitution was rife. The economy had come 
to a standstill and Lebanon had lost most of the position and resources it had had 
before the Civil War. No longer a hub for regional and global trade, banking, finance, 
industry or agriculture, the country was in far worse a situation than it had been 
before the war. Since most of the elite had, in contrast to the majority of the 
population, been able to protect most of their assets by moving them abroad, the great 
divide between rich and poor remained [and was compounded]. Also the regional 
setting remained troublesome: Syria continued to dominate Lebanon and had even 
gained the right to base troops in the country, the Iranian-backed Hizballah had in 
effect established a state within the state in southern Lebanon and, in the absence of a 
solution for the conflict between Palestine and Israel, Lebanon continues to be 
involved. Most importantly perhaps, the war highlighted the vulnerability of every 
individual involved, and this feeling had been greatly exacerbated by the fact that 
virtually every militia and faction involved in the fighting had at some stage betrayed 
their allies, sectarian brethren and even family (Khalaf, 2002). The changes of the 
political system brought by the Agreement were minor as well, and the confessional 
nature of the political system remained almost unchanged. In light of the lengthy 
process of what became the Taif Agreement aimed at ending the war, the parties 
involved even agreed not to have a census, of which the first and last of 1943 was still 
the base for the calculation of political participation and offices.  
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8.	  Violence	  and	  its	  effects	  
 
The beginning of the violence, and equally so the cessation of it, appears from a 
distance to be explained easily by pointing out the existence of sectarianism in 
Lebanon. If this explanation is insufficient then factors such as the nature of the 
economy, the distribution of wealth and political influence and corruption is offered. 
The geographic setting of Lebanon in a highly volatile region with a multitude of 
other armed inter- and intrastate conflicts is a further factor that is relied on as an 
explanation. Yet all of these factors are unconvincing since they cannot, and do not, 
even in combination, explain the sudden and abrupt rupture and the emergence of 
fifteen years of Civil War. Possibly even more perplexing is then the end of the Civil 
War; not only did each of the above remain, but many of these factors were also either 
unchanged, or had in fact, due to the war, worsened considerably. The exhaustion that 
is stated by a number of authors (Chaitani, 2007; Cobban, 1987; Gilmour, 1983) to 
have ultimately caused the end of the fighting also fails to convince; if this had been 
the case why did the fighting not flare up again once resources had been replenished?  
 
What unites all of these explanations is that they focus on the macro-level. The point 
of departure for analysis is the Lebanese state as a whole. As pointed out earlier, the 
Lebanese state is, in contrast to many of the people who are settled there, a very 
recent creation. Instead of adding the short history of Lebanon to the reasons for the 
emergence of violence in the country, it should raise the question of the validity of the 
approach that nominates the short national history of Lebanon as culprit. What makes 
the Civil War in Lebanon the “Lebanese Civil War” is the mere fact that fighting took 
place on Lebanese soil, but since there were various foreign fighters, militias, entities, 
supporters and suppliers, the historically already weak Lebanese government and state 
cannot serve as the basis for a study on why violence emerged and disappeared. A 
further illustration of the weakness of this explanation is that none of the fighting 
between 1975 and 1990 appears to have been undertaken with the aim of dominating 
the whole of Lebanon. Instead, the different factions would appear to struggle for 
control of specific areas and sectors, and would be willing to pursue these goals by 
using various and continuously changing alliances. Finally, as Kalyvas points out, the 
confusing nature of non-state combat - lacking clear structures of command, uniforms 
and conduct as well as often unaccountable resources and logistics - create the 
temptation for combatants and observers alike to explain a local conflict with 
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reference to a wider, at times regional, national or even global context (Kalyvas, 
2006).  
 
 
9.	  Networks	  and	  war	  and	  peace	  
 
In other words, the narrative behind the violence that took hold of Lebanon is 
explained without allusion to many of those who found themselves at the frontline of 
the fighting. Since, as analysed in the earlier chapter, violence is a form of 
communication, it plays a multitude of roles in a conflict. The critique above 
highlights where violence is fundamental in the metaphysical dimension: violence as 
an indicator or evidence of economic inequality, political or social injustice or 
religious and ethnic division. The important distinction is that in all of these instances 
violence is symbolic and embedded in a greater narrative, but in most cases is not 
existential. For example, a firefight between two groups would not break out because 
each member would actively threaten an individual opponent, but rather because each 
would argue that the mere existence of the other manifests a threat in itself The 
apparent discrepancy in why violence broke out and was maintained is what brought 
Seurat to his study on the nature of the fighting in the neighbourhoods. It is there that 
he encountered key individuals who would promote and encourage violence as a tool 
to benefit their own interests and strengthen their position within groups. Seurat 
discovered two kinds of individuals that would stand out: firstly the community elders 
or leaders and secondly the suppliers of goods and services necessary for survival.  
 
The link between the micro- and macro level is described by Castells in his analysis 
of ‘reprogramming communication networks’ (Castells, 2009, p. 299): assuming a 
that life is in a constant atmosphere of change, and in which a interactions between 
cultural and political change produce social change do multiple instances proceed 
parallel at different paces and different domains and groups. This makes any change 
both unpredictable in terms of outcome, but also in terms of the impact it has on the 
individuals that are most fervent in pursuing it (Castells, 2009, pp. 299-303). “Social 
movements are formed by communicating messages of rage and hope” (Castells, 
2009, p. 301), and are centred around the public space, or the multimodal 
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communication networks, in which confrontation and cooperation take place and 
interact with social norms and institutions.  
 
10.	  Conclusion	  
 
The emergence of violence that triggered the Lebanese Civil War was not based on 
the logic and culminating force of pre-existing conditions in Lebanon. Instead, a 
possibly accidental incident that took place in an atmosphere that was charged by the 
multitude of factors that had brought the demands and expectations for great social 
and economic change into conflict with forces that tried to maintain the status quo of 
the political system, led to a sudden mutation. The pre-existing feeling of stress - for 
example the ability to provide enough food for one’s family, or the fear of foreign 
gun-carrying militias, or the apparent impotence of small businessmen against great 
conglomerates that threatened their livelihoods - was suddenly made acute by a 
sudden violent incident. In the case of Lebanon, it was the violent reaction by the 
authorities to the demonstrations by fishermen against the interests of the oligarchy. 
This incident is, albeit only remotely, related to the later battles of the Civil War: it 
caused the reprogramming of the communication networks from a lingual level to a 
violent one. The violence then became, as Seurat observed, the defining factor for the 
life of those who could not escape. For these people, the violence had become an 
existentialist threat that, in turn, empowered the two kinds of influential individuals 
that could, by referencing the situation to the wider macro level - national, regional or 
even global - rely on it for their own advantage. Thus, the violence on the micro level, 
that is the neighbourhoods or the immediate frontline of the fighting, and on the 
macro level, the national, regional or global level, are closely interwoven and are 
networked; at the same time this makes a linear explanation of a civil war so attractive 
yet fundamentally flawed. On the macro-level, for example, the hostility between 
Shi’ites and Sunnis had existed for a long time and yet in most instances individual 
adherers to both faiths had been able to live alongside each other without previously 
feeling the need for violent confrontation.  
 
Further proof for this analysis can be found at the end of the violence, both in certain 
theatres during the war, but ultimately in the early 1990s: the existentialist fear that 
created the singular identities, and created a narrative of ‘us against them’, had 
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strongly divided communication between violent and non-violent forms. Necessary 
for the disappearance of disintegrative violence and the strengthening of integrative 
and non-violent forms of communication was not the eradication of ‘THE’ other but 
simply a reprogramming of the networks. Since the reprogramming of networks is a 
constant occurrence in human affairs (Castells, 2009) no specific and formal peace 
agreement was necessary. Before, during and after the Lebanese Civil War, people 
were making and breaking links and no massacre or atrocity was absolute in 
preventing communication. This can be seen in the fact that multiple times in course 
of the war, alliances were made and broken and often natural allies would become 
enemies or cooperate with former adversaries because the situation seemed to have 
demanded it.  
 
It is thus the very nature that is often argued to be a threat for Lebanon that may as 
well be its greatest asset: a vast number of different networks that constantly interact 
and propel each other in different directions allow the Lebanese people to adapt to 
changes and developments. On the one hand, human nature is driving for security and 
stability, but on the other hand “Change, be it evolutionary or revolutionary, is the 
essence of life.” (Castells, 2009, p. 299). A society such as Lebanon’s is constantly 
exposed to a continuing influx of interconnected factors driving cultural and political 
and, in this way, social change. Especially with the memory of the Civil War in mind 
to some observers, for example Homer Dixon (2006), Lebanon appears to be 
constantly on the edge of disappearing into yet another abyss of carnage and 
massacres between different networks that all call the territory their home, but are all 
connected to networks centred far away from the country. However, when looking at 
the experience of the country through the lens of a Castellian analysis of the dynamics 
found in networks, the apparent instability is also Lebanon’s greatest asset, as its 
history shows. Today’s Lebanon has retained the same actors and networks that had 
fought each other in the long Civil War, but the same networks had brought great 
achievements and wealth to its people. This different perspective on the Civil War 
shows that the prosperity and safety of its people depends on the multitude of 
networks that interact in the country, and it is precisely the absence of a rigid, 
absolute and hierarchical system that provides continuity and balance.  
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Chapter	  6:	  Afghanistan	  
 
 
1.	  Introduction	  
 
In summer 2009, General Stanley A. McChrystal, then Commander of the US and 
NATO forces in Afghanistan, was shown a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation with a 
slide with the title “Afghanistan Stability/COIN Dynamics” depicting the reality of 
events that take place in Afghanistan. His reaction has been reported to have been 
“When we understand that slide, we’ll have won the war.” (Bumiller, 2010). 
Commenting on the overwhelming amount of information and content of the slide, the 
journalist who is credited to have initially discovered the slide coined the term 
“spaghetti logic” (Engel, 2009).  
The slide is titled “Afghanistan Stability/COIN Dynamics” and presented the eight 
factors that NATO’s analysts considered to be most influential in increasing stability 
in Afghanistan. The slide earned the “spaghetti” label due to the complexity of the 
slide, which has a very large number of arrows linking the eight main factors, often 
via sub-factors, to each other. For example the “legitimacy and reputation of 
Afghanistan’s federal government” is one factor in the slide. It is linked by an arrow 
to “corruption” that is then linked to “tax revenue”, which in turn is linked to the 
“basic needs of the population”. From there it is connected with “visible gains in 
security, services and employment” followed by “perception of government strength 
and intent” to return to the initial factor of the legitimacy of the Afghan federal 
government. The myriad number of further arrows which connect each of the factors 
indicates how influence is not hierarchical but dispersed and interconnected. This is 
also what caused General McChrystal’s exclamation of the slide being impossible to 
understand or utilise.  
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Curiously, both the authors of the slide as well as General McChrystal were aware of 
the fact that the reality of Afghanistan was even more complicated. While the slide 
purports to depict the Afghan theatre in which all factors and links are contained, a 
more exhaustive diagram would show an even larger and more complex map that 
links in a multitude of further factors, including ones which are far remote from 
Afghanistan itself. For example, the prices of heroin on the streets of a European city, 
or the US American Congressional elections both, directly or indirectly, influence 
Afghanistan.  
 
A small box on the margins of the slide hints at further detail that has also been 
largely excluded: time. The two lines that cross some of the arrows, or the links, on 
the slide indicate “significant delay”, meaning that some links represent not 
instantaneous effects but effects that may take place over days, months or even years. 
Accordingly, the whole slide is just a snapshot at a certain moment; over time both 
the factors depicted and the connecting links change. For example, the “training and 
mentoring” of Afghan National Security Forces by NATO will not immediately 
increase the “institutional and execution capacity” of Afghan soldiers. This is evident 
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by the events that have taken place since publication of the slide regarding the attacks 
of Afghan soldiers on their NATO trainers and instructors. These so-called “Green-
on-Blue attacks” have severely complicated the training process referred to in the 
slide, and has allowed the insurgents to significantly slow the process of increasing 
Afghan National Force capabilities (Roggio & Lundquist, 2012).  
 
The obvious oversimplification of the slide, and the (therefore) ironic exasperated 
comment by General McChrystal regarding its complexity, does not render the slide 
of no utilitarian value. The slide highlights a number of important factors: first of all it 
shows that the ultimate aim of “Afghan Stability” is far less straight forward than it 
may appear. The definition of the term, and the grounds on which “Afghan Stability” 
is to be measured, will differ from one actor to the other and to agree on specific 
indicators will be either impossible or inaccurate. Secondly, as already touched upon 
above, Afghanistan may lie at the centre of the analysis of the slide, but it is notable 
that extraneous factors – for example the domestic situation in the NATO and ISAF 
coalition countries, or the role of foreign support for the insurgency – are not 
included. Even actions of US Forces outside Afghanistan (such as drone attacks in 
Pakistan, for example) cause reverberations that can be felt in Afghanistan (Johnston 
& Sarbahi, 2013). Thirdly, the slide was produced on behalf of NATO by PA 
Consulting Group, a UK based business-consulting company. The slide may or may 
not be accurate and, most likely, other observers would produce a different map with 
different factors and different links. However, what it likely is that a similar outcome 
would result in terms of complexity. Finally, the slide depicts a snapshot in time – 
both actors and factors emerge and disappear, and links are made and fade away on a 
constant basis – and the situation is subject to constant and random change. The 
diagram was already out of date when it was published because of the constant 
fluidity of the network it is attempting to depict. 
 
 
2.	  Castells	  and	  Afghanistan	  
 
None of these four dynamics are specific to the Afghan situation, but can be found 
everywhere. What Manuel Castells calls “the two macro-trends that characterize the 
Information Age” being: (i) “the globalization of economy, technology and 
	   159	  
communication”; and (ii) “the parallel affirmation of identity as a source of meaning” 
(Castells, 2010a, p. 343), are what placed Afghanistan on the agenda of the NATO 
member states in the first place, and are the reason that NATO remains involved 
there. This is because nation-states, so Castells says, are unable to isolate themselves 
from events that take place elsewhere on the planet. The “black holes of informational 
capitalism” (Castells, 2010a, p. 167) emerge in instances where a nation-state is 
absent and unable to provide institutions of civil society. The connection between 
these “black holes” and the established nation-states are of both economic nature via 
generally illicit trade (i.e. drugs or human trafficking) and bureaucratic nature (via 
agencies aimed at the containment of these effects – for example law enforcement and 
aid agencies).  
 
An additional form of connection between the “black holes” and the established 
nation-states not mentioned by Castells is violence. On 11 September 2001 a non-
state group allied to the Taliban, which at that time controlled most parts of 
Afghanistan, perpetrated the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on US soil. But 
this was not the first time that Afghanistan and the United States were linked by 
violence. An earlier instance was the US support of the Afghan and foreign fighters, 
the Mujahidin, against Soviet invaders. Here, Afghanistan presented a proxy conflict 
between the US and the USSR in the wider, global Cold War. Equally in 2001, the US 
invasion of Afghanistan was clad in the rhetoric of a global “War on Terror” in which 
Al Qaida was the primary target and the fate of the Taliban was only secondary, just 
as earlier the weakening of the USSR was the dominant reason for US involvement. 
Even before the connivance of the two superpowers in Afghanistan, violence had 
emerged as a powerful force and, throughout the change in actors, it remained and 
remains central to Afghanistan. Equally so, the US government sees a clear link 
between stability and violence: a decrease in violence indicates an increase in stability 
(Defense, 2010) and, conversely, “Afghanistan Stability” is the title of the powerpoint 
slide McChrystal was shown and referred to above (Bumiller, 2010). 
Most studies on Afghanistan, its people and history have titles with negative 
connotations: “The Fragmentation of Afghanistan” (B. R. Rubin, 1995), “Modern 
Afghanistan – A History of Struggle and Survival” (Saikal, 2004), “In the the 
Graveyard of Empires” (Jones, 2009) or even more bluntly “The Afghan Wars” 
(Maley, 2002) or “The Wars of Afghanistan” (Tomsen, 2011). They indicate that 
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Afghanistan is a perpetually hostile and warlike place where violent conflict prevails. 
Yet authors disagree on why supposedly this is the case. Some blame the landlocked 
and resource-poor geographic location of the country that causes its people to literally 
fight for survival (Roberts, 2003). Others find that Islamic traditions complicate stable 
and non-violent governance (Rasanayagam, 2003), while for example Giustozzi 
argues that it is the absence of governance that allows internationally recruiting, 
acting and resourcing groups to use the umbrella of Islam in order to justify their 
violent actions in the country (Giustozzi, 2008). Bird and Marshall claim cycles of 
intense foreign interventions and abandonment by the international community are 
exploited by local elites for their criminal activities, most notably the cultivation of 
opium poppies. This, they argue, provides criminal networks with financial resources 
that vastly exceed that of the central government and incentivise insurgencies (Bird & 
Marshall, 2011). Especially the US-led invasion in 2001 is often cited as a major 
cause not only for violence in the country, but also for a situation in which any 
supporter of the Afghan national government is assumed to be a traitor (Gopal, 2014). 
Jones supports this notion and claims that following the invasion the US failed to 
commit sufficient resources to stabilise the country (Jones, 2009), but for former U.S. 
special envoy to the Mujahidin the US-led invasion is only the latest in disastrous 
Great Power invasions (Tomsen, 2011).  
 
Broadly speaking according to these observers there is no, or at best very little 
evidence that would indicate that Afghanistan would be able to ever become a country 
that is not ‘at war’. Yet when assessing the works above the arguments presented fail 
to provide a convincing argumentation in which other countries in the region, with a 
similar ethnographic reality or level of development, political history or religion fare 
differently. Rather than to assume that Afghanistan’s society differs from others an 
alternative narrative to explain the violence that centres on the country is necessary. 
Rather than to argue that certain factors or experiences do not allow any other 
response than destruction and war it is violence itself that has to be approached with 
in the Afghan context. 
 
Castells’ analysis is correct in highlighting the inability of states to isolate themselves 
from developments elsewhere in the world, but this leaves the question of why and 
how Afghanistan emerged in a situation of instability and violence in the first place. 
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The mountainous terrain, the lack of infrastructure, education and health care, and low 
economic development place Afghanistan in the bottom ten countries on the United 
Nations Human Development Index (Programme, 2013), but first and foremost it is 
violence that has had huge influence on the country and its people over several 
generations, leaving one commentator to state:  
“Afghanistan was and would remain a singularly wild and anarchic place that 
would only be managed (if at all) by men of ruthless violence and ambition.” 
(Edwards, 1996, p. 3) 
In this regard, Afghanistan’s history must be analysed under the lens of violence; not 
just the emergence of this dynamic, but its ability to emerge as an issue in which 
arguably the most potent nation-states of the planet see this poor, remote and 
underdeveloped country as being at the heart of their own instability.  
 
 
3.	  A	  history	  of	  Afghan	  violence	  
 
From the mid-19th century, a bureaucratic elite ran Afghanistan, with the monarch 
being represented outside the capital by individuals and families who based their 
influence and behaviour on traditions and hereditary patterns (Misdag, 2006). Due to 
the difficult terrain, lack of modern forms of communication, poverty and 
geographical isolation, the Afghan state lacked the resources to modernise in line with 
other countries in the wider region such as that of the Young Turk movement in 
Turkey. The slow and difficult process of centralising the Afghan state vis-à-vis 
regional clans and tribes was strengthened after the Second World War and it 
involved often military force, assassinations and intrigue which were used to 
subjugate local and regional structures. Standardisation of languages, currency, 
measurement, but also jurisdiction and trade, was a slow and arduous process in 
which many grievances against the central government emerged. While Kabul 
appeared to be slowly gaining the upper hand, these events created sentiments in 
which any representation of the Kabul-centred national authority is met with hostility: 
“Within a number of years a hierarchical tribal system had given way to a 
disorganised assembly of notables of whom the state made use as local agents. 
These traumatic events were to give rise to a strong sentiment of identity 
which was to have its consequences in the present conflict” (Dorronsoro, 
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2005, p. 46). 
At the heart of the Afghan dilemma lies the absence of a national identity in a form 
which is able to unify the Afghan people and provide a shared cohesion on which a 
strong and Kabul centralised state and bureaucracy is able to emerge. The federal 
government is largely based on a foreign ideology of liberal, capitalist and democratic 
values, and relies on international financial, military and logistic support. It is 
doubtful that in these current circumstances the state institutions will be able to 
function effectively and sustainably. Besides the alienation that many Afghans feel 
towards what they perceive as government installed by foreign actors, and the 
functioning of that government itself, there are also many other obstacles to the 
emergence of an Afghan state (Misdag, 2006).  
 
These obstacles are found in the multitude of diverse cultures, languages, religions 
and histories of peoples who live mostly a very poor and fragile life, often lacking the 
ability to communicate over long distances. Most services found in a community are 
not provided by the Afghan national government, and many facilities, goods and 
services are donated by foreign non-governmental organisations. This only serves to 
further weaken the ability of Kabul to establish itself as the central and legitimate 
authority.  
 
The strength of violence as a force to create and maintain an identity despite the 
existence of otherwise very diverse actors becomes apparent in this context of 
Afghanistan. Afghanistan as a geographic and social entity, a nation-state, or simply a 
state that is surrounded by national borders, was only able come into existence due to 
outside forces which created sufficient momentum to bond the diverse and often 
feuding sub-networks into a loose, largely non-hierarchical and constantly adapting 
sub-network. What emerged was that violence became and remained a fundamental 
component in determining the position, reputation and influence of individuals 
embedded in that network. 
 
 
3.1	  The	  Struggle	  for	  National	  Unity	  	  
 
National unity depends on the position of the individual and the circumstances at the 
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time: the existence of an aggressor who was seen to be ‘on the outside’ always 
increased the emotive force of Afghan unity, encouraging the differing groups within 
the country to co-operate and place the possible conflicts between them as secondary 
matters. The earliest times in which Afghanistan could be considered a political entity 
on roughly the same geographic as it is today was under Ahmad Shah. Ahmad Shah 
was an elected military leader, or amir, under whom the local Durrani tribes in the 
17th century sought to expand their influence and secure resources. In the absence of 
defined natural borders, the Afghan entity was at that time under constant threat from 
the outside – the fluid boundaries of the country invited occupation by weaker 
neighbouring tribes or families, but later on also British and Russian colonial 
endeavours. Even on the inside, domestic revolts weakened the state and prevented 
the emergence of a strong and accepted centre.  
 
Ultimately, the national borders of Afghanistan were drawn by the imperial desires of 
Russia and Great Britain leading to the curious situation in which the borders of a 
country existed before the country that they enclosed (Gregorian, 1969). For example, 
in 1891 the British created the ‘Wakhan Corridor’, the thin strip of land that connects 
Afghanistan and China, with the desire to eliminate a Russian-Indian border. The also 
British-drawn ‘Durand Line’ of 1893 was also based on British interests in Pakistan 
and India, but in effect created a border that did not collide with ethnic and linguistic 
limits. From the declaration of this border onwards, Pakistan has sought to destabilise 
the Afghan area of Baluchistan and Waziristan (among others) in the hope of 
annexing the territory. This process has been on-going since then and has resulted in 
an area on both sides of the border that largely lacks any form of representative 
authority, and is out of control of both governments in Kabul and Islamabad. The 
struggle between the two governments has created a vacuum in which non-state actors 
and militants are able to establish bases and find refuge from pursuit by the 
authorities. Occasionally, fire-fights erupt between different groups in the area but 
even for the actors involved it is often difficult or impossible to establish the 
immediate reasons for these skirmishes (Stratfor, 2011). What is clear is that neither 
Pakistan nor Afghanistan is able to control the area, and strained relations between the 
two governments prevent the trans-border pursuit of militants. This has the effect of 
making the border not just ineffective but counterproductive for the state’s security 
(Lalwani, 2013).  
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At the same time, the national borders were of great importance for raising revenue: 
in the absence of a domestic structure to raise, manage and distribute taxes on the 
population from the 1930s onwards, some two-thirds of the national budget depended 
on customs revenues. This left Afghanistan highly vulnerable to upheavals in the 
international sphere and, for example, during the Second World War the state was on 
the brink of bankruptcy. Modernisation of the country depended on raising the 
necessary capital, but outside the major urban centres the virtual absence of the 
federal state hindered this. The only areas in which taxes could be raised were the 
cities, but corruption and banditry meant that additional taxation disappeared before it 
could reach the federal state. At the same time, this made the state an easy target for 
regional and local actors who attempted to install themselves through the federal 
administration. By the late 1940s, the Afghan federal government could no longer 
resist the temptation of trading sovereignty for foreign aid. Foreign aid allowed the 
federal state the freedom to largely ignore the rural population and limit attention to 
the urban centres. The percentage of foreign aid in state revenue continually increased 
and, from the 1960s onwards, provided more than 40% of the budget (B. Rubin, 
1992). This influx of foreign aid was fuelled by the competition between the United 
States and the Soviet Union as part of the global Cold War.  
 
Bossin describes three distinct periods of foreign assistance that prevented the 
emergence of a stable and sustainable political and social structure in Afghanistan: 
first, the subsidies paid by the British Empire from the mid-nineteenth century until 
the end of the Second World War which had the aim of enticing cooperation from 
intractable local leaders. Second, the Cold War period during which the competition 
between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated their agenda for foreign 
development aid. Finally, the third period which began during the Afghan Civil War 
in 1979 and continued until the fall of the Taliban in 2001 when the military, rather 
than economic or social assistance, dominated. Additionally, from the 1980s onwards 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and countries such as Canada, Japan and 
Australia became involved in regional or local aid projects. In all three stages, 
international assistance was dominated and undermined by political elites which 
exploited the foreign support for their own interests, as well as competition between 
the donors and local rivalries which rendered most of it unsuccessful. The absence of 
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domestic mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability meant that the local 
elites benefitted far more than intended from the international support, and this 
prevented the emergence or reform of a central, stable and legitimate domestic 
political system (Bossin, 2004). 
 
 
3.2	  Domestic	  Attempts	  to	  Modernise	  the	  Country	  
 
With regards to modernisation of Afghanistan, its political system was unable to deal 
with the challenges it was confronted with: the influence of the constitutional 
monarchy was largely limited to Kabul and other urban centres, the political system 
was dominated by a small elite, and the government lacked the funds for 
modernisation, infrastructure investments or national security. Any increase in 
taxation was prevented by the members of parliament, most of whom were illiterate 
and uneducated rural landowners whose political actions were dominated by the 
desire to cement their position vis-à-vis the rural population rather than the federal or 
national interests. This left the latter alienated and uninvolved in federal politics. The 
stability of the government therefore rested only on weak institutions that could easily 
be taken over. As Dorronsoro describes: 
“Given the lack of widespread mobilisation of the population, everything 
depended in the event on the ability of the actors to control the country’s 
institutions, and in particular the army from within. From the 1950s onwards, 
the military establishment became the primary objective for any group which 
wished to take control of the state. Up to this point the normal route to power 
had been to seek external support, tribal or foreign, and to intrigue within the 
royal clan. Henceforth, however, conflicts would be settled within the state 
apparatus by way of coups.” (Dorronsoro, 2005, pp. 79-80) 
In this way, political insurrections became institutionalized but, due to the fragmented 
nature of the country, none of the coups was able to install itself as the dominant 
system and every coup became susceptible to either being overthrown by other groups 
or by infighting within their own. This became evident from the beginning of the 
1970s onwards and is illustrated by the example of King Zahir Shah who, in 1973, 
was ousted by his cousin Daud Khan. A long period of successive revolts and 
insurgencies followed, and not only that, but violence between different groups 
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become commonplace. Even before this time different groups – often based on 
kinship such as clans or families – had at times used violence as a tool to address 
conflicts between them. However, these conflicts were predominately limited by way 
of space, time and scope, and lacked the invoking of identity or ideology as an 
underlying reason.  
 
In the period before the 1970s, this type of violence between groups was generally 
used for instrumental purposes such as access to water or arable land. The political 
deadlock that emerged in the 1970s changed this in a way in which violence was 
becoming the norm for communication; as Dorronsoro states, violence became 
opportune and began to emerge as the standard behaviour for these actors:  
“The salient characteristics of this period [the 1970s] was the opportunism of 
various protagonists in a situation which none succeeded in resolving to their 
own advantage” (Dorronsoro, 2005, p. 79).  
Due to the fragmentation of the country, even massacres committed in the course of 
coups or attempted coups would not invoke much of a reaction by those Afghans who 
were not the immediate target. Because of the absence of a singular national identity 
and the gulf between urban and rural groups, political actors would end up looking for 
support from foreign powers rather than fellow Afghans. This foreign support had two 
major components: first of all, foreign funds were used for the purchase of weapons 
since, as touched on above, it only required a small number of individuals armed with 
small arms to hope to be able to overthrow the government in place at the time 
(Bhatia & Sedra, 2008). Secondly, once foreign actors observed the increasing 
violence and instability in the country, they became concerned about losing their 
influence and investments clad (either overtly or covertly) as development aid. The 
culmination of this was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 but, instead of 
bringing stability and decreasing the violence that had taken hold of the country, it 
further deepened the rift between urban and rural population. Furthermore, the Cold 
War caused the US to provide financial and military support to those Afghans that 
had started an insurgency against the Soviets and the Afghan factions it supported. 
Barfield summarises the period between the late 1970s and 2001 well: 
“In retrospect, Afghanistan’s troubles over these twenty-three years can be 
divided into three unholy parts. The first phase began in 1978 with a bloody 
coup by 
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(PDPA), who murdered Daud and declared a socialist regime. After only 
twenty months, internal dissent within the regime’s own ranks and a growing 
insurrection against its radical policies brought the government to near 
collapse. In an attempt to stabilize the situation the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in December 1979. This initiated a ten-year occupation that pitted 
the Soviets and the PDPA against the Islamist-led mujahideen (holy warrior) 
factions that waged war against them. The mujahideen party leaders based 
themselves in Pakistan, but were funded by the United States and Saudi 
Arabia. The Soviet war would leave a million Afghans dead and create three 
million refugees before the Russians withdrew their troops in 1989. Against 
the odds, the PDPA regime under Najibullah (r. 1986–92) maintained its 
power in Kabul after the Russians left. Najibullah’s stability, however, was 
fatally undermined when the Soviet Union collapsed. The PDPA dissolved 
itself in April 1992, and its internal factions joined with competing 
mujahideen parties, mostly on the basis of ethnicity or regional affiliation 
[until 2001 when the third phase was initiated by the invasion of the United 
States following 9/11]. (Barfield, 2010, pp. 170-171)  
Giustozzi and Ibrahimi agree with Barfield’s description. Prior to 1978, political 
mobilization was generally limited to a small, Kabul-based elite but this rapidly 
changed following the Soviet entry in 1979. Not only the United States, but also 
Saudi-Arabia and Pakistan, believed that they could benefit from providing support to 
various factions within Afghanistan. 
 
In turn, Afghan actors would change their rhetoric and behaviour in order to 
maximise the funds that came from these outside actors leading to an increase in 
radicalisation and decrease in the influence that domestic and local support would 
play for these actors (B. R. Rubin, 1995). Equally, foreign actors readily exploited 
internal divisions of Afghanistan; the fragmented nature of the society and the 
political system provided openings that could be used to weaken Afghanistan and 
ensure that actors involved in the ‘Great Game’ over Central Asia could make use of 
the internal fragmentation (Misdag, 2006). Domestic and international actors behaved 
in a similar fashion leading to violence, coercion and threats which replaced the 
moderating and dispute resolution abilities that traditional community leaders were 
able to provide:  
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“It seems clear that the control exercised by the communities over the 
kumandanan [community leaders or commanders] was strongest where 
community structures were strongest and that the longer and more violent the 
conflict, the more destabilising the impact on the community on its ability to 
restrain an emerging professionalization of violence. Even in areas not known 
for the strength of community links, mobilisation by elders played an 
important role. Where community authority was weak, commanders had the 
strongest power even in the absence of a reciprocal relationship. (Giustozzi & 
Ibrahimi, January 2012, p. 13) 
Of great interest here is the reference to the duration and the level of violence in the 
conflict, since the authors indicate that it was these two factors which led to a 
deterioration of the situation of the Afghan population. Previously, most of the 
fighting which had the aim of establishing control over the country involved only a 
small group of individuals, but this was changing rapidly.  
 
 
3.3	  The	  Soviet	  Invasion	  
 
This situation was to be the backdrop for the Soviet Invasion that, similar to the US 
involvement in Vietnam earlier, was based not on a single and clear factor, but rather 
a combination of events and developments in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, as 
well as wider ideological, political and developmental events. Mohammad Daoud, 
cousin and brother-in-law to the king in Afghanistan, had been involved in Afghan 
politics since the 1930s and had, over the years, gained the support and approval of a 
number of different domestic and international actors. This support led to a bloodless 
coup against the king in 1973. Wary of relying on a single pillar of support, 
Mohammad Daoud carefully manoeuvred in a bid to benefit from domestic instability 
that had emerged as a result of the failed political and social modernisation attempts, 
as well as a major famine in 1969-71. In addition, international competition had 
fragmented the Communist Block into a Soviet and Chinese one – Afghanistan was 
sharing a land border with both blocks – and the wider global Cold War. Regardless 
of these factors, Daoud was unable to unite his different camps of support and failed 
to stabilise the country. Ultimately, the emergence of conflicts and fragmentation of 
communist groups that had become one of his main pillars for power, led to both his 
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own demise as well as the gradual and progressive attempts by the Soviet Union to 
dominate the country. 
 
In the absence of a clear strategy for the future of Afghanistan, Moscow’s support of 
the Afghan system was a piecemeal attempt to bring to the country what no domestic 
leader had been able to do: a stable and sustainable country that was able to solve the 
open questions that modernisation had opened up. Initially, Daoud had been 
supported by the Soviets but, because he refused to accept the authority of Moscow, 
he grew wary of Moscow and the influence it was gaining through supporting, 
training and instructing Afghan Communists. Daoud tried to exploit different groups 
for his own interests and was increasingly becoming seen as a liability, ultimately 
leading Moscow to instruct communist factions in the country to lead in a coup d’état 
(Misdag, 2006). 
 
In theory the Soviet Union had two options: either to allow the Afghan population 
more freedom to choose their own leadership and policies, or to try and install their 
own modus operandi. The instability of the Afghan government in the first place is 
what Casti calls the “complexity gap” (Casti, 2012, p. 10), the space that emerges 
between the population on the one hand and the government on the other. When the 
government as programming authority is unable to close this gap either by repressing 
the population or by making concessions to their demands then a revolution will break 
out with unknown outcome (Casti, 2012).  
 
By this stage, Moscow was already deeply involved in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs, 
but despite vastly increasing political, military and social resources the Soviet Union 
it was unable to alter the dynamics that had already established themselves in the 
country. Additionally was Moscow perceive the domestic opinion in the Soviet Union 
as being unable to support a withdrawal of forces or to make concessions – fearing 
that this would lead to demands for reform in the Soviet Union itself. Despite the fact 
that one of the two global superpowers invaded Afghanistan and continued to commit 
vast reserves and resources, Moscow was unable to untangle the complexity of the 
fighting:  
“This muqawomat (resistance) which later played a decisive role against the 
Soviet forces (1979–89) started as an embryonic movement in the 1960s and 
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was turned into a small fighting force by Pakistan against Daoud, because of 
his demand of autonomy for ‘Pashtunistan’.” (Misdag, 2006, p. 143). 
Following the increasing Soviet presence, one which was felt most acutely due to the 
heavy-handed and arrogant behaviour of Soviet armed forces, jirgas came together to 
organise a resistance and an army made up of local forces (lashkar) was established. 
Due to the formidable fighting power of the Soviets vis-à-vis these Afghan forces, all 
possible support was to be covered, including the religious networks of the ulemas 
that reached far outside of the country. Funds, support and even personnel were sent 
from these countries to Afghanistan, and often this was done not because of the 
primacy of the motivation to support the sovereignty of Afghanistan, but because of 
domestic and other reasons. For example, the Saudi government believed that by 
sending the most outspoken and aggressive members of the ulemas to fight in 
Afghanistan, it could maintain or even strengthen its control (Barfield, 2010; Misdag, 
2006). Equally so, the US ended up supporting the Afghan resistance (the mujahidin) 
not because it supported its motivation or ideology, but because of wider, geo-
political considerations that were aimed at weakening the Soviet Union at all costs; 
arming the mujahidin occurred almost entirely as a side effect (Abdullaev, 2004). The 
support of the Afghan forces was not limited to funds, weapons, logistics and media 
but by invoking a Jihad, a struggle on religious grounds, many foreign volunteers 
joined the resistance as a religious duty. The Afghan context was largely lost in the 
recruitment drive in which foreign authorities were often supportive of young men, 
often unemployed and critical of their governments, who could be neutralised by 
encouraging them to leave for Afghanistan (McCauley, 2002). 
 
The inability of the Soviet Union to alter the situation in her interests can be traced 
back to the programming that already existed in the country before the invasion. The 
Soviets assumed that their capacity to use violence, inflict pain and prosecute the 
opposition, would exceed the abilities of the other actors involved and, in this way, 
lead to a Soviet ‘victory’. What they did not appreciate was the already firmly 
established role that violence played in the country and, in effect, the Soviet Union 
became simply another actor in this network. Additionally, in the course of the Soviet 
involvement, Moscow revealed itself not to be the unitary and strongly hierarchical 
actor it had assumed itself to be, but became trapped between different sub-networks 
both within Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and the wider world.  
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Domestic limitations, most notably the willingness of the Soviet population to support 
an escalation of a war that had never been popular or seen as being in their interests, 
meant that Moscow lacked the political, financial and military resources to try and 
fight the Afghan resistance in its supply and training bases in Pakistan, or to force an 
end of Saudi or US American support. Other issues, especially the economic situation, 
further weakened the Soviet Union’s ability to put political or other pressure on the 
foreign supporters of the Afghan resistance. The Soviet Union failed to install a 
programme in the country that would not be challenged. They aimed to install a stable 
and non-violent programme that would allow communication and a basis to mediate 
conflicts, but they became only one of the multitude of actors involved.  
 
Central here is the different function violence played in the different contexts. For 
example, the United States supported the violence in Afghanistan because weakening 
the Soviet Union gave Washington a largely instrumental benefit, not because it had 
any form of historic involvement. Moscow will most likely have concluded that there 
were both instrumental and metaphysical gains; instrumental in trying to increase its 
share of political influence and economic reach, and metaphysical as a component of 
the Leninist notion of exporting its communist ideology abroad (McCauley, 2002). 
Equally so for many Afghans, the thought of a foreign intervention in what they 
perceived to be their sphere would have triggered an instrumental and metaphysical 
reaction aiming to defend or regain their autonomy and independence. These 
motivations are not exclusive and ultimately depend on the position of the individual 
in his or her social networks. The major change, however, comes when an individual 
is faced with the immediate experience of existentialist violence.  
 
The longer the war in Afghanistan lasted, the more it became apparent that there were 
no benefits, or only limited ones, for the Soviet Union. To the contrary, the more 
suffering, pain and death was relayed back to the Soviets, the less they became 
willing to support their government’s attempts to use the violence for their own 
purposes. Equally in Afghanistan, major financial and developmental support during 
the Soviet invasion and occupation did little to increase support in the population for 
the Soviet forces (Johnson & Leslie, 2008), and the instrumental and metaphysical 
possibilities for the violence to be integrative or positive diminished. 
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The Soviet invasion into Afghanistan highlights the inability of one at the time most 
powerful states to control a complex situation. The hierarchical structure of Soviet 
government was, due to its structure and rigidity unable to alter its behaviour or 
policies and found itself in a situation that exemplifies a “wicked problem” (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973): was the domestic audience in the Soviet Union the driver for the 
invasion of the country or was it the believe in the Stalinist ideology that demanded 
Moscow’s control over communist regime in the world? If so then the strategy 
pursued by Moscow in Afghanistan could not be altered even if it turned out to be not 
only unsuccessful but even couter-productive. For the Afghan population the interests 
of the Soviet Union were at secondary at best; what mattered for them was not which 
form of ideology the government would pursue but whether a strong national 
government was needed in the first place and secondly whether Kabul would be able 
to address their grievances and demands. The multitude of other actors that emerged 
and became involved in the fighting further highlight the complexity of the situation 
and the impossibility of one single actor to dominate the situation.  
 
Thus, the Soviet invasion and, ultimately, the withdrawal in 1989, did in terms of 
motivation and course differ little from earlier or later attempts to conquer the 
country. However, just like the Soviet Union had determined to use violence in 
Afghanistan for its own benefits, so did a multitude of other actors; they all relied on a 
programme in which violence worked as primary form of communication in the 
network centred on Afghanistan. In the 1970s, Afghanistan had descended into 
violence partly because of domestic developments, but what worsened and maintained 
the violence is highlighted by Giustozzi and Ullah:  
“One of the major catalysts for this new development [the emergence of 
warlords and ‘tribal entrepreneurs] was foreign interference. I do not refer 
here to the Soviet Army, whose role in 1979-1989 demonstrated similarities 
with the role of the British Army during the nineteenth century. Instead, I 
focus on the patronage of political organizations active among the tribes by 
foreign powers, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States. […] 
This was a major factor in the emergence of entrepreneurs, who exploited 
these new opportunities for raising revenue and establishing a following.“ 
(Giustozzi & Ullah, 2010, p. 139) 
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Yet this description also falls short in explaining the developments in Afghanistan 
following the sudden withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989. With the end of the Cold 
War, the United States also lost its interest in the region and funding and support 
quickly dried up. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan focused on domestic issues (although 
there were concerted efforts from within Pakistan to continue to try and weaken 
Afghanistan for political, economic and criminal benefits (Dorronsoro, 2005)) and 
there was a substantial drop in foreign interest and support. If the involvement of 
foreign governments was the reason for violence in Afghanistan, then its sudden 
withdrawal should have led to a weakening of the warlords, a substantial drop in 
violence and a parallel increase of stability and security in the country. That this was 
not the case quickly became apparent in the civil war that followed, a civil war which 
engulfed most of the country from the time the Soviets withdrew to the US-led 
invasion following the terrorist attacks of September 2011. This civil war was by no 
means fought by Afghan actors for Afghan reasons alone, and there was no central 
authority that could prevent foreign involvement. Local warlords continued to rely on 
the ability to exploit their links by, for example, trading raw opium for weapons 
which in turn could be used to force farmers to grow opium poppies.  
 
 
3.4	  The	  Civil	  War	  
 
Despite the Soviet Union’s withdrawal in 1989, the Communist government was able 
to maintain itself until 1992, but violence continued in an unabated fashion to 
dominate the affairs of Afghanistan. In this second phase of Afghanistan’s history 
since the end of the monarchy in 1972, the United Nations tried to support attempts 
by the central government to increase its influence in the country and develop 
methods to address the challenges it faced. These challenges were both domestic and 
international, especially with regards to Afghanistan’s neighbour, Pakistan. 
Ultimately these attempts were doomed to fail. Success would have required a change 
in the programming of the country’s networks away from violence to a more inclusive 
system; the simple disappearance of one actor, even one as powerful as the Soviet 
Union, or by extension, the fading of some foreign support for the resistance, 
ultimately had little effect on the violence embedded in the country. 
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Whilst it can be argued that a large number of Afghans, perhaps even the majority, 
supported an end to the violence and believed that the withdrawal of Soviet forces 
could bring this goal, ultimately the same dynamics that had emerged in the 1970s 
were still present (Misdag, 2006). In other words, the struggle for power and 
domination continued to fuel violence as the dominant form of communication in and 
between Afghan networks. Different warlords, strongmen and tribal leaders continued 
to fight each other over resources which, due to the withdrawal of foreign forces and 
support, became even more scarce. Some authors regard this period as driven by 
economic conflict, as compared to the earlier political drivers (Giustozzi & Ibrahimi, 
January 2012).  
 
Despite the fact that religion had served as the backdrop for much of the narrative and 
motivation for violent resistance against forces who were judged to be heretical, 
religion was unable to provide the basis for a non-violent state of affairs in 
Afghanistan. If, as one author puts it: “The Islamists were the major groups who 
organised resistance against Daoud (1973–78), against the communists (1974–79), 
against the Soviet invasion (1979–89), against one another for power (1992–96), and 
finally against the Taleban (1994–2001).” (Misdag, 2006, p. 167) then why was it 
never able to stabilise its rule and the country?  
 
Already by 1990, the violence in Afghanistan had become a “forgotten war” (UN 
Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan Felix Ermacora quoted in Johnson & Leslie, 2008, 
p. 21) in which violence continued to inflict suffering and misery for the population, 
with little attention paid to it by major powers. Just as the Soviet withdrawal had not 
eliminated existentialist violence in Afghanistan, the disappearance of the initial 
policies that had pitted the urban elites against the rest of the population was no 
longer active in the 1990, and yet violence continued to be the most prominent form 
of communication of the networks found in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the scarcity of 
goods and high levels of poverty had made crime, especially smuggling and drug 
cultivation, the most attractive economy (Bhatia & Sedra, 2008).  
 
The continued instability and volatility may have benefitted those who were able to 
use their position in the networks to extract rents from the population, through 
smuggling and crime and by exploiting their ability to dominate trade and the 
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exchange of goods and services. The majority of these individuals had little or no 
ability to use an alternative to violence in their approach to address conflicts and 
threats, since they lacked the ability to rely on, for example, a Jirga in order to 
address disagreements. The legitimacy of these individuals was almost entirely based 
on violence, so they lacked a narrative that would allow them to participate in a 
network with an alternative programming and, as a result, violence largely continued 
– with regional and temporal patterns - to haunt Afghanistan. This period between the 
Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the next major invasion in 2001 is often referred to as 
‘civil war’ in precisely the way Stathis Kalyvas describes it: it is not the existence of 
different identities that causes the violence that is found in a civil war, but instead 
violence is retroactively explained and legitimised by reference to a clash of identities 
and belonging (Kalyvas, 2006). In fact the reference to ethnicity as fundamental 
component of the war shows that the complexity of the situation; ethnic identities are 
not rigid or prescribe the behaviour of those who share this identity. Instead they are a 
welcome tool to be used in justifying actions that benefit only the interests of few 
individuals.  
 
For many actors, especially those outside the country, instability and violence in 
Afghanistan were beneficial since their business interests and power depended on the 
maintenance of a violent programme dominating the country. For the Soviet Union on 
the other hand, the violence in Afghanistan was no longer acceptable since the 
domestic programme had changed and it no longer supported the perils, injury and 
death of Soviet soldiers in pursuit of an ideological goal. In short, the Soviet Union’s 
withdrawal meant that Afghanistan disappeared back into the same dynamics of 
different networks fighting each other with the aim of dominating the country and 
installing a programme that they perceived to provide legitimacy to their rule, just as 
had existed prior to 1978.  
 
 
3.5	  The	  Taliban	  
 
Another development, in comparison to the Soviet invasion and withdrawal and the 
subsequent civil war, was the emergence of the Taliban. The Taliban was a group that 
emerged in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar in 1994, and was led by a 
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charismatic leader, Mullah Omar. It was a loosely structured organisation that differed 
to other groups because of its change of narrative to gain and justifiy legitimacy. In 
contrast to the many groups that would exclusively base their legitimacy and power 
on the use of violence, the Taliban sought to establish themselves as a political and 
social authority. Basing themselves on a number of madrassas that had been 
established in Pakistan with the help of Saudi Arabian funds, they based their actions 
on a strict code of Islam. Instead of using violence for the immediate maximisation of 
their power and interests, they aimed to garner the support of the local population by 
offering religious, legal and security services. By prosecuting bandits, drug addicts 
and small gangs who were harassing and extorting others, the Taliban rapidly 
increased their influence. Its ideology and behaviour differed greatly from other 
groups and was far more inclusive; it invoked the shared religion of Islam, albeit a far 
more conservative school than that which had been found in Afghanistan before 
(Dorronsoro, 2005). 
 
Its links to the Pakistani madrassas enabled the Taliban to command military supplies 
and weapons to hold off against other armed factions in the country, but most 
importantly the Mullah Omar instilled a sense of law and order after a long and 
increasingly lawless period of war: 
“In this situation the Taliban appeared to present an alternative to disorder. Its 
programme was based on the restoration of order: freedom of movement and 
of trade, the end of banditry, a ban on drug use, and so on.” (Dorronsoro, 
2005, p. 246) 
In no sense were the Taliban a benevolent and liberal force and often, if not directly 
involved, they colluded with the opium industry. However, their sudden success as a 
state within the state was based on their ability to widen their legitimacy in the 
population while remaining heavily armed and ready to use violence against anyone 
who dared to oppose them (Davis, 1988). There was little economic and long-term 
investment made by the Taliban and most of their activities were focused on the 
creation of administrative structures, the judicial system and religious activities 
(Dorronsoro, 2005). With the combination of governance and violence the Taliban 
were able, far more than other factious groups, to expand their field of influence 
across Afghanistan. Yet, in order to maintain the support of more orthodox and 
conservative donors, their interpretation of Islam was alien to Afghanistan and 
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remained a cause for dispute within. 
 
This means that most of the support for the Taliban was not in exchange for aid or 
goods and services but was offered because of the Taliban’s ability to offer a sense of 
stability, security and identity in a society in which existentialist violence was 
dominating. In a sense, in their organisation and narrative, the Taliban would have fit 
well into the period before the Soviet invasion: 
“Their [the Taliban] rise to power, the result of a collective mobilisation, 
enabled them to occupy positions of prestige and authority out of proportion to 
what they could have expected within the Afghan society of the 1970s, when 
the prestige of the ulema had been in decline.” (Dorronsoro, 2005, p. 273) 
The shortage of supplies and funding, and the invoking of religious laws also opened 
the door for further foreign influence. In many other places in the Middle East 
jihadists and Islamists had failed in trying to use violence in order to place themselves 
and their programming in power, and Afghanistan became one of the last remaining 
areas in which Jihadists of different affiliations could find refuge and were welcomed 
because of their ability to provide a link to resources and advice (Stenersen, 2013). 
The most aggressive of these at the time was lead by a Saudi millionaire who 
promoted himself and his organisation by calling for a global Jihad aimed against the 
last remaining superpower in the world, the US (Gerges, 2011). 
 
Fuelled by the desire to participate in the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets, Osama 
bin Laden came first to Afghanistan in the 1980s. The wealth of his family made him 
a very important and influential figure throughout his life. While formally the head of 
Al Qaida, he focused his actions not towards increasing his own power or influence 
but saw his main purpose in providing funds and resources to those who would share 
his understanding of Islam. By promoting a strategy which legitimised the indifferent 
use of violence and the rejection of any form of authority that was not sanctioned by 
his definition of Wahhabi Islam, he became a fugitive and was forced to operate from 
underground. Because neither the Taliban nor Al Qaida were, or are, homogenous 
actors, it is difficult to examine and qualify their relationship (Stenersen, 2013). For 
the Taliban he was a welcome ally: in exchange for them adopting his understanding 
of religion he would continue to provide them with much needed funds (Misdag, 
2006), but his prescribed religious conservatism, the global aims and the disregard to 
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Afghan culture continued to cause great friction (Barfield, 2010; Dorronsoro, 2005). 
An additional cause of conflict was the cultivation of opium poppies: many Afghans 
lived off the rents but many of the foreign Islamists rejected the opium economy as 
being against Islamic law (Giustozzi & Ibrahimi, January 2012). 
 
 
3.6	  Post	  9/11	  
 
The invasion of Afghanistan by the United States at the end of 2001 brought the third, 
and so far final, stage of Afghanistan’s history since the 1970s. Quickly following the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, 
Al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden was widely understood to be the perpetrator. Fuelled 
by a domestic programme that demanded revenge and retribution, the US government 
was quick to demand the Taliban, at that time the de facto government of 
Afghanistan, to hand over the accused. Initially, the Taliban refused to obey the 
request citing Pashtunwali (the unwritten Pashtun code of honour) and Islamic 
principles which forbid the handing over of guests to their enemies and organised a 
meeting of religious scholars and elders – a Jirga - to decide on the matter (Misdag, 
2006). This highlighted two facts: first, Osama Bin Laden was considered to be a 
guest and not an Afghan, and this was despite the resources he had provided and the 
shared religious and possibly cultural background. Second, it was a Jirga that was to 
decide the course of action, an example of the traditional decision-making process.  
 
When the Jirga had made the decision, which was that Bin Laden was asked to leave 
on his own terms, this effectively told the United States that Bin Laden was no longer 
protected by the customary laws of Afghanistan and could be arrested by the US in 
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Washington continued to demand from the Taliban to 
hand him over. The behaviour of the US was seen by the Taliban, and the member of 
the Jirga, as a means of using Bin Laden as an excuse to force Afghanistan to comply 
with the US regarding other issues, such as form of government, the eradication of 
opium production, women rights and separation of religion and state (A. R. Clark, 
2004). As it became clear that the issue would not be solved, the US made the 
decision, in October 2001, to support Afghan factions that were against the Taliban, 
bomb Taliban positions and invade the country.  
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The most important observation here is the conflict of programmes that both sides felt 
they could not alter; traditional laws regarding hospitality stood above even the 
differences between the Taliban and other Afghan networks, and for Washington a 
compromise was judged to be a sign of weakness in the eyes of the US public who 
was seen to demand an aggressive sign of revenge for the attacks of September 2001. 
 
For Afghanistan, the invasion of the US was yet another foreign armed intervention, 
differing little from earlier attempts to alter the programming of the networks centred 
on Afghanistan, with the exception that this time there was no existing state or, as 
Barfield puts it: “United States invaded Afghanistan at a time when the state structure 
had ceased to function” (Barfield, 2010, p. 272). Yet for the networks that were most 
influential at the time, the US and later NATO troops manifested a substantial threat 
not only because of their military abilities, which were far superior, but also because 
of their aim to install a programme in the country that would create a major challenge 
for the legitimacy and power of the existing networks. This is collaborated by the fact 
that only a very small number of foreign fighters killed in Afghanistan were actually 
involved in international terrorism, indicating that their motivation to fight was 
closely tied to their personal position and power rather than to the global endeavour 
promoted by Al Qaida (Stenersen, 2011). The previous uneasy relationship between 
many of the foreign actors who had found refuge in Afghanistan on one side and 
Afghan networks on the other, for example the Taliban, was replaced with 
increasingly closer co-operation (Stenersen, 2013).  
 
The relative ease in which the US was able to find and support factions in 
Afghanistan who were aimed at defeating the Taliban and its allies shows how fragile 
their power and legitimacy had been, but also how much the US was able to insert 
itself very quickly into the networks in Afghanistan. They did this by using violence. 
This was not by choice but because no other form of communication was available, 
both by reference to the domestic audience in the US that expected an act of revenge 
and a sign of relentless destruction and in Afghanistan, where non-violent 
communication would have required the ability to use the local language, customs and 
traditions in order to try and influence the local networks. The result of the US 
invasion was a removal of the Taliban from power but, as Giustozzi and Ibrahimi 
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point out, the US and its allies were unable to establish the supremacy of their 
networks:  
“From 2002 to 2009, the strongmen were largely southern-based; mostly part 
of either [president] Karzai’s own patrimonial network or the CIA’s network. 
[…] The rival networks coexisted uneasily, as each tried to maximise its 
influence over the government structure at the expense of the other.” 
(Giustozzi & Ibrahimi, January 2012, p. 29) 
This means that the US and NATO may have been able to militarily defeat the 
Taliban and prevent them from providing the de-facto government, but they were 
incapable of instilling a programme that was able to alter the existing realities in the 
country. The reason for this is not only found in Afghanistan itself, but also in the 
limit to the resources which the US can mobilise. Rather than being a homogenous 
and hierarchical actor, Washington depends on factors such as public opinion in the 
US, economic and financial resources, the support of its international allies and the 
actions of a myriad of other actors to try and to break the circle of violence.  
 
The PowerPoint slide that General Stanley A. McChrystal was presented with 
highlights this; violence is so firmly embedded as the dominant form of 
communication in Afghanistan and the obviously complex nature of the multitude of 
different actors and their behaviour being interlinked made the aim to alter the 
existing programme incredibly complex. Because all actors in Afghanistan rely on 
violence as a tool to increase their power instability, volatility and fear is 
commonplace and becomes self-reinforcing. As Castells points out: 
“Anger is one of the most potent emotions behind rebellious practices as it 
reduces the perception of risk and increases the acceptance of risk-taking 
behaviour. Furthermore, anger intensifies with the perception of an unjust 
action and with the identification of the agent responsible for the action. […] 
The price of bread, the suspicion of witchcraft, or the injustice of rulers have 
been more frequent sources of revolts and social movements than the ideals of 
emancipation. In fact, it is often the case that these ideals only come to life by 
germinating in the fertile soil of popular anger against the unjust.” (Castells, 
2009, p. 347) 
All actors in Afghanistan are faced with the same dilemma: regardless of their 
motivations any of their actions, intended or not, takes place in a complex network, 
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and is being interpreted and amplified along the multitude of different interests of the 
actors. The opening of a school can be narrated as either a benevolent act to help the 
local population or an attempt to subvert and weaken social cohesion and local 
culture. Similarly, a traffic accident that costs the life of a child may trigger violent 
action against the network the perpetrator is being allied with and cause great harm. 
One example of this is the destruction of Qurans by NATO staff in February 2012; on 
Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan books were used by prisoners to write clandestine 
messages to each other, and so were ordered for destruction. When this was witnessed 
by Afghan workers, word spread causing several days of violent protest against 
foreigners regardless of their nationality, affiliation or whether the causing incident 
had been deliberate or accidental (Rahimi & Rubin, 2012). 
 
An analysis of the history of Afghanistan between the 1970s and the current day 
demonstrates why the United States and its allies have been as unsuccessful as all 
other actors in seeking to establish a stable programme in Afghanistan. The separation 
of Afghanistan’s history, promoted by Barfield (2010) and Giustozzi and Ibrahim 
(January 2012), is far less powerful a tool for analysis then it appears since all actors, 
foreign and domestic, state and non-state, military and political were faced with the 
same dynamics of a programme that relied on a violence they could not control. 
 
However, violence does not cause a complete and absolute descent into anarchy and 
destruction. People not directly involved in the fighting, either as perpetrator or 
victim, did not automatically leave the area or flee. As Dorronsoro states: “[…] there 
was no automatic linkage between the number of departures and the intensity of the 
fighting […]” (Dorronsoro, 2005, p. 170). This suggests that people would instead 
seek to adapt their behaviour to the situation they were faced with. A study of the 
social networks of two villages in Herat province Harpviken, was able to show that 
violence, or the threat of it, would create anxiety in people. This anxiety, and the 
increasing insecurity of access to goods and services necessary for survival (such as 
housing, water and information) would be answered by key individuals who had links 
to sources able to provide these services. This increased the power of those 
individuals as well as the community leaders who had traditionally led a community 
(Berg Harpviken, 2009).  
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Almost as an unintended consequence, this rendered violence the most powerful 
factor in altering social networks: in a society in which non-violent communication 
would dominate decision-making, and power depended on a system such as the Jirga 
that was slow, transitions of power required time and commitment over time. When 
the traditional system becomes unable to address the challenges it is faced with – as 
happened in Afghanistan in the 1960s and 1970s – the system breaks down. Violence 
becomes the most powerful influence that determines the power of an individual and 
his position in the network. The narrative that is attached to this violence, the reason 
why violent acts are being committed or the context in which violent behaviour takes 
places, becomes secondary and is easily manipulated. This was found by David 
Kilcullen when trying to assess why individuals would join a fight or violent 
confrontation. In the case of Afghanistan, local adolescents joined an insurgent-led 
ambush on a NATO convoy not because they identified with the insurgents, but 
largely because their reputation and social standing would be enhanced by the fact 
that they had participated in a battle (Kilcullen, 2009). 
 
 
4.	  Institutionalisation	  of	  Violence	  
 
The analysis of Afghanistan’s history since the 1970s demonstrates the centrality of 
violence in the discourse. Parallel to the political developments that have emerged, 
there has been an on-going proliferation of small arms in the country caused by the 
conjunction of continuous fighting between and within different factions. The 
inability of the traditional networks to address issues such as modernisation, 
industrialisation and urbanisation led to a growth of fear, insecurity and mistrust to 
which the Jirga system did not provide a platform for moderation or a venue to deal 
with the issues faced by its members. Growing insecurity and absence of moderating 
institutions led to increasing levels of insecurity, fear, anger and mistrust leading to a 
surge in demand for arms and protection. 
 
With the entrance of the Soviet military and a great proliferation of weapons in the 
hands of the elite, other foreign actors, most notably the US, realised that their 
previous investments were coming under threat. Foreign aid and financial support 
were increasingly used to purchase small arms which were then shipped to 
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Afghanistan and distributed along the various groups, accelerating the process 
discussed earlier in which domestic actors would focus their behaviour and rhetoric 
not on the interests of the local population but on foreign supporters (Bhatia & Sedra, 
2008).  
 
This indicates not that the issues of contention or causes of conflict changed, but the 
way in which they were being dealt with. Traditionally, Afghans had relied on a 
system in which all matters of public life were debated and decided within a loose and 
largely unregulated system of irregular meetings. The nature of the issue, threat or 
contention defined the make-up, urgency and scope of the meetings in which 
unelected representatives of different families, neighbourhoods, regions, clans, 
ethnicities or interest groups would meet and decide, often via lengthy process, on a 
compromise that all attendees could agree on.  
 
This traditional system, of which the various different groups within Afghanistan had 
relied, and which has been mentioned on some occasions already, is called Jirga – 
customary meetings that were held on an irregular basis to regulate a multitude of 
facets in daily life ranging from trade to the resolution of property issues to foreign 
policy:  
“The Jirga is an assembly or council that renders decisions on particular issues 
or cases. The latter are binding on all parties to any conflict. Decisions are 
based on Pashtunwali and Islamic law. The traditional function of the Jirga has 
been the equitable distribution of power in tribal social organisations.” 
(Abdullaev, 2004, p. 117) 
Violent conflicts between the members of these assemblies were not uncommon nor 
an exception. Disagreements about land, honour or reputation often only led to a Jirga 
coming together in the first place because they became so violent that they harmed the 
wider community. Because of their relative social isolation in the countryside, 
families or tribes often develop a very strong sense of identity that is centred on 
loyalty, honour and ancestry. The strong sense of identity and the role of violence for 
the standing of an individual in isolated communities is also found in other places in 
the world, for example in Turkish Kurdistan. Similar to Afghanistan, the people in 
this region base much of their identity and behaviour on ritual and actual violence, 
and perceptions of honour, strength and shared ancestry are major determinants for 
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the behaviour of individuals (de Bellaigue, 2011). An example for this in Afghanistan 
is the largely unwritten Pashtunwali, a shared code of behaviour for those who 
consider themselves to belong to the tribe of Pashtuns. A different word for ‘code’ 
could be ‘programme’: in order to maintain a network its members agree on a shared 
pattern of behaviour that will protect their interests, provide for their needs and also 
be the basis of identity and cultural narrative.  
 
One of the factors that determined a man’s membership and position in the 
community were his abilities as a fighter and, because of the scarcity of goods and the 
largely absent authority, aggressive behaviour often paid of. However, the jirga 
system was generally capable of moderating conflicts that were considered to be too 
harmful. Nevertheless, this largely non-hierarchical and fragmented system was not 
universal; especially in and around cities and larger settlements where a system called 
Galang can be found. This differs from the Jirga system because of its quasi-feudal 
and strongly hierarchical structure, but a growing fragmentation and weakness of the 
state also weakened or threatened the position of these leaders. 	  	  	  
4.1	  Violence	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  modernisation 
 
From the late 1940s, the Jirga system was slowly undermined by the forced 
modernisation coming from Kabul and other urban centres. The attempts of the state 
to increase its influence and control in rural areas were implemented by trying to 
establish schools teaching a national curriculum, building and maintaining transport 
and communication infrastructure, and implementing a legal system based on federal 
law. In order to pool resources and to hinder or prevent governmental policies that 
would weaken the influence of the elders, the Jirgas became the centres of an anti-
governmental movement. The different ethnic, social, linguistic and geographic 
background of the delegates of the Jirga system relied on the most common 
denominator as basis: Islam. Over centuries a network of Islamic seminaries had 
become established in Central Asia in which Madrassas, or schools, taught basic 
education and law and provided resources for the Jirga system.  
 
The weakness of this system is based in its non-hierarchical and fragmented structure 
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in which conflicts were common. Its strength were its flexibility, adaptability and, 
largely due to its religious underpinnings, its ability to link a multitude of actors 
together, even internationally. By invoking religious motives, the Afghan elders were 
able to source support from the outside in order to maintain their, in effect, shadow-
government in the country, as well as labelling the resistance against the common 
enemy an essential religious duty. After the communist takeover the government 
arrested, tortured and killed a large number of religious and local leaders and, 
following the Soviet Invasion, this process accelerated but was met with strong 
opposition: 
“In response to the violence of the state, and afterwards to invasion by a 
foreign power, the population rose up in revolt and embarked on a Holy War, 
a jihad. The mobilization of the countryside took lace in a context of local 
solidarity networks, organized around ‘commanders’.” (Dorronsoro, 2005, p. 
93) 
Both sides, the state and the rural population, now had the ability to rely on large 
funds to purchase weapons and supplies that facilitated a form of violence that had 
previously been absent. The increasing proliferation of weapons led to a spiral in 
which violence became endemic and spread into all sectors and areas, and the Jirga 
system struggled to contain it. There was violence between its members, similar to the 
federal government which was equally faced with vicious infighting. Those 
individuals that used their connections most effectively were able to raise their own 
militias and became convinced that violence would allow them to maximise their 
power and ability to collect rents (Barfield, 2010): 
“Whether over land, water, business or marriage, conflicts between 
individuals, families and communities become all the more violent by the 
ready stockpiles of mines, explosive ordnance and guns, While the possession 
of weapons is he most visible way of distinguishing the power of commanders 
and militias, it is not the exclusive manifestation of power. Availability and 
victimization are only one determinant of influence and impact.” (Bhatia & 
Sedra, 2008, p. 14) 
When in the 1970s, the political elites began to utilise the majority of their resources 
to fight each other for the control of foreign funds, the already weak governmental 
presence in the rural areas disappeared quickly. The influx of weapons began in 
conjunction with the fading away of a controlling and regulating authority of the state, 
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and gradually the Jirga system lost its ability to moderate conflicts. Suddenly, 
conflicts that earlier had been contained within the social structure had changed their 
nature and forced a change of behaviour in the networks. Those who had links to 
suppliers of funds, weapons and supplies had now gained control of the programming 
of the networks, and relied on the extortion of rents while trying to increase their 
influence in comparison to others.  
 
Parallel to the improved weapons and the provision of training by Pakistan, the US 
and European powers’ communication equipment and training was also fundamental 
for the effectiveness of a group of fighters. Yet, upgrading these tools also fuelled 
rivalry between different factions that may, on the macro-level, share the same 
enemy, but on the micro-level would compete against each other:  
“Relationships between commanders [of the mujahidin] were generally 
characterised by competition arising out of personal rivalries, logistical issues, 
control over strategic positions, and humanitarian aid among other 
considerations.” (Dorronsoro, 2005, p. 209) 
The image that these forces and their leaders are backwards, archaic or primitive is 
disputed by Hussain, who counters that warlords replaced ‘traditional’ power 
structures because the changes in their environments demanded this. Power and social 
standing was no longer being maintained by a slow-acting and moderating lose 
network, but “by building patron-client networks through control over the opium 
economy, arms and foreign aid” (2012). 
 
 
5.	  The	  emergence	  of	  warlords	  
 
Increasingly numerous and powerful weapons were discriminately used and in this 
way violence became the dominating form of communication, replacing those forms 
that had build the basis for the Jirga system. Warlords emerged – leaders of a small 
group of armed men who, because of their ability to carry weapons and cause great 
harm, were able to exploit violence for a varying and often changing and conflicting 
means. The same actor could claim to be motivated by gaining political control within 
Afghanistan, using religious arguments to gain support from outside actors, while 
exploiting rent from the local population and benefiting from the control of smuggling 
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and illicit trade.  
 
The definition of ‘warlord’ is disputed, because most of the literature argues that these 
are individuals who, through violence and the leadership of military forces, dominate 
a territory without political legitimacy (Zisk Marten, 2012). Supposedly, they differ 
from political actors because they lack a political or ideological goal, and from 
‘strongmen’ who lack a military background but are similarly able to directly or 
indirectly coerce the local population (Giustozzi & Ullah, 2010). Although warlords 
do not exist everywhere where central political control has broken down (Giustozzi, 
2005), there is a close link between instability, the chance to extort rents, especially 
from otherwise illegal or forbidden goods or activities such as smuggling, drug trade 
or extortion and the emergence of warlords (Hussain, 2012). 
 
In contrast to traditional community leaders who had gained their position, influence 
and power by gaining the support of the wider group over time (for example by 
making just judgements in legal disputes, or through the maintenance of kinship ties 
and decisions that helped the community to survive), warlords differ, lacking this kind 
of political legitimacy. Instead, they rely on military legitimacy – the ability to inflict 
pain (Giustozzi & Ullah, 2010).  
 
At the same time, these warlords are under constant pressure to both fulfil the 
expectations and demands of followers and fight off rivals. Charisma and superior 
personal abilities may provide the basis for elevation to a prominent position in the 
network, but survival will depend on striking the balance between providing the 
goods and services the community requires, and the provision of too much which in 
turn may make him and his position superfluous. The methods that a warlord may 
employ for this will depend on the programming of the network he is in: in an 
environment with little or no occurrence of unsanctioned violence, he will be stripped 
of his major tool for the extraction of rents and power because his use of violence will 
alienate the local network. Equally, the more that violence dominates the 
programming of the local environment, the more resources the warlord will have to 
employ to maintain his position as a provider or necessary goods, supplies and 
security (Glatzer, 2002).  
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The emergence and spread of violence in Afghanistan was not a result of political 
instability and failed attempts to modernise the country per se, but a change of the 
programming of the social networks in the country. Because violence became so 
readily available, through increased weapons and training, it was used for a multitude 
of reasons causing destruction and further fragmentation. The violence was focused 
on Afghanistan, but international links supplied the goods and supplies that were 
necessary for the maintenance of the expansion of violence. Porous borders and the 
fragmented nature of the country provided the fertile ground on which different actors 
from outside the country could benefit from the violence in Afghanistan, which serves 
to highlight the difficulty in identifying a unified and shared cause for this.  
 
It is remarkable that the existence of warlords, and with it the existence of violence as 
a main method of communication, does not require a narrative of conflict which is 
caused by different and conflicting identities. In other words, there is no indication 
that identity and narrative are at the root of the conflict. Rather, they become a 
retrospective tool to seek to explain and justify instability, hostility and violence.  
 
 
6.	  The	  Myth	  of	  Hierarchy	  	  
 
Because violence is so universal, it allowed a multitude of narratives for the use of 
violence to emerge. Every actor had different, and at times multiple, explanations for 
his violent actions. Moscow was, for example, led by wishes to expand its political 
reach, counter a perceived entrenchment of the United States in the region as well as 
possibly emotional reasons for its increasing activity in the country. In interviewing 
many of the Soviet decision makers at the time, Feifer finds that every one of them 
had a different motivation and narrative for their actions (Feifer, 2010).  
Similarly, the United States felt that it could, via the proxy of Afghanistan, weaken its 
Cold War antagonist, find a market to which to sell its weapons, and allow certain 
individuals to be able to fight for their understanding of ideology and political and 
personal rights. Other countries, for example Pakistan and India, equally became 
involved in Afghanistan because of the antagonism against each other, while financial 
support came from many Islamic societies motivated by what they perceived to be a 
religious duty.  
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Besides state actors, there were also a multitude of other nodes involved in the use of 
violence, ranging from arms dealers, smugglers, politicians and elders to financiers, 
religious authorities and journalists. The fighting was not controlled by any single 
actor, and levels of violence differed across time and place. Dorronsorro points to the 
only constant that appears from the 1970s:  
“The guerrillas existed in a wide variety of local circumstances, and the Shi’ite 
and Sunni groups developed in different ways, while the priorities of the 
commanders on the ground diverged from those of the leaderships in exile. A 
common thread nevertheless emerges: the tendency towards 
professionalisation among the mujahidin, which emerged in parallel with the 
prevalence of institutional styles of leadership over the patrimonial model.” 
(Dorronsoro, 2005, p. 207) 
This shows that it mattered less who was fighting whom or for what purpose, but that 
there was fighting in the first place. Once violence had been able to emerge and 
establish itself within the networks in Afghanistan, a dynamic emerged in which 
violence became increasingly prevalent and effective, demanding an evolution of 
weapons and tactics of those who wanted to remain able to exert power and influence.  
 
In this sense, the thought of ‘the mujahidin’ or ‘the Taliban’ appears to be tempting, 
but is not helpful since these networks exist without a controlling central actor who is 
able to dominate the organisation in a hierarchical structure. They are what 
Dorronsoro refers to when he describes “the prevalence of institutional styles of 
leadership” (Dorronsoro, 2005, p. 207), but these institutions were not hierarchical but 
remained complex non-hierarchical networks in a constant state of change and 
adaptation. Because of this circumstance, any actor would aim to increase the 
stability, security and prevalence – which could also be called ‘legitimacy’ - in the 
network by trying to formalise it through gaining validation and respect by others. 
However, because other actors would follow the same path they would assume a zero-
sum game in which the gain of one actor would be considered detrimental to another.  
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7.	  Conclusion	  
 
The powerpoint slide that General McChrystal was shown does not explain the war in 
Afghanistan, nor does it provide much guidance for how to end it. What it does show 
is the complexity of the situation and the difficulty in establishing a single narrative 
that could both explain the continued existence of violence and decipher which agents 
were promoting its use.  
 
The United States and its allies are faced with the same challenge as all other actors in 
Afghanistan: they aim to establish a programme in the country in which their form of 
communication dominates, and in which their primacy of creating a narrative is 
secured. Just as little as Afghanistan can be described by a graph printed on a single 
sheet of paper lacking links to the outside, so is neither the programme nor the related 
narrative limited to Afghanistan itself. To add further complexity, the entire situation 
and the underlying networks are subject to constant change. Seemingly unrelated 
incidents – for example the threat to burn copies of the Quran by a radical in Florida – 
may have profound impact on the events in Afghanistan.  
 
The emergence of instability in Afghanistan can be traced back to rapid changes 
caused by events taking place outside the country, mainly the Second World War and 
decolonisation. This in turn created great imbalance between traditional power 
structures and those who relied on newly emerging links which increased their power 
and influence. Traditionally, power and influence was based on factors such as 
kinship, exchange and cooperation and conflicts were addressed within a fluid and 
flexible system such as a Jirga. When relatively sudden new skills, for example 
education, linguistic skills or access to foreign funds became far more influential in 
determining an individual’s power, conflicts emerged in which the traditional systems 
were unable to cope with.  
 
Links to actors outside of Afghanistan suddenly emerged, challenging the influence 
and power of traditional rulers. Often without negative intent, these links provided an 
existential threat to them. For example, the construction of a dam and irrigation 
channels empowered those who controlled it above the landowners. When schools 
were built to decrease child mortality and improve awareness on health issues, those 
who relied on religion, superstition and traditional medicine lost their influence and 
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livelihood. Especially in a country such as Afghanistan, where the absence of 
transport and communication infrastructure had prevented the emergence of a 
centralised power, the sudden improvements in these fields caused conflicts and, in 
the absence of agreed structures to address them, they became more heated and 
ultimately violent. 
 
In a simplified way, these new links pitted old against new, traditional against 
modern. Ideological rifts emerged between those who advocated rapid modernisation 
and those who feared that this would weaken their power, but neither side was a 
hierarchical or unified entity, as the 1970s show: political factions in the urban centres 
would be faced by violent struggles against each other for the leadership of reform. 
Depending on their links to foreign bodies, actors would try to dominate the discourse 
based on ideology, as much as they subscribed to it because their power, influence 
and wealth would depend on the support of these foreign entities. The result was an 
increase in instability, marred with the emerging narrative of a unified and centralised 
Afghan nation-state resulting in a zero-sum game in which the winner would 
dominate the entire country. 
 
The growing instability and insecurity led all actors, both domestic and foreign, to 
feel that they and their investments were under threat. In the absence of an authority 
that could address this, different actors began to arm themselves, clashes ensued and 
violence emerged as the most influential force for the struggle of security, power and 
influence. Due to the fragmentation of the society and the absence of a functional and 
hierarchic state structure, it was easy for outside actors to become involved in 
fighting. For the Soviet Union, the violence in Afghanistan served two distinct 
purposes: firstly, Moscow believed it could gain political capital by trying to export 
its ideology abroad and to benefit from being able to dominate Kabul. Secondly, 
fighting between different factions in the Afghan capital and the weakness of 
communist influence in the rural areas manifested a threat to the investments that the 
Soviet Union had made in the country. 
 
Only in the second phase, lasting from 1992 until 2001, did ethnic identity replace 
ideology in defining the fault lines in the narrative of conflict. This was a gradual 
process that only accelerated after the emergence of the Taliban, an organization 
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largely financed and ideologically led by non-Afghans. At the same time, there is the 
view that many Afghans do not share the rigid division into different ethnic identities, 
and there are also foreign observers who argue that ethnic divisions are 
overemphasised due to foreign observers academic bias (Dorronsoro, 2005). 
 
Beginning in 2001, the third phase is characterised by the ingress of the United States, 
NATO and other foreign actors that, under a auspices of the ‘Global War on Terror’, 
led to a renewed fragmentation of Afghanistan and, to an extent neighbouring 
Pakistan, that is defining the country today (Giustozzi & Ibrahimi, January 2012).  
 
Using a Castellian approach to the analysis of Afghanistan’s history, the 
fragmentation into periods involving different actors and phases of the conflict 
becomes secondary, since the underlying dynamics do not change. The narrative and 
justifications for the behaviour across the periods may differ, but what they each share 
is an attempt to install a programme into the country which would ensure their own 
primacy and domination. To consider Afghanistan or the Afghans as unitary and 
hierarchical actors is erroneous, because the country is tied into a multitude of 
different networks, leading to the result that the entire violent conflict in the country 
relies on networks shaped by a programme in which violence is the most powerful 
dynamic. Regardless of the different actors involved, those in the country all share the 
conviction that violence would work for them. 
 
The approach promoted by NATO and many international non-governmental 
organisations is to focus on human rights, education, health care etc, to try to alter the 
current embedded violence, but this is only successful to a limited degree. For those 
who hold power, this approach manifests a threat to their power and position to which 
they answer with the only weapon they have: violence. On the basis that their 
legitimacy is almost exclusively built on violence, they need to maintain a programme 
in their network that is dominated by this.  
 
Conversely therefore, a change of the programme of the network in Afghanistan that 
replaces violence with a non-violent form of communication, will rely on the support 
of the individuals who benefit from violence. This is much more difficult than it 
appears since it would, for example, require the United States to cooperate with 
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individuals involved in the production or smuggle of opium, or religious extremists. 
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Chapter	  7:	  Network-­‐centric	  peacebuilding	  
 
 
1.	  Introduction	  
 
‘Network’ and ‘networking’ are words that have, in recent years, become common in 
all aspects of science and human behaviour. They represent a new and modern form 
of understanding of interaction that, due largely to the development and adaptation of 
new technologies, is claimed to be revolutionising human behaviour and interaction 
as well as the understanding of natural phenomena. Equally, it is seen as part of a 
solution to many challenges such as environmental destruction and climate change.  
Despite the absence of a clear and uncontested definition of ‘network’ and 
‘networking’, it can be argued that there are a number of key elements at the heart of 
the terms. Firstly, networks focus on the links between nodes rather than the nodes 
alone. With respect to natural phenomena, this could be the electric flow between 
atoms or the impact of the introduction of an alien species into a biotope. With respect 
to human behaviour, this indicates a focus on human communication and interaction. 
In other words, rather than assessing a person’s position in a social network as a basis 
for analysis of agency, the focus now lies on how and in what form that person 
communicates with others. Secondly, ‘networking’ indicates a weakening of 
hierarchical, linear and vertical flows in favour of ad-hoc, spontaneous and horizontal 
influences. Thirdly, rather than relying on rigid and formal dynamics, networks are 
structures that are subject to constant change, modification and evolution. Not only do 
links emerge, change and disappear, but the very aim and purpose of a network (in the 
words of Manuel Castells the “programme” (Castells, 2009, p. 22)) is subject to 
permanent, although not necessarily steady, transformation.  
 
Human beings have always ‘networked’ (Kardushin, 2012), and stability and control 
has always been at the heart of human quest for greater knowledge. This is visible in 
the initial rejection of the scientific community as regards to the emergence of chaos 
and complexity theory (Gleick, 1998). However, just as the natural sciences have 
come to come to accept non-linearity as a fundamental dynamic of nature, so have the 
social sciences embraced complexity in human affairs. This is demonstrated by 
debates on topics such as risk (Beck, 2010) and liquidity in human affairs (Bauman, 
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2007). Manuel Castells makes a number of important observations of how human 
beings are adapting to inventions such as the Internet, mobile communication and 
satellite technology (Castells, 2000) (Castells, 2001) (Castells, 2009) (Castells, 2012). 
The impact of these technologies on human behaviour is what propelled networks to 
the heart of recent debate and analysis. This is not only because technology alters the 
methods of communication between nodes, but also because it renders the observation 
of communication, and of links between nodes, possible.  
 
Despite the on-going analysis of networks and the dynamics found within them, the 
focus of research has been almost exclusively placed on specific forms of behaviour 
that assume the desire for mutual gain through cooperation. In other words, 
‘networking’ is understood as a conscious activity by individuals who are interacting 
with each other for mutual benefit. This can be seen in particular in the political sector 
which, aided by modern communication technology, is subject to much deeper, 
efficient and spontaneous association (Kahler, 2009). 
 
However, the so-called ‘facebook revolutions’ in North Africa and the Levant 
highlight the weakness of this approach, since it fails to include involuntary and 
forced behaviour based on coercion and threat. Networking technology played a 
major role in the uprisings but, as Castells points out, this is insufficient to explain the 
course of the protests: the people who joined together to rise up in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, Syria and elsewhere, did not do so (and in the process risk their health and 
well-being) simply because they had read a communication about it on social media 
(Castells, 2012). Instead, violence played a major role in shaping behaviour: many of 
those who demonstrated against the existing regimes shared the long-held common 
sensation of suffering from injustice and impotence. What triggered the “Youm al-
Ghadab” – the “Days of Rage” was a sudden violent event of perceived injustice 
related to the regime. The self-immolation of the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in 
Tunisia, or the violent crackdown of state authorities on demonstrators, served as 
catalysts for changes within social networks. The shared grievance, suffering and 
threat of becoming a victim of violence brought people together because it provided a 
shared narrative and identity. In other words, it was not social networks or social 
network technology that caused the uprising, but the shared threat of violence. Social 
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networks are only the venue on which the creation of a shared identity and narrative 
takes place and where the programme of the network is shaped.  
 
The implication of this is that the study of networks must embrace not only 
cooperation under the assumption of mutual benefit, but also how shared threats, and 
especially ones of violence, shape those networks. This is especially important since 
violence is not only a common emotion capable of causing a negative reaction, but 
because it also fuels the feeling of community, group identity and shared experience - 
sensations that lie at the centre of networks. 
 
This type of analysis or study has particular implications in the field of international 
relations, where it can assist in an understanding of the dynamics of violence and 
conflicts. This chapter will pursue this by analysing the relationships between 
violence and war and, subsequently, violence and peace. Social networks are groups 
of human beings who share a narrative and identity which guides their actions, 
behaviour and beliefs. Since the world is a ‘network of networks’ (Christakis & 
Fowler, 2011), the relationship between different networks will also be analysed. 
States and its organs are specific kinds of networks; they are networks which tend to 
be hierarchical, rigid and clearly structured, differing from the loose, flexible and non-
hierarchical social networks found, for example, at the heart of the Arab Awakening. 
Often, when rigid structures become unable to adapt and engage with the demands 
they are facing, violence emerges. On the one hand, this violence aids in the creation 
of meaning, the feeling of community and shared narrative and identity, but on the 
other hand violence also hurts, destroys and rejects, triggering behaviour that is aimed 
at avoiding violence. This disintegrative violence hinders the likelihood of 
compromises being made to address the inherent conflicts, which are found in every 
network. Violence also tends to be corrosive and infectious and, especially in the 
context of international relations, causes negative effects such as large-scale migration 
movements, organised crime and destruction of infrastructure, livelihoods, agriculture 
and industry. ‘Peacebuilding’, ‘statebuilding’, ‘stability operations’ and ‘post-war 
reconstruction’ are just some of the terms used to describe international efforts aimed 
at mitigating these issues. In Lebanon and Afghanistan attempts to end violence 
produced quite different results. Following an analysis of this under the auspices of 
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network theory, recommendations will be offered as to how the negative effects of 
violence in international affairs can be minimised.  
 
 
2.	  War	  
 
Because violence is a central component of everyday human behaviour its presence 
and impact on societies, or social networks, is not surprising. Because of its often 
destructive and harmful impact on both individuals and their networks however, 
violence is tightly embedded into a narrative that determines when and how violence 
is to be used. There are instances where these narratives seem to be largely absent 
and, in such absence, violence, with the death and destruction it causes, dominates 
human affairs. The largely unrestricted and unmediated actuality of violence between 
human beings can be defined as war.  
 
The profoundly human activity of war is by nature confusing and difficult to both 
define and explain. In fact the word ‘war’ has its roots in the Old English ‘wyrre’ 
meaning ‘to bring into confusion’. Yet, when asking why someone is participating in 
combat, the answer that is presented is generally straightforward and simple. No more 
than a single sentence is needed to explain why they are not only permitted to kill 
other human beings and to destroy their livelihoods, but why this becomes the 
primary aim of all actions. Only in war is the taboo of taking another’s life, a taboo 
found in all social primates, suspended (Smith, 2007) and replaced by something that 
is difficult to describe. This difficulty arises because, to those who are not 
participating or sharing in the suspension, the situation appears illogical and morally 
wrong.  
 
For Thomas Hobbes, war is the outcome of the fact that all resources are finite in 
nature: 
“And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they 
cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to the End, […] 
endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another […] If one plant, sow, build, or 
possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come 
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prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the 
fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty.” (Hobbes, 1960, p. 184) 
Although most likely unintended, the most important word here is ‘united’: as much 
as war destroys, kills and maims it also works as a force that brings people together. 
This is true not only in circumstances of physical combat itself, but also in the more 
abstract form of a narrative. Human beings are social animals, and it is hardwired into 
their nature to form groups and societies for both pleasure and to aid the survival of 
the individual. What binds groups together is a shared narrative that can be based on a 
multitude of identities such as family ties, language, ceremonies and a shared history. 
The shared history of battles lost and won, of heroic deeds by individuals who died in 
the process of defending the group, of hardships that were endured together, are 
important dynamics which stand in stark contrast to the destruction that war brings. 
Every capital city in the world has places named after famous battles or military 
commanders, regardless how present people of the country perceive war today.  
 
So war has two duties: firstly, it provides for the attainment of resources and, 
secondly, it creates the narrative that underlies the identity of groups. Because both of 
these are of such great importance to human beings, war has evolved along with 
scientific developments: “We exploit science to make war because we are warlike 
creatures. If science did not exist, we would still be killing one another.” (Smith, 
2007, p. 29). Science has made war ever more destructive and on a larger scale (from 
the raids of hominoids that involved a dozen or so to the destructive power of nuclear 
weapons) and perhaps because of this a growing opposition to war – pacifism – 
emerged. Pacifism fits well with the concept of the enlightened creature, one who is 
able to self-reflect and to make conscious decisions undisturbed by emotion and 
dogma. One who is able to assess that war has become so dangerous, destructive and 
full of risk that it should no longer exist. Finite resources could be dealt with by trade 
and exchange, and history could be written by events that did not emerge out of 
violence.  
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2.1	  Peace	  
 
The difficulty of defining ‘war’ also emerges when trying to define its antonym - 
peace. If war is defined by the existence of violence, then even the most peaceful 
society would be considered to be ‘at war’ since its historiography, traditions, rituals 
and sporting events will most likely either include or directly refer to violence. 
Equally cumbersome would be the distinction between war and non-war where the 
latter is demarked as violence being present in the discourse but with a predominately 
non-destructive or harmful intent. In other words, the presence of, for example, 
boxing matches, military ceremonies or the teaching of the societies’ history in 
schools by reference to the past wars and battles it has fought, do not mean that this 
population is not at ‘peace’. Equally, the dissection of peace into ‘positive’ peace in 
which violence is entirely absent from the discourse and ‘negative’ peace where 
potential conflicts will likely cause further violence (Galtung, 1969, 1996), does not 
provide further insights into why human beings at times refer to the use of violence, 
and at other times do not.  
 
The use of violence is strongly dependent on the surrounding context to which the 
narrative is tied. This is demonstrated by the fact that even the most inhumane 
behaviour, such as the beheading of women, children and the elderly by groups such 
as the Islamic State (IS), is almost always accompanied by references to the necessity 
of the action due to interpretation of scripture. This example highlights the dual 
function of violence: IS justifies the actions of its members by referring to the group’s 
narrative, and equally so do those who commit violent acts indicate their affiliation to 
IS by their behaviour. The same act of violence is destructive, or disintegrative, for 
the victims, and constructive, or integrative for the perpetrators.  
 
Identities and narratives are not fixed entities, and are subject to constant change, 
emergence and disappearance. In particular, communication technology is breaking 
down many barriers to identity creation and maintenance, facilitating further these 
constant changes. In addition to the analogue social networks of the past, social 
networks now also exist in the digital realm in which time, space and singularity of 
character no longer apply. In earlier times an identity positioned an individual in her 
or his social network limited by time, space and the cost associated with maintaining 
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links. Now, the dynamics of identity are changing on a constant basis, and today the 
number of narratives and therefore linked networks are virtually infinite:  
“What matters most […] is to retain the ability to reshape ‘identity’ and the 
‘network’ the moment the need (or, indeed, a whim) to reshape them arises or 
is suspected to have arrived. The worry of their ancestors about their one-off 
identification is increasingly elbowed out by a worry about perpetual 
reidentification. Identities must be disposable; an unsatisfying or not-
sufficiently satisfying identity, or an identity betraying its advanced age, needs 
to be easy to abandon; perhaps biodegradability would be the ideal attribute of 
the identity most strongly desired nowadays.” (Bauman, 2010, p. 16) 
It is important to note that Bauman’s assessment only applies to settings in which 
existential threat is absent; similar to authors who focus on, for example, policy 
networks (Kahler, 2009).  
 
An alternative definition of war is the use of violence by individuals, who are 
sanctioned by the narrative of the society they associate themselves with, to pursue 
the aim of killing or destroying livelihoods of those who do not share that singular 
narrative. Peace, on the other hand, is when individuals belong to multiple identities 
and networks and are able to maintain multiple narratives. 
 
 
2.2	  Between	  war	  and	  peace	  
 
The discussion above shows that the perspective of the observer determines whether 
he or she sees ‘war’ or ‘peace’, similar to whether war is seen as a fundamental 
component of human behaviour, or a dynamic that only emerges when all other forms 
of human agency have broken down. Gray exemplifies the importance of violence in 
human affairs when he states: 
“[…] force and the threat of force have had a greater impact upon the many 
contexts for human behaviour than has any other source of influence.” (2007, 
p. 265) 
Most societies, states and groups refer to past battles, wars, victories and defeats in 
order to construct a history that can serve as a basis for the present. George Orwell 
expresses bluntly but ardently: “Who controls the past controls the future, and who 
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controls the present controls the past.” (1954, p. 199). I.e. any kind of power structure 
in a network will depend, either directly or indirectly, on coercion and dominance. It 
can be argued that ‘winners write history’, but the language used is one of violence 
and war. Even those societies that place the protection and wellbeing of the individual 
at their heart, teach a history in their schools that is shaped by battles, destruction and 
heroism.  
 
The most liberal and democratic States maintain militaries, celebrate wars that ended 
generations ago, and maintain ceremonies, uniforms and monuments that are 
distinctively military. The British Poppy Day Memorial, the annual Commemoration 
of the Gallipoli Attack in Australia or Bastille Day in France are events of great 
importance for many individuals. Yet most of these people would, when questioned, 
regard war and violence as out-dated and morally indefensible. “[M]ost conflicts are 
in effect bargaining situations” (Schelling, 1960, p. 5), an opinion echoed by 
Kalyvas: all actors are struggling to dominate the narrative, firstly to maintain the 
cohesion of their own identity, and secondly as a tool to evince concessions from 
adversaries. Far from being coherent, every leader of a faction will need to make 
concessions in order to maintain his own position, a task as complex as actual conflict 
with the adversary (Kalyvas, 2006). For example, Wilhelm II had to accept defeat and 
abdicate not because he was militarily defeated but because his troops refused to obey 
his orders. Castells would argue that the programme that determined Germany’s 
policies towards the end of the First World War had lost their strength and ability to 
create a narrative convincing enough for German soldiers to fight in the name of the 
Kaiser.  
 
Whether the ceremonies commemorate a battle won (such as the annual celebration of 
Russia’s victory over Nazi Germany on 9 May), or a crushing defeat (for example the 
Serbian defeat at the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389), they manifest important 
components of the narrative that maintains power relations within the social networks 
they are embedded in.  
 
This raises important considerations for the termination of violent conflicts, since it 
appears that victory or defeat are only secondary in a war: 
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“The idea that engagement with the enemy provides wartime leaders with 
accurate, predictive information about the relative capacity of the two 
belligerents for continued warfare needs to be modified. The idea that wars 
end when calculations based on wartime data reveal that the anticipated cost 
of continued war exceed the expected benefits is too simple. Yet wars do end.” 
(Rosen, 2005, p. 110) 
The role of the violence, fighting and suffering becomes secondary since the 
interpretation of events is far more potent a force than the events themselves. Reiter 
furthers this argument, stating: 
“[…] combat is a relatively ineffective means of hastening war termination 
[…]. The fog of war makes combat outcomes often quite ambiguous, 
impeding the process in which expectations might converge sufficiently to 
permit war termination.” (2009, pp. 220-221) 
However, the dictum that the character of war changes while its nature does not, 
remains valid. War always contains uncertainty, which is what motivated Clausewitz 
to compare war to “a game of cards" (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 86). War is destructive and 
“composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity[…] ; of the play of chance and 
probability[… ]; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, 
which makes it subject to reason alone.” (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 89).  
 
The dependency of war on interpretation, its complexity, uncertainty and absence of 
perfect information, the inability of establishing a clear winner and, finally, the 
reluctance of some societies to associate themselves with violence being fought in 
their name, means that the character of war is changing. War is no longer accepted as 
a natural and common human activity (Storr, 2009). Yet at the same time, there is a 
re-enchantment of war that is not necessarily based on development in biotechnology 
(Coker, 2004), but because war is so powerful a tool for group cohesion; identities 
and narratives are remarkably resilient against violence because they are shaped by it. 
In other words, it remains permissible for a society to base its narrative, ceremonies, 
identity and history on war and violence, yet it is no longer permissible to engage in 
the physical act of fighting itself.  
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2.3.	  An	  end	  to	  war?	  
 
The experience of the First and Second World Wars indicates the danger of seeking to 
maintain a system at all costs: the Treaty of Versailles was to provide security by 
solidifying a power structure that, even before the outbreak of global war, had proven 
to be under great stress. Rather than providing lasting stability, the Treaty in fact laid 
the foundation for Nazi Germany, a fascist state that exemplifies the extremes that 
narrative and identity can develop. Parallel to this, the evolution of weapons made the 
disintegrative effect of violence far stronger than ever before. Thirdly, trade, transport 
and communication led not only to a growing global interconnectivity, but also 
created further strains on identity and narratives, as exemplified in the anti-colonialist 
movement that emerged in parallel to the World Wars. 
 
The need for the establishment of a venue in which conflicts both within and between 
States could be addressed in a way that would minimise the corrosive use of violence, 
resulted in the establishment of the United Nations Charter. It had the explicit aim of 
preventing the destructive impact of war (Nations, 1945). Violence remained central 
as a tool of international relations but, in order to minimise its destabilising impact, 
the UN Chapters VI ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’ and VII ‘Actions with Respect to 
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’ (Nations) were 
established. However, these do not prevent States from pursuing foreign policies 
geared towards defending their national interests. For example, the three key factors 
of US foreign policy listed by former US Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, were: (i) protection of freedom and wellbeing of the US and its interests; 
(ii) global spread of democracy; and (iii) the prevention of violent expansions of 
power (Kirkpatrick, 2007). These factors show both the interest in change (global 
democratisation) and stability (preventing violent expansion of power).  
 
The end of the Cold War did not manifest an end to history as Fukuyama predicted – 
he argued that since ‘history’ was the description of past wars and battles, this was no 
longer necessary in a world where conflicts could now be solved by supply and 
demand (Fukuyama, 1992). The precise opposite was the case; with the end of the 
ideological division of the Cold War, identity and narratives did not fade away or 
decrease in importance, but instead emerge as the culprits for an increase in violence 
and turmoil: 
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“A post-ideological world stokes its frenzies in the flames of nationalism, 
ethnicity, and tribal triumphalism. Old injustices and older enmities are 
reviewed and intensified; history becomes a whip with which to flail those 
who are inclined to compromise. Few rules are observed in these wars, fewer 
still in the tenuous moments of peace that punctate them. The techniques of a 
calmer era, peacekeeping included, seem inadequate at the moment.” 
(Tharoor, 1996, pp. 213-214).  
With hindsight, the apparent volatile atmosphere of the Cold War turned out to be 
much more stable than it appeared; the ideological conflict between the superpowers 
provided a strong and reliable narrative that divided the world into ‘us versus them’. 
The underlying power structures lost their most important tool when this unifying 
dynamic disappeared. In most of the former Soviet Republics in Eastern Europe, 
Tharoor’s bleak assessment did not apply. For example, the people of Poland were 
able to develop a power structure based on national identity and narrative with hardly 
any utilisation of violence. In other places, for example in the Balkans, the 
disappearance of the unifying narrative caused a power struggle that quickly turned 
violent, forcing its people to associate with a single identity. Similarly to the Sherif’s 
experiment of boys at a summer camp (discussed below), the violence that emerged in 
former Yugoslavia appears to be incomprehensible to outsiders, yet to those who are 
involved or directly affected it dictates all their actions, behaviours and convictions.  
 
Violence emerged following the end of the Cold War not because there were unsolved 
conflicts, or because there was an absence of a venue able to support the development 
of compromise and cooperation, but because a struggle over meaning and identity 
emerged. To recall Coker: wars are fought either because of an existential threat, 
instrumental benefits, or because of the metaphysical ability of war to create the 
image of a shared destiny (Coker, 2004). The existing order in international relations 
was equipped to deal with the two former causes of war, but unable to deal with the 
complexities that emerged out of the latter. Some authors even argued that the violent 
conflicts that emerged after the end of the Cold War were a necessary evil in order to 
prevent instability emerging from a continuation of a vacuum of power (Luttwak, 
1999).  
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2.4	  Group	  identity	  and	  hostility	  	  
 
In his landmark 1957 experiment of group behaviour, Muzafer Sherif invited a 
number of schoolboys to a summer camp in Oklahoma. The boys all had a similar 
socioeconomic background and had also enjoyed an otherwise similar upbringing. 
Prior to arriving at the camp, the boys were split into two groups. Each group was 
kept separate, and each was unaware of the existence of the other. For one week the 
groups went camping and hiking, establishing social bonds and an esprit de corps. 
Afterwards, the councillors brought the two groups together in a series of 
competitions, involving baseball, touch football and tug-of-war. Although amicable at 
first, the relationship between the two groups quickly turned hostile; each accused the 
other of cheating, there was name calling and even stealing and burning of the rival 
group’s flag. Even social events such as a shared dinner did not improve the 
relationship between the groups, as insults were traded and paper and food were 
thrown at each other. In short, despite the similarity of the boys’ background, the 
comparability of their experience in the camp and the absence of a predisposition of 
animosity, the relationship between the two groups turned sour and even shared social 
events were unable to eradicate the animosity that had grown up between them 
(Sherif, 1956).  
 
This experiment indicates that group dynamics and the struggle over resources (in this 
case the victory of one group over the other in a competition) were enough to create a 
group identity that determined the behaviour of each member of one group towards 
the ‘other’. A number of other experiments have confirmed these findings (Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008).  
 
The existence of group dynamics may even be denied by group members in some 
situations, as the election of President Obama shows. There are clear indications that 
President Obama’s racial background, his name or suspected religious background, 
caused people who otherwise agreed with his policy proposals to not vote for him. 
When questioned about this, only a small number of people were willing to admit 
their true reasons for voting as they had (Glaser & Ryan, 2013). There are indications 
that the opinion of people in political matters are often more influenced by their group 
identity than their self-interest (Kinder, 1998) as, for example, the Tea Party 
movement in the US shows. Despite the fact that many of its members will benefit 
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from universal healthcare, they object to it because their group dismisses any policy 
forwarded by the Democratic Party and President Obama.  
 
This discussion demonstrates that group identity is very powerful as a tool for a group 
to manipulate its members, standing against the assumption that individuals possess 
free will and act on a rational basis. The behaviour of the boys at the summer camp 
does not make sense to an observer who does not share the same group identity as the 
boys, but it is safe to assume that most of the boys involved will not agree. Instead, 
they will be willing to risk their health and well-being, and accept the possibility of 
getting hurt in the enmities between the groups, above their self-interest as 
individuals. This is similar to the political ideology and actions pursued by 
individuals; rather than assessing their own interests and acting accordingly, they base 
their behaviour on that of the group they perceive to be part of. When applied to war 
this means: 
“The individual is a volitional being, whose cognition is free to use and direct; 
and in group activity such as a battle, each individual must contribute his 
thought and effort – even if only by accepting the orders of others. 
Metaphysically, such concerted action is always voluntary- that is, it requires 
the compliance of the individual. War arises when individuals decide to 
aggress or defend values in a group endeavour, either by joining up or by 
delegating others to fight. The group does not decide, for groups do not think 
or act – action and thoughts always pertain to individuals.” (Moseley, 2002, p. 
39) 
Therefore, war is a social phenomenon and has to be understood as such. Hostility 
and enmity always exist but, as Sherif’s study (1956) has shown, often appear 
nonsensical to those who are not immediately associated with the parties involved. 
Additionally, whilst such an individual may not feel associated to any of the parties 
involved, the violence in the conflict also negatively affects them as a mere observer.  
 
 
2.5	  Outsiders	  and	  third	  parties	  
 
These ‘outsiders’ to conflicts are often not able to protect themselves from the 
harmful effects hostility and violence between others can have on their life. Social 
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networks, as power relationships, mean that those who use violence are able to 
dominate others (Castells, 2006), but violence has harmful effects beyond the 
immediate incident. For example, supply chains become interrupted increasing 
competition over resources, individuals feel less secure leading to growing demands 
for weaponry and protection, and criminal behaviour such as robberies, theft and rape 
become more common since rewards appear to increase whilst the risk of punishment 
falls. Violence is contagious and its effects are very difficult to predict and isolate. 
For example, the civil war in Syria is creating major challenges in neighbouring 
Lebanon: people fleeing the violence are hoping for shelter, food and support. 
Smuggling goods, information and individuals in and out of Syria challenges 
Lebanon’s authorities, and violent confrontation between hostile groups can easily 
rekindle even outside of Syria. Often, these different groups refer to religion since one 
of the main foundations of monotheistic religions is their ability to provide an equal 
approach to the entire human existence: there is a beginning, then a period of human 
life, generally associated with suffering and hardship, followed by paradise. This 
pattern applies the course of human life to the entirety of mankind in order to try to 
explain the existence of the individual by referring to the entire group. This is not the 
origin of linearity as the underlying pattern, but instead shows the need for meaning in 
human existence (Halpern, 2000).  
 
Once conflicts can no longer be addressed in a non-violent manner that allows for 
compromise, then multiple identities are increasingly difficult to maintain. For 
example, the boys at the summer camp were unable to share an identity that would 
associate them with members of the other group such as the support of a sports team, 
a shared hobby, social class or religion. The ability of the boys to bridge the gap 
between the two groups is much lesser compared to that of an individual who does not 
associate him or herself with one of the two groups. In other words, the ‘outside 
actors’ are much more able to change the programme – to ‘re-programme the 
network’. As Castells argues:  
“Yet, once set and programmed, networks follow the instructions inscribed in 
their operating system, and become capable of self configuring within the 
parameters of their assigned goals and procedures. To alter the outcomes of 
the network, a new program (a set of goal-oriented, compatible codes) needs 
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to be installed in the network – from outside the network.” (Castells, 2009, p. 
20) 
Yet the separation into ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ appears to be blurred; a violent 
conflict can have negative effects far beyond those people it immediately impacts. For 
example, the civil war in Eastern Ukraine may be fuelled by a conflict over whether 
the population prefers to be associated with Moscow or Kiev, but the ripple effects of 
this violent conflict can affect apparently unconnected issues such as the security of 
civilian air travel, the transport of fossil fuels or the negative impact of economic 
warfare such as sanctions on agricultural products. Castells is correct in the sense that 
those who are at the centre of a violent conflict are less able to alter their behaviour, 
but at the same time it is strongly in the interests of those outside the immediate 
conflict to intervene with the aim of reducing the negative impacts of violence felt 
outside the relevant network. 
 
 
2.6	  Programming	  networks	  and	  violence	  
 
Once violence emerges as the programme of the network, it will become self-
perpetuating since it becomes the dominant tool and component to manage power 
relations at the expense of other forms of communication. As discussed above, this 
makes it very difficult for those on the inside to alter the programme and replace 
violence as the dominating form of communication in the network.  
 
For example, in Sherif’s experiment (1956) members of the two hostile groups of 
boys would have risked being branded as traitors if they argued against the group’s 
narrative based on its hostility towards the other group. All power relations both 
within and between the two groups of boys will be built on the conflict between the 
two. Alternative programming could only have come from the outside from, for 
example, the supervisors, councillors or from boys who were not part of either group. 
What Moseley calls ‘cultural and traditional ideas’ is nothing but a different word for 
programme or narrative: 
“What is required for peace is a combination of changes in man’s liminal and 
explicit thinking regarding the metaphysical status of his own choice: man is 
free to choose; therefore he is free to choose war. But he is also “free” to 
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renounce his freedom and to offer his body to others to determine his fate. 
However, since much of the reason for war is generated by a thoughtless or 
unthinking acceptance of cultural and traditional ideas – which often denounce 
man’s ability to choose, peace is best secured by dissemination of a pro-reason 
(critically rational) mindset and the evolution and development of the 
alternative culture of the market system, in which the use of physical force is 
renounced in favor of voluntary contracts.” (Moseley, 2002, p. 40) 
Stathis Kalyvas follows this argument and argues that violence in civil wars cannot be 
explained by simple reference to an existing grievance since this would imply that 
man had no choice but to continuously fight (Kalyvas, 2006).  
 
Combining Kalyvas’ argument with the programming of networks advocated by 
Castells, the role of the underlying narrative emerges clearly: if a network’s identity 
becomes shaped by the hostility towards another group, the interactions between 
those two networks will be bellicose. This emotion can then be exploited by specific 
individuals within a group who are interested in increasing their personal power 
within their network. The more hostile and threatening an atmosphere exists, the 
easier the exploitation of the conflict becomes.  
 
 
3.	  The	  changing	  role	  of	  violence	  in	  international	  relations	  
 
War and violence have strongly influenced the study of international relations and of 
history, but their role is subject to constant change. Following the Napoleonic Wars, 
Clausewitz could write: “War is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by 
bloodshed” (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 100), but the destruction brought by ever more 
cataclysmic weapons and strategies, and the growing negative global repercussions 
war and violence anywhere on the planet can have, has evolved greatly. Throughout 
history inventors and scientists, such as Alfred Nobel or J. Robert Oppenheimer, 
assumed that their inventions had, intentionally or unintentionally, such a potential for 
destruction that they made war impossible (Ellis, 1975).  
 
However, growing technological developments have not created an end to war; 
instead, some of the most savage and inhumane violent conflicts depended on newly 
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developed technology for their destructive abilities. The Nazi regime depended on a 
highly developed communications infrastructure to maintain control of its own people 
and of its enemies. Instead of relying on technology and human progress and 
development to bring an end to the catastrophes caused by war, a venue that would 
allow conflicts between states to be approached in non-violent manners had to be 
created. The unprecedented destruction caused by the Second World War in particular 
demanded drastic action: “the clashes between major interests that cause bloodshed” 
were threatening to become too costly for the survival of mankind, and the only 
apparent solution was to outlaw the use of violence. The United Nations Charter was 
drafted with the explicit preamble “to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war” (Nations, 1945). A body was needed that could maintain peace and alleviate 
human suffering.  
 
During the Cold War, the decision to outlaw the use of violence as a tool in 
international relations (which was enshrined in the UN Charter) was largely ignored 
by the ‘superpowers’. For example, the war in Vietnam was never declared by the 
United States, and it was not the UN but the US Congress which was considered to be 
the ultimate authority in deciding on the armed intervention in sovereign Vietnam. 
Similarly, the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 was not subject to a UN 
declaration but unilateral actions emanating from Moscow. Similarly, these two 
superpowers were not reluctant to support the use of violence by governments even 
against their own people, when they perceived this to be in their interests, or would 
(as in Vietnam or Afghanistan) support armed factions in sovereign States that fought 
against their ideological rival. Proxy-interventions were justified since they increased 
the national security of one actor by binding the military forces of the other 
(Loveman, 2002).  
 
 
3.1	  States	  and	  violence	  
 
Only after the end of the Cold War did the debate on the role of violence, and with it 
the centrality of States in the international sphere, re-emerge. The disappearance of 
the ‘superpower conflict’ created an international system in which the reasons for 
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States to go to war against each other had dwindled, but now it was intrastate conflicts 
that came to present the greatest challenge to human beings.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the destruction of the two World Wars, the intense global 
instability and arms race of the Cold War, and the genocide that followed, States 
maintained armed forces, both military to counter threats from the outside, and police 
to deal with internal domestic unrest. This decision of a State as to whether or not to 
use violence is much less the choice of individuals or governments, but a component 
of the international system: 
“When states are challenged in their power, they respond according to their 
institutional rules, be they democratic, dictatorial, or a mix of both. When they 
fail to integrate the demands or projects of their challengers without 
jeopardizing the fundamentals of the power relationships they embody, they 
resort to their ultimate essence: their monopoly of violence in their sphere of 
action. Their willingness to use extreme violence depends on the extent of 
their legitimacy, the intensity of the challenges they have to face, and their 
operational and social capacity to use violence. When movements are 
determined enough to keep up their relentless pressure on the state regardless 
of the violence they endure, and the state resorts to extreme violence (tanks 
against unarmed demonstrators), the outcome of the conflict depends on the 
interplay between political interests in the country and geopolitical interests 
related to the country. (Castells, 2012, p. 97) 
By referring to the monopoly of violence, Castells equally sees the State at the centre 
of his analysis of the wave of political turmoil that emerged in North Africa in 2011 
and became known as the ‘Arab Awakening’. Yet where they had been successful in 
overthrowing the old regimes, the new governments may have, at least theoretically, 
gained control of the monopoly of violence. But this did not mean much. More 
pressing issues such as unemployment, the fight against corruption, inequality and 
high and rising costs of living remained the most destabilising forces – all of which 
largely exist outside the control of a State.  
 
Lu compares the shift in the role of violence and State sovereignty to the domestic 
violence. Traditionally, the use of force within intimate relationships and as a 
component of the education of children was perceived to be acceptable because it 
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took place within the family, a body that was legally regarded as a private realm. 
Today this has changed - social and legal regulations establish boundaries of 
acceptable behaviour both inside and outside the family. The same is the case with 
State sovereignty; the concept of sovereignty no longer protects those who commit 
atrocities against their own people (Lu, 2006). This analogy may serve well in theory, 
but the practical implications are less clear: just as domestic violence has not been 
eradicated by laws that now threaten to prosecute those who use violence within their 
family, so has violence not been eradicated by a change in global attitudes. Violence, 
as shown earlier, is too central a component of human behaviour to be capable of 
removal. Precisely because domestic violence could not be eradicated, laws and a 
legal structure aimed at enforcing the ban on violence was needed. States continue to 
arms themselves even in the absence of a clear and distinguished enemy, and they 
continue to try and maintain their social cohesion by reference to past battles, 
skirmishes, military deeds and tales of heroism and gallantry of its people.  
 
 
3.2	  Nationalism	  as	  a	  programme	  
 
States are a product of human social actions aimed at creating a structure that 
provides the needs of the people who share a same interpretative understanding 
(Weber, 1946). Yet States are too rigid a system to be able to accommodate the 
constant changes that emerge from within and without. As Ernest Gellner describes, 
unpredictable changes in the climate, environment, economic development and social 
events cause an unceasing movement of people and ideas. A good example is of a city 
where wages and living standards rise and, in this way, an influx of people from the 
poorer rural areas to the city takes place, each in search of a better life. However, 
because in the city they are clearly identifiable as foreigners they are discriminated 
against and grow frustrated; they return to their rural origins where they then declare 
that the differences between them and the people of the city are so great that they 
claim nationalism and demand a state of their own (Gellner, 1983). If the city, or in 
other words State, resists this then an intense pressure is placed on the structure, 
regardless of which kind of identity the state was initially based on, be it language, 
religion, ethnicity or mythic origin. This emergence of an opponent who defines itself 
along a specific identity will force the other society to do the same. This results in the 
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emergence of different networks that are defined by differences in the underlying 
programme, but they nevertheless coexist and share a number of connections. This is 
comparable to dense clusters of sub-networks in a universe of networks. “People 
belonging to different ethnic groups cooperate nearly all the time” (Laitin, 2007, p. 
11), because as long as they are able to communicate in ways that are non-violent 
they can address their challenges and needs for mutual benefit.  
 
However, when economic, environmental or social stresses emerge and the existing 
programme is unable to embrace these challenges, then strains on the power structures 
of both networks will emerge. This means that States are under constant pressure to 
bolster the unifying narrative in order to maintain the power structure within the 
network they assemble. If States fail to satisfy the needs of the people, its power 
structure that is embedded within the unifying narrative becomes increasingly more 
difficult and costly to maintain. A seemingly minor act such as the demonstration by 
fishermen against a conglomerate can cause the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, 
or the anti-governmental graffiti of young boys can lead to Syria descending into a 
vicious war. To repeatedly quote Castells:  
“When [the state] fail to integrate the demands or projects of their challengers 
without jeopardizing the fundamentals of the power relationship they embody, 
they resort to their ultimate essence: their monopoly of violence in their sphere 
of action.” (Castells, 2012, p. 97) 
The importance of a shared narrative in providing a programme to the network of 
individual nodes it assembles is also visible in cases where a disappearance of the 
State’s identity forces the power structure to fade. For example, the Ottoman Empire, 
after hundreds of years, dissolved remarkably quickly following the First World War. 
Since the State’s narrative is only one identity of many that existed within the 
Ottoman Empire, its subjects were able to switch to others which could provide them 
with goods and services necessary for their survival, social contact, meaning and 
sense of belonging.  
 
 	   	  
	   214	  
3.3	  Stability	  and	  security	  
 
Even those forms of political organisation that are arguably more flexible and 
inclusive are not immune to this, as the independence movements in Scotland or 
Andalucía show. The weakness of the democracies in the world to advertise their 
form of society lies in the parallel existence of laissez-faire capitalism, since at the 
heart of social democracy is security that in free-market capitalism does not exist 
(Elliott & Atkinson, 1998). The conjunction of these two ideologies creates winners 
and losers, a fact that is obvious to outside observers more than to those elites that 
dominate social democracies and can be considered to be the winners. This is not 
dissimilar to dictatorial or absolute regime in which those who are winners and losers 
are clearly visible. The assumption of many with social democratic backgrounds who 
observe political upheaval, as for example in Egypt or Syria since 2011, and see a 
motivation for the establishment of democratic structures is thus flawed. What 
motivates people to rise up against the status quo is less found in abstract political 
ideologies and more in the desire to no longer be one of the ‘losers’. In the words of 
Castells’ network theory, the desire to change the programme of a network is not 
caused by a defined and elaborated alternative to replace the existing, but instead 
because the prevailing programme is no longer perceived as able to address the 
challenges faced by the nodes that make up its network. 
 
The often-made mistake of the international community is to equate ‘stability’ with 
‘security’; the present may not be perfect, but it is to be preferred to everything due to 
it being perceived as being stable and, thus, secure. There are plenty of examples of 
this in history, but most famously Franklin Roosevelt is alleged to have said about 
Nicaragua’s dictator: “Somoza may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch” 
(quoted in Cavendish, 2011). Similarly, the US government continued to support the 
Egyptian President Mubarak even after having earlier announced the US’ support for 
democratic reforms. Equally, the former Iraqi President al-Maliki continued to receive 
support from the former members of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ despite having 
shown that his rule based on ethnic division, corruption and nepotism was neither 
liberal nor democratic. Contrary to the assumption that stability and the maintenance 
of the status quo are beneficial and positive at all times, power structures that prove to 
be too rigid and too unable to address challenges and to embrace change are likely to 
break down. 
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Following the atrocities of the Second World War, States became concerned with how 
they could heighten domestic and international support for their foreign policy. Rather 
than pursuing rhetorics of aggression and war, they sought to use language aimed at 
creating a positive emotion. Words such as ‘stability’, ‘peace’ and ‘protection’ 
became central to the discourse (James, 1969).  
The result of this is that almost all foreign interventions have become enveloped into 
a language that relies on creating positive emotions, a process that has continued to 
the present. For example, the Russian military actions in the Chechnya since the 
1990s or the US led intervention in Iraq in 2003 are described by the pursuers as 
‘peacebuilding’, a description which is fiercely contested by those who doubt the 
motives and activities of the occupying forces (MacQueen, 2006). 
 
Many States then, or international State-centric actors such as the UN or NATO, 
engage anywhere in the world by focussing on stabilising the status quo. This results 
in strategies that are often aimed at producing outcomes in which the actual causes for 
violence are secondary to the interests of the actors. This is firstly caused by self-
interest that is geared towards preventing or minimising the negative effects that the 
spread of violence, and the associated instability, may have on their interests. 
Secondly, there is also the limitation these networks experience due to their own 
programming that may limit the resources and tactics that can be deployed. This 
pattern of behaviour is not only found in the political sector but also elsewhere. The 
global reaction to the financial turmoil that emerged following the subprime mortgage 
crisis in the US in 2007, clearly showed most surreptitiously how the rules of free-
market capitalism were halted in order to prevent structural reform. Maintaining the 
current system is perceived as maintaining security, least from the unknown that may 
emerge instead of the present system.  
 
By extending the reasoning that the maintenance of the status quo ‘equates to 
stability’, and subsequently security, to what is generally referred to as ‘peacebuilding 
‘, the sporadic success of the latter (Miller, 2005) can be observed. For most people 
who live in a network in which the status quo is not desirable, the motivation of 
outside actors to maintain an order is inherently unattractive. For example, the 
population in Afghanistan do not associate the presence of the US military in the 
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country with security, but with the attempt to maintain an existing state of affairs – 
the power structure - which for most people in the country is not regarded as 
satisfactory or desirable to maintain. They simply do not share the narrative needed in 
order for the power structure within the network to continue to exist.  
 
 
4.	  Peacebuilding	  
 
In the absence of an agreed and precise definition of ‘peacebuilding’ (Berdal, 2009), it 
can be described as the strategy to employ third actors to interfere in a violent conflict 
with the aim of replacing armed confrontations with a peaceful system that allows the 
local populations to address conflicts in a non-violent manner (James, 1969). This 
approach is pursued by a wide range of actors including NGOs, civilian actors, the 
business community, intergovernmental actors and states, all using tools such as 
military force, education, training, disaster and poverty relieve and venues to 
exchange information and to use as platforms of cooperation (M. Newman, 2009). 
Similarly worded is ‘statebuilding’, where State-led actors follow a narrower strategy 
focused on the installation and functioning of State organs such as domestic political 
bodies, the judiciary, security forces and a bureaucracy able to provide healthcare, 
education and infrastructure services such as roads and communication. Statebuilding 
is largely led and managed by States but can involve actors such NGOs, private 
enterprises, academics and military units, often working as together as teams on 
individual projects. Both approaches share the goal of ending hostilities, alleviating 
human suffering and preventing the further spread of the instability and suffering 
brought by violence.  
 
Especially since the end of the Cold War, the number and scope of these kinds of 
operations had increased. Despite “their decidedly uneven record of achievement” 
(Berdal, 2009, p. 15), this trend has continued to increase, bringing it into the centre 
of international relations.  
“Indeed, if anything, interests in the subject – whether it is measured in terms 
of new missions or of the institutional provisions increasingly made for ‘post-
conflict’, ‘peacebuilding’ or ‘stability’ operations within the decision-making 
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machinery of states and international organisations and among armed forces – 
has intensified since 2003.” (Berdal, 2009, p. 15) 
In places such as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Chechnya, Lebanon, 
Afghanistan and elsewhere, violent conflicts erupted. None of these conflicts seem to 
share much in the way of a cause of contention, the actors involved, their strategies 
and behaviour or the impact they had on their regional environment and the global 
sphere. Yet all of these conflicts had an impact that could be felt at various places and 
in varying degrees. Violence changes the programme of a network that in itself is a 
sub-network in a network of networks. The negative impact was, for example, sudden 
mass migration of people fleeing the violence causing strain on the networks they 
found refuge at, as was the case with Palestinians fleeing into Lebanon following their 
expulsion out of Jordan in 1971. Similarly, the Civil War in Somalia is endangering 
the international shipping routes off its coast. In the case of Afghanistan, a global 
terrorist organisation could claim, through bribery and reference to a shared ideology, 
a base to organise the attacks of 9/11.  
 
Miller makes a sound case for why moral considerations cannot be ignored in regards 
to humanitarian intervention, since policy makers will feel under pressure by their 
constituents to act in order to alleviate suffering. This can lead to situations in which 
foreign policy is not made under the auspices of national interest or relations with 
allies, but instead on the basis of domestic opinion (Miller, 2005). In contrast to the 
ideological constraints of the Cold War, it was now domestic considerations that, for 
example, limited the effectiveness of UN peacebuilding mandates. The governments 
of member states were highly reluctant to risk getting involved for fear of harm to 
their soldiers, and subsequently their domestic position. On the basis that often there 
was no peace to keep, even the supposedly neutral parties were drawn into a violent 
conflict (Tharoor, 1996). However, even if this is the case, the criticism of 
humanitarian intervention being nothing but the violation of a State’s sovereignty by 
other name, remains. Aiming to soften the claim that humanitarian intervention was 
just an excuse for an armed intervention in the sovereign sphere of a State on a far 
less altruistic motivation, “The key question was: Should the international community 
move toward the development of collective mechanisms for responding to large scale 
suffering within states?” (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1996, p. 79).  
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At various times different actors had tried to improve the success rate of these 
endeavors: For example the publication of An Agenda for Peace by UN secretary 
Boutros Boutros-Gali in 1992 (Boutros-Ghali, 1995) is as much an indicator of the 
changes taking place within the UN and the international community following the 
end of the Cold War, as a result of an inability to end violent and destructive conflicts 
(M. Newman, 2009). Boutros-Gali recommend the widening of the concept of 
peacebuilding from the mere focus on managing military actions, to include the 
transformation of violent conflicts by rebuilding civil society, institutions, the 
economy and facilitates reconciliation. While Boutros-Gali’s approach manifested an 
important widening of the scope of peacebuilding operations, it proved to be largely 
incapable of success.  
 
Another attempt was the “Comprehensive Approach” (CA) to statebuilding that 
emerged within NATO in 2004. It also acknowledges the inability of military actors 
alone to control or end local violence and highlights the complexity of peace and 
statebuilding operations. Rather than comprising a strict set of rules, the CA was seen 
as an attempt to increase the success of this kind of operation by increasing 
cooperation and coordination between the multitudes of different actors involved 
(Williams, 2011).  
 
Even the US military approached the topic of counterinsurgencies (COIN) via a very 
similar language and strategy. Due to the expectation of becoming involved in 
combat, it is argued that COIN operations differ from peacebuilding (Petraeus & 
Amos, 2006), but its major argument is that:  
“Military efforts are necessary and important to counterinsurgency (COIN) 
efforts, but they are only effective when integrated into a comprehensive 
strategy employing all instruments of national power.” (Petraeus & Amos, 
2006 p. 43) 
Underlying this repeated call for deeper integration is the assumption that the 
cooperation and coordination of all actors involved would make the termination of a 
violent conflict possible.  
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4.1	  A	  Castellian	  critique	  of	  peacebuilding	  
 
According to Castells, ‘network society’ “originated in the historical coincidence […] 
of three independent processes: the information technology revolution; the economic 
crisis of both capitalism and statism, and their subsequent restructuring; and the 
blooming of cultural social movements, such as libertarianism, human rights, 
feminism, and environmentalism” (Castells, 2010a, p. 372). This on-going process 
has emerged in the public discourse only recently, but its roots are much older which 
allows his insight to be applied to past events.  
 
As indicated by the growing trend of identity-based, highly flexible, social 
movements replacing rigid power structures with the aim of addressing the needs of 
nodes that share a common narrative: 
“The relative importance of a node does not stem from its specific features but 
from its ability to contribute to the network’s effectiveness in achieving its 
goals, as defined by the values and interests programmed into the networks.” 
(Castells, 2009, p. 20) 
‘Programmed’ refers to the underlying narrative of the network:  
“A network is defined by the program that assigns the network its goals and its 
rules of performance.“ (Castells, 2009, p. 20) 
Narratives, or Castells’ wording ‘programmes’, are what maintain the links that 
function as the venue for communication between nodes of a network. The 
programme determines what the aim of the network is (for example, the support of a 
sports club) and how this is going to be achieved – the form of communication, norms 
of behaviour and the shared interest in the network’s aim: 
“In sum: in the network society, the battle of images and frames, at the source 
of the battle for minds and souls, takes place in multimedia communication 
networks. These networks are programmed by the power relationships 
embedded within the networks […]. Therefore, the process of social change 
requires the reprogramming of the communication networks in terms of their 
cultural codes and in terms of the implicit social and political values and 
interests that they convey.” (Castells, 2009, p. 302)  
If, for example, one of the nodes of the network of sports club supporters is also 
linked to a political party, he could try to increase his power by gaining the support of 
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the club supporters who would operate along a different programming of their 
network.  
 
This kind of social network is subject to constant change through the emergence and 
dissolution of links between nodes, as well as changing relational capacities of power 
of the nodes. A further important element of networks is their borderless-ness: 
“[N]etworks do not have fixed boundaries; they are open-ended and 
multiedged, and their expansion or contraction depends on the compatibility or 
competition between the interests and values programmed into each network 
and the interests and values programmed into the networks they come into 
contact with in their expansionary movement.” (Castells, 2009, p. 19) 
Since increasingly faster and easier communication allows not only for more social 
intercourse, but also provides the means, especially via the internet (Howard, 2011), 
for the creation of links that are unaffected by the traditional ‘analogue’ limits on time 
and space.  
 
While a rigid structure is tightly controlled by a power hierarchy, these complex 
networks are constantly changing and adapting to their environment which makes 
controlling them nearly impossible: 
“Law of requisite complexity: “This ‘law’ states that in order to fully 
regulate/control a system, the complexity of the controller has to be at least as 
great as the complexity of the system that has to be controlled. To put it in 
even simpler terms, only complexity can control complexity. An obvious 
corollary is that if the gap is too large, you’re going to have trouble. And in 
the world of politics, ‘trouble’ is often spelled r-e-v-o-l-u-t-i-o-n.” (Casti, 
2012, p. 12) 
This equally underscores the inability to predict the behaviour of complex networks. 
Due to their human agency they do not necessarily act in a linear or rational manner 
in any given situation. Additionally, the emergence of random events to which 
reactions and impact cannot be predicted further complicates this.  
 
While Castells mentions anger as one of the most powerful emotions that shapes 
behaviour, he also touches on the role of violence and threats in social networks: 
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“[P]olitical violence is a form of communication by acting on the minds of 
people through images of death to instill fear and intimidation. [V]iolence and 
the threat of violence always combine, at least in the contemporary context, 
with the construction of meaning in the production and reproduction of power 
relationships in all domains of social life.  
 (Castells, 2009, p. 436) 
Castells approaches violence in a perspective that is limited to its disintegrative 
dynamic of destruction and suffering, but the ‘construction of meaning’ already 
indicates that violence also has integrative abilities. Since the programming 
determines the goals and rules of performance of a network, it also installs which 
forms of communication the nodes within the network use. This is not limited to 
spoken or written language but contains all forms of human expressions, including the 
ability to threaten or commit violent acts.  
 
 
4.2	  Lebanon	  
 
This became visible in the Lebanese civil war when the rigid political system turned 
out to be unable to deal with stresses that were placed on it by growing urbanisation, 
economic stress and regional political developments. The mysterious shooting of a 
former mayor in Sidon led to the sudden eruption of violence in which social 
networks that had, before the war, interacted through predominately non-violent 
means of communication, all of a sudden turned against each other. Armed men 
required support and supplies and relied on their social networks to provide these, 
causing the rapid replacement of non-violent communication with violence.  
 
Over the next fifteen years, groups were founded and abolished, alliances announced 
and rejected and a multitude of domestic and foreign actors became involved in the 
violence of the war. Observers struggle to describe the course of the war in a linear 
fashion (Khalaf, 2002; O'Ballance, 1998; Traboulsi, 2007) and often point to either 
domestic sectarianism (Gilmour, 1983) or to foreign interference and regional 
instability as cause for the war (Deeb, 2003; Picard, 2002).  
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Network theory as presented by Castells provides a more credible analysis: The rigid 
and slow-moving Lebanese political system had firmly established itself following 
independence. When challenges such as rapid urbanisation, growing unemployment, 
regional instability and demands for a greater distribution of wealth, resources and 
influence emerged, the political system appeared to be unable to address these issues. 
Suddenly, a minor incident was enough to cause a rapid reprogramming. Non-violent 
communication based on spoken language had proven to be ineffectual, so violence 
emerged instead, rapidly spreading and engulfing the country in its wake. The causes 
for the conflict became secondary, since the dynamics of violence in Lebanon 
profoundly altered the narrative of social networks demanding people to choose a 
single, steady and absolute identity, contrary to the multiple identities that exist 
outside situations of existential threat.  
 
There is no senseless violence. Instead, it served as a tool for those who had relative 
power to placate an existential threat that existed outside of the network. This allowed 
them to create a narrative able to maximise and solidify their position of influence. 
The protracted course of the Lebanese civil war with its combatants adhering to a 
multitude of different narratives shows that identities were altered depending on 
whether alliances were deemed to be successful or not. In other words, once violence 
had emerged in the struggle to re-programme the network centred on Lebanon, it had 
come to dominate the discourse, causing widespread suffering and destruction. 
 
Conversely, what was then needed for violence to gradually decline was a 
reprogramming of the network. A number of authors proffer different factors as 
causes for the outbreak of the civil war, yet none of these multitude of factors was 
addressed either by peacebuilding operations from the outside, or by the fighting 
inside the country. The hypothesis presented here is that during the fifteen years of the 
Lebanese civil war, the fighting had taken place not everywhere with the same 
intensity at all times, but that violence had increased and decreased in different 
theatres. In areas with a low intensity of violence, individual nodes would be able to 
maintain more than one identity. The more different identities a node possesses, the 
less likely it is that he or she will need the metaphysical integrative use of violence. 
To express it in different terms, the more a node could rely on different identities, the 
easier cooperation and communication became, lessening the dependence on violence. 
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From these ‘islands’, links would emerge based on mutual benefit. Growing slowly 
and unevenly this allowed those who had initially benefitted from violence to alter 
their group’s identity in conflicts, allowing hostilities to be engaged with in a non-
violent fashion.  
 
The end of the Lebanese civil war does not mean that there will be no more violence, 
and that fighting as was seen then cannot again break out again. The strength of this 
system is its flexibility and, in the absence of a rigid structure, the ability to adapt and 
alter the shape, purpose and programming of the social networks able to provide 
meaning and the goods and services necessary for the survival of its people. Instead of 
a rigid and formal ‘peace’ forced on the people without addressing their needs, it is 
the flexibility and adaptability of network dynamics that maintain a condition that 
neither fits into traditional definitions of war nor peace. In a complex network, fixed 
end states do not exist; rather there is a constant flow (Bauman, 2007), and it is this 
dynamic adaptive nature that is the strength of the hypothesis presented.  
 
 
4.3	  Afghanistan	  
 
In contrast to the Lebanese experience, Afghanistan has been unable to break out of 
the violence which engulfs it. However, the assumption that Afghanistan is by 
definition destined to be subject to continuous and atrocious violence is flawed, and 
the flaws become apparent when trying to isolate the explanations. Similarly to as in 
Lebanon, an often referred to national, in this case ‘Afghan’, identity exists (B. R. 
Rubin, 2013). Yet identification with this identity does not provide an indication of 
the programming of this network or, in Castells’ words, “the purpose and its goals and 
its rules of performance.“ (Castells, 2009, p. 20). 
 
The harsh realities and the often existential threats and dangers that the people in 
Afghanistan are facing is having a major impact on their social networks. Even areas 
that are not subject to immediate fighting display enormous rates of poverty and other 
substantial threats due to a multitude of factors which are mostly out of control of the 
people (Berg Harpviken, 2009). The complexity of the situation is indicated by the 
powerpoint slide that General Petraeus was presented. It provides a snapshot 
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highlighting the multitude of actors, strategies and interests that exist in the country 
but does not present much of a unifying narrative, besides the fact that violence plays 
a major role. Violence connects the domestic audience of the NATO member states to 
Afghanistan, violence determines the reputation and influence of an individual 
(especially poor young men in the rural areas (Kilcullen, 2009)), and violence 
provides the base for the zero-sum game that dominates the political process of the 
country in which the gain of one actor is assumed to unavoidably indicate the loss of 
all others. For example, NATO regards that the Afghan national government has been 
elected and, in this way, gained exclusive legitimacy, a perception that NATO is 
willing to defend with its armed forces.  
 
Yet military operations today are becoming wicked problems, leading to the inability 
of the military to cope with the demands it is being faced with. Militaries around the 
world are trying to adapt themselves to the constant changing realities of the network 
society (Schmidtchen, 2006), but only with moderate success, as demonstrated by the 
situation in Afghanistan. Despite the growing role of technology and ICT, war is and 
remains a very human endeavour and will continue to do so. Human beings have 
always been the weakest actor in the chain, since contrary to machines they require 
identities to guide their actions (Storr, 2009). 
 
Afghanistan has not, in contrast to Lebanon, been able to benefit from a 
reprogramming of the network which is capable of ending the violence in the country. 
This is primarily because the discourse is almost entirely dominated by violence, 
leaving no room for reprogramming. Instead of the further and deeper coordination 
that it demanded efforts to end the violence in the country cannot be successful as 
long a hierarchic methods are applied to the complex adaptive network centred on the 
country. 
 
 
5.	  Conclusion	  
 
As the example of Afghanistan shows attempts to install a rigid power structure of a 
nation-state is futile unless its programme is able to provide the nodes it addresses 
with the goods and services they require. Because violence is such a corrosive 
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dynamic, non-hierarchical and adaptive networks are much more resilient to the 
disintegrative effects it can have. Especially when human beings are faced with 
existential threats the role of belonging, community, narrative and identity is 
becoming increasingly important.  
 
Afghanistan's social networks are often remote from each other - only a small number 
of relatively weak links many of the individuals that live in isolated and closely knit 
communities, and many do not have access to modern Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT). Many Afghan's adhere to an national identity and 
consider themselves to be 'Afghans' (B. R. Rubin, 2013), yet the nation-state with its 
authorities and policies does only play a minor role at best. This is even the case when 
parts or an entire social group migrates, including a relocation into the urban centres 
(Berg Harpviken, 2009).  
 
Social networks tend to be relatively small and are based on a highly codified and 
structured narrative. In contrast to societies such as the Lebanese following the 
Second World War the survival of an individual depended almost exclusively on the 
social network. Conflicts that emerge outside this structure are often dealt with 
violently not because of the severity of the issue at hand, but because of the absence 
of a shared identity that could provide for behaviour geared towards addressing the 
conflict in a cooperative and consolidative way. Additionally is violence and the 
threat of violence a welcome tool for both community leaders to try and cement their 
position within the network, and for those who are able to link different networks to 
provide income. These two different kinds of nodes are, as shown in the example of 
Lebanon, hostile against any kind attempts to moderate since they perceive this as a 
threat. 
 
For example when, as part of a multilateral peacebuilding and development efforts 
and international actors builds a primary school the majority of the population will 
welcome this. At the same time certain actors and groups may perceive this to be a 
threat to their position; for example the local Madrassa will fear that another school 
will limit their influence and position. The network of individuals that associate 
themselves with the Madrassa will try and destroy the newly build school and hinder 
its functioning, not because they are against education, the foreign actor or the 
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possible economic gain of the construction work, but because they feel threated in 
their position and identity.  
 
Additionally, and further complicating the field of peacebuilding is that violence and 
destruction may even be of benefit for a community: since the attention of outside 
actors, for example NGOs, reconstruction and poverty relief, tend to focus on the 
most deprived and volatile areas. Finally a weak and ineffective state is often 
beneficial to organised crime. Weak police authority, corruption often being attractive 
or even necessary to low salaried officials, and low-wage workers provide resources 
for criminal activity. In these cases violence is used to protect business interests to 
threats from the outside - for example as part of peacebuilding measures - and the 
inside - for example forced labour.  
 
Violence is a form of communication with both integrative and disintegrative 
functions. When integrative then the shared experience of violence creates meaning 
and a shared narrative that is the basis of human behaviour. Because violence is so 
central to life it retains much of its power even if it is abstracted or used in 
cyberspace. This does not mean that people who watch the videos of fighting of the 
Syrian Civil War will automatically take up arms, but an individual that lacks identity 
and narrative will be easily identify him or herself with one of the factions. In other 
words for a young Briton online videos of violence that are presented together with a 
simple to understand identity and narrative are already enough to join a militia in 
Syria or Iraq to become quickly willing to kill and die, often inexplicable to those 
who do not share this narrative.  
 
Lebanon shows that a focus on the causes that are presented to explain a war is futile. 
Violence requires a reason and narrative to explain and justify it, but almost anything 
can be interpreted as cause, depending only on the position of the observer. The 
hostility that Sherif (1956) found to emerge between groups is similar to what 
Kalyvas (Kalyvas, 2006) sees in civil wars; the need for identity and narrative 
increases in situations of stress, and since violence is an important provider of identity 
the supposed cause to justify violence becomes secondary.  
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With a growing awareness of the non-linearity, complexity and inability to predict the 
course of events comes the realisation that hierarchic and rigid structures are unable to 
address the challenges that emerge. Unpredictable and seemingly random events do 
trigger an equally unpredictable cascade of other events (Taleb, 2007). Non-
hierarchic, fluid and adaptive organisations are much faster and more efficient to 
minimise the harmful effects of these events on those affected (Homer- Dixon, 2006). 
Just like an individual soldier can make the difference between winning and losing an 
entire war (Schmidtchen, 2006), and a single node can cause disproportional damage 
to a peace process (E. Newman & Richmond, 2006a) so is it a single individual node 
that shifts from violent to non-violent forms of communication.  
 
The lack of success in peacebuilding operations should not be understood as a signal 
that these endeavours should not be undertaken. Moral considerations alone make this 
position difficult to maintain. Instead of hierarchical strategies and deeper 
coordination between actors approaches should focus on re-programming social 
networks of those most affected by violence. 'Peace' can be defined with the 
possibility of nodes to have multiple identities that co-exist. The process of 
reprogramming a network and to alter how identities are being made is slow, uneven 
and yet constant. After being founded by Charles de Gaulle in 1940 it took the Free 
French Army three years to unify, and even longer before this network was no longer 
primarily occupied to deal with international conflicts, despite the existence of a 
shared and highly dangerous enemy. Ultimately they were successful not only in 
defeating the enemy and ending the war, but also in providing France with an identity 
in which the now abstract violence of the Second World War has become part of the 
French identity. 
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